





Van den Stock, J.B.
Publication date:
2010
Link to publication in Tilburg University Research Portal
Citation for published version (APA):
Van den Stock, J. B. (2010). Bodies and background: Contextual influences on perception of emotional body
language. [s.n.].
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
            • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
            • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
            • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.







Bodies and background:  










Proefschrift ter verkrijging van de graad van doctor aan de Universiteit van Tilburg, op gezag 
van de rector magnificus, prof. Philip Eijlander, in het openbaar te verdedigen ten overstaan 
van een door het college voor promoties aangewezen commissie in de aula van de Universiteit 
op vrijdag 4 juni 2010 om 10:15 uur door Van den Stock Jan geboren op 25 februari 1978 te 
Aalst (België). 
  
Stock_PROEF (all).ps Front - 1     T1 -    Black CyanMagenta Yellow
2 
 
Promotor: professor doctor Beatrice de Gelder
Stock_PROEF (all).ps Back - 1     T1 -    Black CyanMagenta Yellow
Contents 
Introduction........................................................................................................................................7 
References .................................................................................................................................... 14 
Chapter 1: Real faces, real emotions: perceiving facial expressions in naturalistic contexts of voices, 
bodies and scenes ............................................................................................................................. 17 
Introduction .................................................................................................................................. 17 
Making space for context effects in models of face perception ....................................................... 18 
Face perception and categorization ........................................................................................... 19 
Similarities between facial expressions and other affective signals in perceptual and 
neurofunctional processes ........................................................................................................ 19 
From a face module to a face processing network ..................................................................... 20 
Face processing includes subcortical and cortical areas ............................................................. 22 
Body context effects on facial expressions..................................................................................... 23 
Perception of facial expression is influenced by the bodily expressions ..................................... 23 
Possible mechanisms underlying body context effect ................................................................ 25 
Facial and bodily expressions in the context of scenes ................................................................... 29 
Facial expressions in the context of the affective prosody of voices ............................................... 32 
Summary and conclusions ............................................................................................................. 34 
References .................................................................................................................................... 36 
Chapter 2: Standing up for the body. Recent progress in uncovering the networks involved in 
processing bodies and bodily expressions ......................................................................................... 43 
Introduction .................................................................................................................................. 43 
Similarities in perceptual routines: configuration and feature based perception of faces, bodies and 
other visual objects ....................................................................................................................... 44 
The neurophysiology of body perception. Implications for neural representation and time course of 
processing ..................................................................................................................................... 45 
Similarities and differences in neurofunctional basis of faces and bodies ....................................... 52 
Emotional modulation of body selective processing....................................................................... 70 
Static vs. Dynamic body perception............................................................................................... 71 
Bodies may be processed without attention and visual awareness .................................................. 73 
Learning from lesions ................................................................................................................... 75 
Models of body perception ............................................................................................................ 77 
Conclusion .................................................................................................................................... 79 
References .................................................................................................................................... 80 
Chapter 3: Seeing bodily expressions in context: contagion between bodily expression and scene .... 89 




Introduction .................................................................................................................................. 89 
Method ......................................................................................................................................... 89 
Results and Discussion .................................................................................................................. 93 
References .................................................................................................................................. 101 
Chapter 4: Body expressions influence recognition of facial expressions and emotional prosody .... 103 
Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 103 
Experiment 1: recognition of bodily expressions ......................................................................... 105 
Method ................................................................................................................................... 105 
Results .................................................................................................................................... 106 
Discussion ............................................................................................................................... 107 
Experiment 2: the influence of body expressions on recognition of facial expressions .................. 108 
Method ................................................................................................................................... 109 
Results .................................................................................................................................... 109 
Discussion ............................................................................................................................... 110 
Experiment 3: The influence of body language on recognition of voice prosody .......................... 111 
Method ................................................................................................................................... 112 
Results .................................................................................................................................... 113 
Discussion ............................................................................................................................... 114 
General discussion ...................................................................................................................... 115 
References .................................................................................................................................. 117 
Chapter 5: Human and animal sounds influence recognition of body language ............................... 121 
Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 121 
Method ....................................................................................................................................... 123 
Results ........................................................................................................................................ 126 
Discussion .................................................................................................................................. 129 
References .................................................................................................................................. 132 
Chapter 6: Instrumental music influences recognition of emotional body language ........................ 135 
Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 135 
Method ....................................................................................................................................... 136 
Results ........................................................................................................................................ 138 
Discussion .................................................................................................................................. 140 
References .................................................................................................................................. 144 
Chapter 7: Moving and being moved. The relative importance of dynamical information for residual 
face processing in clinical populations and brain damaged patients ................................................ 147 




Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 147 
Face perception: some antecedents .............................................................................................. 148 
The brain basis of face perception in neurologically intact individuals: Perceiving movement...... 149 
Neurophysiological studies in monkeys ................................................................................... 154 
Visual object agnosia and face agnosia or prosopagnosia ........................................................ 154 
The neural correlates of face deficits ....................................................................................... 155 
Still vs. dynamic face images in patient studies ........................................................................ 156 
Conclusion .................................................................................................................................. 158 
References .................................................................................................................................. 159 
Chapter 8: Prosopagnosia ............................................................................................................... 167 
Definitions and concepts ............................................................................................................. 167 
Inability to process the face as a whole ........................................................................................ 169 
Acquired and developmental prosopagnosia ................................................................................ 169 
Face-specificity of prosopagnosia ................................................................................................ 170 
Behavioural and neural correlates of prosopagnosia..................................................................... 172 
References .................................................................................................................................. 173 
Chapter 9: Neural correlates of perceiving emotional faces and bodies in developmental 
prosopagnosia: an event-related fMRI-study................................................................................... 177 
Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 177 
Methods ...................................................................................................................................... 182 
Results ........................................................................................................................................ 187 
Discussion .................................................................................................................................. 197 
References .................................................................................................................................. 202 
Chapter 10: Huntington’s disease impairs recognition of angry and instrumental body language .... 209 
Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 209 
Method ....................................................................................................................................... 210 
Results ........................................................................................................................................ 213 
Discussion .................................................................................................................................. 215 
References .................................................................................................................................. 218 
Chapter 11: Perceiving emotions from bodily expressions and multisensory integration of emotion 
cues in schizophrenia ...................................................................................................................... 221 
Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 221 
Experiment 1: Recognition of static body language ..................................................................... 222 
Methods ................................................................................................................................. 222 
Results .................................................................................................................................... 224 




Discussion ............................................................................................................................... 225 
Experiment 2: Multisensory integration of dynamic body language and vocalizations .................. 226 
Methods ................................................................................................................................. 227 
Results .................................................................................................................................... 227 
Discussion ............................................................................................................................... 229 
General discussion ...................................................................................................................... 230 
References .................................................................................................................................. 233 
Discussion ....................................................................................................................................... 237 
The social brain hypothesis ......................................................................................................... 237 
Emotions are expressed in the whole body .................................................................................. 238 
faces convey information about identity ................................................................................. 238 
bodies convey information about actions ................................................................................ 239 
Emotional expressions are prone to contextual influences ............................................................ 240 
time course of crosscategorical affective influence .................................................................. 241 
neuro-anatomy of crosscategorical influences ......................................................................... 242 
References .................................................................................................................................. 246 










Humans are considered to be among the most social organisms on the planet. Indeed, the days 
we do not come in contact with conspecifics are exceptional. Humans normally take part in a 
wide range of heterogeneous social interactions on a daily basis. Therefore, the adaptive value 
of interpreting the intentions and emotions of others is considered to be significant.  
 
Although the importance of social functioning and perception of the affective states of others 
is now generally acknowledged, research on emotion perception has only taken off in the last 
decades. The focus of emotion perception research has been primarily on how we perceive, 
process and recognize facial expressions. The findings so far have led to formulation of 
theories and models that do or do not capitalize on a ‘special’ status for faces in the perceptual 
system (Bruce & Young, 1986; de Gelder, Frissen, Barton, & Hadjikhani, 2003; Haxby, 
Hoffman, & Gobbini, 2000; Kanwisher, McDermott, & Chun, 1997).  
 
In our natural environment however, faces are not perceived in isolation and usually co-occur 
with a wide variety of visual, auditory, olfactory, somatosensory and gustatory stimuli. The 
main stimulus categories that are naturally associated with faces include whole bodies, voices 
and background scenes. This thesis moves beyond facial expression perception and focuses on 
how perception of emotional body language is shaped partially by contextual stimuli like 
natural scenes and vocal expressions. The content of this thesis can be divided into two 
sections: section one (chapters one to six) describes findings from research on normal subjects 
and section two (chapters seven to eleven) focuses on investigations in clinical populations. 
 
Respecting the scientific chronology and the importance of facial expression research issues 
for the research agenda on bodily expressions, chapter one provides a review of studies 
addressing contextual influences on the perception of facial expressions. The emphasis of this 
review lies on how bodies, scenes and voices influence our perception of faces and facial 
expressions, both at the behavioral and the neural level. Chapter two also provides a review, 
but shifts the focus from contextual influences on face perception to neural correlates of 




perceiving bodies and bodily expressions. These two review chapters provide an illustrative 
‘contextual background’ and introduction to the following chapters that report empirical 
studies investigating diverse contextual influences on body perception. 
 
The empirical chapters report studies using different methods to investigate the respective 
hypotheses. In the behavioral experiments, we focused on psychophysics and cognitive 
aspects of emotion processing. We have aimed to use paradigms that are most optimal in the 
operationalisation of the research question. In all psychophysical behavioral tasks, we aimed 
to keep response alternatives to a minimum in order to minimize the cognitive load of the 
task. Furthermore, verbal labeling was avoided when possible in order to tap primarily into 
the target processes of emotion perception and to minimize language effects. Our 
investigations of multisensory integration were based on experimental conflict situations and 
the crossmodal bias paradigm (de Gelder & Bertelson, 2003). In this paradigm, auditory 
emotional expressions are simultaneously presented with visual stimuli that display an 
emotional expression that is either congruent or incongruent with the auditory stimulus. 
Participants are instructed to categorize the emotion expressed by one of both modalities and 
to ignore the other modality. For example, fearful and happy vocal expressions are 
simultaneously presented with fearful or happy body language, while the task instruction 
states to categorize the emotion expressed by the body expression and to ignore the 
information provided by the voice. The difference between the congruent and incongruent 
conditions gives an indication of multisensory integration processes.  
Data from behavioral psychophysical experiments reveal information about behavioral 
processes but are less suitable to investigate the time course or stage in the perceptual process 
where the observed effects occur, for example whether the nature of observed effects is early 
perceptual rather than late more cognitive. Carefully designed behavioral experiments allow 
inferences about the nature of perceptual effects (for example making use of recalibration or 
adaption paradigm), but the optimal methodology to investigate timing issues requires the use 
of techniques with a high temporal resolution, like event related potentials (ERP) or magneto-
encephalogram (MEG). These techniques allow recording of electrical signals produced by 
the brain in the order of milliseconds. ERP data have low spatial resolution on the other hand 
and are therefore limited regarding information about the brain regions involved in emotional 
processes.  




To investigate the functional neuro-anatomy of emotion processes, we made use of functional 
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). This technique requires that subjects perform a task 
while the magnetic characteristics of regional blood flow in the brain (the so-called blood 
oxygenation level dependent (BOLD) signal) are being recorded by an MRI-scanner. fMRI 
measurements reveal information about the amount of oxygenated and de-oxygenated blood 
levels throughout the brain during different experimental conditions. Using the subtraction 
method, this technique enables to make inferences about which brain areas require more or 
less oxygenated blood supply during one experimental condition, compared to another. fMRI 
thus provides a useful method to investigate neural networks involved in perception and 
cognition.  
The fMRI data reported in chapter three focuses on brain regions involved in perception of 
bodily expressions embedded in neutral or threatening scenes in normal subjects. This 
provides information about brain areas that process both bodies and scenes. However, data 
from normal subjects is limited concerning which brain regions are either necessary or 
sufficient in performing the experimental task. This can be investigated with experiments that 
include patients with brain damage. Patient data are reported in chapters nine (prosopagnosia), 
ten (Huntington’s disease) and eleven (schizophrenia). In these studies, we aimed to 
establishe single dissociations, meaning that a patient population (associated with a 
characteristic brain abnormality) is impaired at performing task X, but not task Y. This is for 
example the case in chapter ten: patients with Huntington’s disease are significantly worse 
than normal control subjects in recognizing angry and instrumental whole body expressions, 
whereas there is no significant difference between both groups for fearful and sad body 
expressions. This indicates that successful recognition of angry and instrumental body 
expressions is more dependent on the affected brain regions in patients with Huntington’s 
disease (primarily caudate nucleus and putamen) than perceiving fearful and sad bodies. 
Ideally, patient studies aim to report double dissociations. This implies that patients with 
lesions in brain area X are able to perform task A, but impaired at performing task B, whereas 
patients with lesions in brain area Y are able to perform task B, but impaired at task A. This 
would demonstrate that brain region Y is critical for performing task A and brain region X is 
necessary for performing task B. 
 




Combining imaging techniques and patient research allows investigation of more subtle 
research questions, for example what brain areas are recruited to perform a task when brain 
regions on which successful task performance relies are damaged (Vandenbulcke, Peeters, 
Van Hecke, & Vandenberghe, 2005). 
 
The following provides an overview of chapters three to eleven, including the empirical goals 
and predictions where applicable. 
 
Chapter three describes the study investigating the neural correlates of perceiving whole body 
expressions embedded in emotionally congruent or incongruent scenes. The idea for 
performing this study was built on recent findings of contextual influences of emotional 
scenes on facial expression processing, revealed by behavioral and ERP data (Righart & de 
Gelder, 2006, 2008a, 2008b). Combining these findings with models of body perception (de 
Gelder, 2006) and scene perception (Bar, 2004) led to the formulation of the research question 
and experimental setup making use of the experimental conflict situation in order to 
investigate how the brain integrates and processes emotional information from different 
sources, in this case bodies and scenes. One of the aims of this study was to explore the brain 
regions that are sensitive to (in)congruence between body expressions and scenes.  Our 
predictions included activation of regions involved in emotion perception like the amygdala 
and regions involved in conflict processing like the anterior cingulate gyrus. However, the 
results showed that the integration of both stimulus categories mainly takes place in the 
known scene perception and body perception areas, namely the extrastriate body area 
(Downing, Jiang, Shuman, & Kanwisher, 2001), the parahippocampal place area (Epstein & 
Kanwisher, 1998) and the retrosplenial complex (Bar & Aminoff, 2003). The only brain area 
that was specifically sensitive to body x scene interaction corresponded to the lateral occipital 
complex (Malach et al., 1995). The latter finding is also reported by a recent study also using 
bodies embedded in scenes (Peelen, Fei-Fei, & Kastner, 2009).  
 
Chapter four reports three experiments on how we recognize whole body expressions and the 
influence of body expressions on the perception of facial expressions (cfr supra) and vocal 
expressions. This study was set up in order to explore behavioral similarities between face and 
body perception. Previous studies have shown that fearful faces are the most difficult to 




recognize (Ekman, 1976) and we hypothesized that this would also be the case for bodily 
expressions. In the first experiment participants performed a body expression matching task 
and we predicted lower accuracies and higher reaction times for fearful expressions compared 
to the other expressions. The results indicate good recognition of all emotions, with fear 
indeed being the hardest to recognize. In the second experiment, categorizations of the 
expression in the face of a face-body compound stimulus were strongly influenced by the 
bodily expression, compatible with a previous study using a similar paradigm but different 
emotions (Meeren, van Heijnsbergen, & de Gelder, 2005). Moreover, we observed that the 
influence of the body on the facial expression was a function of the ambiguity of the facial 
expression. In the third experiment, we focused on crossmodal effects using the experimental 
conflict situation. This experiment was carried out to investigate whether the previously 
reported influence of facial expressions on the recognition of voice prosody (de Gelder & 
Vroomen, 2000) extends to bodily expressions. We hypothesized an influence of the emotion 
conveyed by the task irrelevant bodily expression on the recognition of the emotional tone of 
voice. The findings indeed show a bias in the recognition of voice prosody towards the 
emotion expressed by the body expression. The results described in chapter four illustrate the 
importance of emotional whole body expressions in communication either when viewed on 
their own or, as is often the case in realistic circumstances, in combination with facial 
expressions and emotional voices. 
 
Building on the results of experiment 3 in chapter four, we designed two audiovisual 
experiments described in chapters five and six. The experimental setup was similar to that of 
experiment 3 in chapter four, but now the task was reversed and focused on the visual 
modality. Subjects were instructed to categorize the emotion expressed by the body 
expression and to ignore the auditory information. We constructed dynamic face-blurred 
bodily expressions displaying a person engaged in an everyday action (grasping a glass) in a 
realistic situation (a living room). These visual stimuli were combined with human and animal 
vocalizations (chapter five) and instrumental music (chapter six). The main goal of these 
experiments was to investigate whether affective crossmodal bias effects also apply for 
audiovisual stimuli of which both modalities are unmistakably produced by a different source. 
Our prediction were that a crossmodal bias effect would also obtain for these stimulus 
combinations and this was confirmed by the data as the results indicated that recognition of 




body language is biased towards the emotion expressed by the simultaneously presented 
auditory information, whether it consists of human or of animal sounds or instrumental music. 
 
Chapter seven is the first chapter of the clinical section. Chapter seven provides a review of 
perception of dynamic facial expressions in clinical populations. It forms a bridge to the 
remaining chapters that focus on whole body perception in clinical populations. In chapter 
eight we review and discus the notion of prosopagnosia, a peculiar symptom that relates to 
face recognition deficits. This as a prelude to chapter nine that describes how we used event-
related fMRI to investigate how neutral and emotional facial and bodily expressions are 
processed in the brain of patients suffering from prosopagnosia. This experiment was set-up 
in the rationale that investigation of face perception deficits in prosopagnosia requires the use 
of a refined control stimulus category. Since on the one hand faces contain information of 
many dimensions (for example identity, emotion, gender, age...) and on the other hand our 
perceptual system has been bombarded with faces from birth, very few stimulus categories are 
suitable the serve as face-control. The stimulus category that is probably the most comparable 
to faces on a wide range of attributes as well as on the perceptual expertise dimension is 
bodies. Therefore bodies seem to be the preferable control category. The second consideration 
in setting up this study was the fact that there was up to that moment no available data on the 
neural correlates of facial expression perception in developmental prosopagnosics (subjects 
with prosopagnosia but without neurological antecedents). Our predictions were based on a 
study with acquired prosopagnosia (prosopagnosia following brain damage) that showed how 
emotional faces activated brain regions associated with emotion perception, while areas 
involved in face perception were damaged (de Gelder et al., 2003). The results were 
surprisingly in accordance with the notion of dissociable processing systems of facial emotion 
and facial identity: we observed normal activation for emotional faces and reduced activation 
for neutral faces. This finding was later replicated by a different research group (Peelen, 
Lucas, Mayer, & Vuilleumier, 2009). The second main finding of this study was that, 
compared to control subjects, faces trigger more activation in body areas and bodies trigger 
more activation in face areas in developmental prosopagnosics. 
In chapter ten, we describe our research into the perception of whole body expressions in 
patients with Huntington’s disease. Patients with HD exhibit motor impairments as well as 
cognitive and emotional deficits. The reason to investigate body language recognition in HD 




was twofold. First, the growing body of evidence linking motor production and motor 
perception, as illustrated by research on mirror neurons (Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004) brings 
forth the hypothesis of a link between motor production (impairment) and emotional motor 
perception (impairment). Second, the alleged importance of subcortical structures in 
emotional processes (de Gelder, 2006; Panksepp, 1998) consequently leads to the logical 
consideration that damage to subcortical structures disrupts emotion perception. Previously, 
impairments in the ability to recognize emotional stimuli have mostly been investigated by 
using facial expressions and emotional voices. Chapter ten reports how we tested recognition 
of emotional body language (instrumental, angry, fearful and sad) in a group of HD patients 
and their matched controls. The results indicate that HD patients are impaired in recognizing 
both instrumental and angry whole body postures. Furthermore, the body language perception 
deficits are correlated with measures of motor deficit. The results therefore suggest a close 
relationship between emotion recognition (specifically anger) and motor abilities. 
 
The rationale behind the experiments reported in chapter eleven join with that of chapter four. 
The aim of the study in chapter eleven was to extend findings from facial expression research 
in schizophrenia to whole body expressions. The chapter reports how these patients perceive 
static whole body expressions but also if crossmodal bias effects previously reported for faces 
(de Jong, Hodiamont, Van den Stock, & de Gelder, 2009) are replicable with bodies (cfr 
chapter five). As in previous chapters and based on the many similarities between faces and 
bodies, the predictions were in parallel with what is known from face research in 
schizophrenia. The results of Experiment 1 show emotion recognition impairment in the 
schizophrenic group and the findings of Experiment 2 show that schizophrenics are more 
influenced by the auditory information than controls, but only when the auditory information 
consists of human vocalizations. These findings indicate that emotion recognition difficulties 
in schizophrenia extend to whole body expressions and multisensory integration, particularly 
in naturalistic audiovisual combinations. 
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Chapter 1: Real faces, real emotions: perceiving facial expressions in naturalistic 






For a while ‘’Headless Body in Topless Bar” counted as one of the funniest lines to have 
appeared in US newspapers. But headless bodies and bodiless heads figure only in crime 
catalogues and police reports and are not part of our daily experience, at the very least not part 
of the daily experience that constitutes the normal learning environment in which we acquire 
our face and body perception expertise. Yet, except for a few isolated studies, the literature on 
face recognition has not yet addressed the issue of context effects in face perception. By 
‘context’ we mean here the whole naturalistic environment that is almost always present when 
we encounter a face.    
 
Why has context received so little attention and what, if any, changes would we need to make 
to mainstream models of face and facial expression processing if indeed different kinds of 
context have an impact on how the brain deals with faces and facial expressions? Discussions 
on context influences and their consequences for how we read and react to an emotion from 
the face have a long history (Fernberger, 1928). But the kind of context effects that were 
investigated in the early days would nowadays qualify as so called late effects or post-
perceptual effects, related as they are to the overall (verbal) appraisal of a stimulus rather that 
to its online processing. In contrast, the context effects we have specifically targeted in recent 
studies are those that are to be found at the perceptual stage of face processing.  
 
In this chapter we review recent investigations of three familiar naturalistic contexts in which 
facial expressions are frequently encountered: whole bodies, natural scenes and emotional 
voices (See also Ambady and Weisbuch, this volume) . In the first section we briefly review 
recent evidence that shifts the emphasis from a categorical model of face processing, based on 
the assumption that faces are processed as a distinct object category with their dedicated 
perceptual and neurofunctional basis, towards more distributed models where different 
                                                        
1
 This chapter is based on de Gelder, B., & Van den Stock, J. (in press). Real faces, real emotions: 
perceiving facial expressions in naturalistic contexts of voices, bodies and scenes. In Calder A., 
Haxby, J., Johnson, M., & Rhodes, G. (Eds.) The Handbook of Face Perception . Oxford University 
Press. 




aspects of faces (like direction of gaze and emotional expression) are processed by different 
brain areas and different perceptual routines and show how these models are better suited to 
represent face perception and face-context effects. In the second section we look in detail at 
one kind of context effect, as found in investigations of interactions between facial and bodily 
expressions. We sketch a perspective in which context plays a crucial role, even for highly 
automated processes like the ones underlying recognition of facial expressions. Some recent 





Making space for context effects in models of face perception 
 
Older theories on face perception have tended to restrict scientific investigations of face 
perception to issues of face vs. object categorization. The major sources of evidence for 
category specificity of face perception are findings about its temporal processing windows 
and neurofunctional basis. But this debate is not settled and recent evidence now indicates that 
the temporal and spatial neural markers of face categorization are also sensitive to some other 
non-face stimuli (for a review of such overlap between spatial and temporal markers of face 
and body specificity, see B. de Gelder et al., 2009). Furthermore, it is becoming increasingly 
clear that the presence of an emotional expression influences even those relatively early and 
relatively specific neural markers of category specificity like the N170 and the face area in 
fusiform gyrus. Finally, distributed models as opposed to categorical models of face 
processing seem more appropriate to represent the relation between face perception, facial 
expression perception and perceptual context effects as they represent the various functional 
aspects of facial information and allow for multiple entry points of context into ongoing face 
processing. Finally, models must also include the role of subcortical structures shown to be 
important components of face and facial expression processes.  
 




Face perception and categorization 
Much of the face recognition literature has been dominated by the view that face processing 
proceeds at its own pace, immune to the surrounding context in which the face is encountered. 
In line with this, one of the major questions in the field continues to be that of the perceptual 
and neurofunctional bases of faces. An important assumption has been and continues to be 
that faces occupy a neurofunctional niche on their own, such that face representations co-
exists with but does not overlap with object representations, a view that in one sense or 
another is linked to the notion of modularity. Typical characteristics of modular processing as 
viewed in the eighties and brought to a broad audience by Fodor (1983) are mainly that 
processing is mandatory, automatic and insulated from context effects. What was originally a 
theoretical argument purporting to separate syntactic from the more intractable semantic 
aspects of mental processes became for a while the focus of studies using brain imaging 
(Kanwisher, McDermott, & Chun, 1997). A research program fully focused on category 
specificity is unlikely to pay attention to perceptual context effects on face processing.  In 
contrast, more recent distributed models of face processing appear more suited to 
accommodate the novel context findings (B. de Gelder, Frissen, Barton, & Hadjikhani, 2003; 
Haxby, Hoffman, & Gobbini, 2000). 
 
Similarities between facial expressions and other affective signals in perceptual and 
neurofunctional processes  
Seeing bodily expressions is an important part of everyday perception and scientific study of 
how we perceive whole body expressions has taken off in the last decade. Issues and 
questions that have been addressed in face research are also on the foreground in research on 
whole body expressions (see B. de Gelder et al., 2009 for a review). This is not surprising, 
considering the fact that faces and bodies appear together in daily experience. It may be not so 
surprising that perception of faces and bodies show several similarities at the behavioural and 
neuro-functional level. For example, both faces and bodies are processed configurally, 
meaning as a single perceptual entity, rather than as an assemblage of features. This is 
reflected in the perceptual processes triggered when face and body stimuli are presented 
upside-down (the inversion effect): recognition of faces and bodies presented upside-down is 
relatively more impaired than recognition of inverted objects, like houses (Reed, Stone, 
Bozova, & Tanaka, 2003). Also, a comparison of perception of upright and inverted faces 
reveals that the time course of the underlying brain mechanisms is similar  for upright and 




inverted bodies (Stekelenburg & de Gelder, 2004). The presence of a bodily expression of 
fear in the neglected field also significantly reduces  attention deficits in neurological 
populations (Tamietto, Geminiani, Genero, & de Gelder, 2007), just as has been reported for 
faces (Vuilleumier & Schwartz, 2001). As will be shown in detail in the later sections, 
perception of bodily expressions activates some brain areas that are associated with the 
perception of faces (for reviews, see B. de Gelder, 2006; Peelen & Downing, 2007. See also 
section II). 
  
From a face module to a face processing network 
Categorical models of face processing (e.g. Kanwisher et al., 1997) tend to assume that the 
core of face processing consists of a dedicated brain area or module  that is functionally 
identified by contrasting faces with a small number of other object categories mostly by using 
passive viewing conditions. All other dimensions of face processing corresponding to other 
dimensions of face information (emotion, age, attractiveness, gender…) are viewed as 
subsequent modulations of the basic face processing ability implemented in the brain’s face 
area(s). In contrast, distributed models for face perception also consider other aspects of faces 
besides person identity (Adolphs, 2002; Adolphs, Damasio, Tranel, Cooper, & Damasio, 
2000; B. de Gelder et al., 2003; B. de Gelder & Rouw, 2000; Haxby et al., 2000; Haxby et al., 
1994; Haxby et al., 1996; Hoffman & Haxby, 2000; Puce, Allison, Asgari, Gore, & 
McCarthy, 1996). In distributed models, different areas of the brain process different 
attributes of the face, such as identity (FFA and the occipital face area (OFA), gaze direction 
(superior temporal sulcus (STS) and expression and/or emotion analysis (OFC, amygdala, 
anterior cingulate cortex, premotor cortex, somatosensory cortex).  
 
Clinical cases constitute critical tests for theoretical models, and patients suffering from a 
deficit in face recognition or prosopagnosia (Bodamer, 1947) have long served as touchstone 
for models of face processing (see also chapters by Young, Calder, and Kanwisher and 
Barton). Available fMRI studies targeting face perception in prosopagnosics so far show 
inconsistent results (see Van den Stock, van de Riet, Righart, & de Gelder, 2008 for an 
overview), but very few of those studies included facial expressions or compared emotional 
with neutral faces (see Calder, this volume). Configural processing as measured by the 
inversion effect is a hallmark of intact face processing skills and a few studies have reported 
that the normal pattern of the inversion effect does not obtain when a face perception disorder 




is present whether of acquired or of developmental origin (B. de Gelder & Rouw, 2000; but 
see McKone & Yovel, 2009).  We investigated whether adding an emotional expression 
would normalize their face processing style with respect to the inversion effect. We presented 
neutral and emotional faces to patients with acquired prosopagnosia (face recognition deficits 
following brain damage) with lesions in FFA, inferior occipital gyrus (IOG) or both. Our 
study showed that emotional but not neutral faces elicited activity in other face related brain 
areas like STS and amygdala and, most importantly, that most of these patients showed a 
normal  inversion effect for emotional faces as well as normal configural processing as 
measured by in a part-to-whole face identity matching task when the faces were not neutral 
but expressed an emotion (B. de Gelder et al., 2003). In a follow up fMRI study with patients 
suffering from developmental prosopagnosia (prosopagnosia without neurological history), 
we presented neutral and emotional (fearful and happy) faces and bodies and the results 
showed normal activation in FFA for emotional faces (fearful and happy) but lower activation 




Figure 1. Face-specific BOLD-activation in right fusiform face area (FFA) when comparing 
faces (fearful/happy/neutral) with houses. Left: Areas are shown on an inflated right 
hemisphere. Activation maps of the control subjects are collapsed and displayed by the black 
contours. Activation of the individual developmental prosopagnosics (DPs) is plotted in color. 
Right: beta-values in the plotted areas. Conditions represent from left to right: fearful faces, 
happy faces, neutral faces, fearful bodies, happy bodies, neutral bodies and houses. White 
columns display the average value of three prosopagnosics, black columns show the average 
value of the controls. Triangles represent the individual values of the DPs. Error bars 
represent one standard error of the mean (SEM). (Van den Stock et al., 2008b) 
 




Increased activation for emotional faces compared to neutral faces in FFA has since been 
reported in an acquired prosopagnosia case by others also (Peelen, Lucas, Mayer, & 
Vuilleumier, 2009). 
 
Electrophysiological studies are crucial for investigating distributed face models because the 
limited time resolution of fMRI does not allow one to conclude that all dimensions of facial 
information indeed necessarily depend on activity in the fusiform face area. Studies using 
electroencephalogram (EEG) or magnetoencephalogram (MEG) data initially provided 
support for face modularity, in the sense that there appeared to be a unique time window for a 
stimulus to enter the face processing system. EEG and MEG investigations into face 
perception have characterised two early markers in the temporal dynamics of face perception: 
a positive waveform around 100ms (P1) and a negative waveform around 170ms (N170) after 
stimulus onset indicating the time course of dedicated brain mechanisms sensitive to face 
perception. It is a matter of debate where in the brain these waveforms originate, whether in 
early extrastriate areas, STS or fusiform gyrus (FG) and what type of processing mechanism 
these waveforms reflect, whether global encoding, object categorization or configural 
processing (see B. de Gelder et al., 2006 for a review).  
  
Face processing includes subcortical and cortical areas 
Finally, we have shown, as have other groups, that patients with striate cortex damage can 
process and recognize faces presented in their blind visual field (Andino, Menendez, Khateb, 
Landis, & Pegna, 2009; B de Gelder & Tamietto, 2007; B. de Gelder, Vroomen, Pourtois, & 
Weiskrantz, 1999; Morris, de Gelder, Weiskrantz, & Dolan, 2001; Pegna, Khateb, Lazeyras, 
& Seghier, 2005) and for which they have no conscious perception. For this and other reasons 
not relevant here, the involvement of subcortical structures in face perception also needs to be 
represented in a distributed model of face processing as we sketched in de Gelder et al (2003) 
. Masking studies performed with neurologically intact observers, on residual visual abilities 
for faces and facial expressions in cortically blind patients and on face processing skills of 
infants with immature visual cortex converge to provide tentative evidence for the importance 
of subcortical structures. Research indicates that the distributed brain network for face 
perception encompasses two main processing streams: a subcortical pathway from superior 
colliculus and pulvinar to the amygdala that is involved in rudimentary and mostly 
nonconscious processing of salient stimuli like facial expressions (B. de Gelder, Pourtois, van 




Raamsdonk, Vroomen, & Weiskrantz, 2001; B. de Gelder et al., 2008; B. de Gelder, Vroomen 
et al., 1999; Morris et al., 2001; Morris, Ohman, & Dolan, 1998; Pegna et al., 2005) and a 
more familiar cortical route from the lateral geniculate nucleus (LGN) via primary visual 
cortex to OFA, FFA and STS, sub serving fine grained analysis of conscious perception. Feed 
forward and feedback loops, especially between amygdala and striate cortex, OFA, FFA and 
STS (Amaral & Price, 1984; Carmichael & Price, 1995; Catani, Jones, Donato, & Ffytche, 
2003; Iidaka et al., 2001; Morris, Friston et al., 1998; Vuilleumier, Richardson, Armony, 
Driver, & Dolan, 2004) support the interaction between these routes to contribute ultimately 
to a unified and conscious percept (but see Cowey, 2004; Pessoa, McKenna, Gutierrez, & 
Ungerleider, 2002). 
     
In summary, clinical phenomena like prosopagnosia and affective blindsight form an 
important contribution to the current understanding of face perception.  Distributed face 
processing models that neuro-anatomically include subcortical structures and incorporate the 
many dimensions of faces like emotional expression appear to resonate best with the 
empirical data. 
 
Body context effects on facial expressions 
 
Of all the concurrent sources of affective signals that routinely accompany our sight of a 
facial expression, the body is by far the most obvious and immediate one. We review recent 
evidence for this perceptual effect and follow with a discussion of possible mechanisms 
underlying body context effects.   
 
Perception of facial expression is influenced by the bodily expressions 
Research on the simultaneous perception of faces and bodies is still sparse. Two behavioural 
studies directly investigated how our recognition of facial expressions is influenced by 
accompanying whole body expressions (Meeren, van Heijnsbergen, & de Gelder, 2005; Van 
den Stock, Righart, & de Gelder, 2007). Meeren et al. (2005) combined angry and fearful 
facial expressions with angry and fearful whole body expressions to create both congruent 




(fearful face on fearful body and angry face on angry body) and incongruent (fearful face on 
angry body and angry face on fearful body) realistically looking compound stimuli (see 
Figure 2). These were briefly (200ms) presented one by one while the participants were 
instructed to categorize the emotion expressed by the face and ignore the body. The results 
showed that recognition of the facial expression was biased towards the emotion expressed by 
the body language, as reflected by both the accuracy and reaction time data. In a follow-up 
study, facial expressions that were morphed on a continuum between happy and fearful were 
once combined with a happy and once with a fearful whole body expression (Van den Stock 
et al., 2007). The resulting compound stimuli were presented one by one for 150ms, while the 
participants were instructed to categorize the emotion expressed by the face in a 2 alternative 
forced choice paradigm (fear or happiness). Again, the ratings of the facial expressions were 
influenced towards the emotion expressed by the body and this influence was highest for 
facial expressions that were most ambiguous (expressions that occupied an intermediate 
position on the morph continuum). Evidence from EEG-recordings during the experiment 
shows that the brain responds to the emotional face-body incongruency as early as 115ms post 
stimulus onset (Meeren et al., 2005).  The reverse issue, whether perception of bodily 
expressions is influenced by facial expression has not been studied so far. However, natural 
synergies between facial and bodily expressions predict emotional spill over between the face 









Figure 2. Stimulus examples of congruent and incongruent face-body compounds (Meeren et 
al., 2005) 
 
Possible mechanisms underlying body context effect 
A few different explanations are suggested by body context effect. First, one may view these 
effects as providing support for a thesis that has a long history in research on facial 
expressions and states that facial expressions seen on their own are inherently ambiguous 
(Frijda, 1986). A different approach may be that emotions are intimately linked to action 
preparation and that action information is provided much more specifically by bodily than by 
facial expressions. A third consideration is that there may be considerable overlap between 
the neurofunctional basis of facial and bodily expressions such that showing either the face or 
the body also automatically triggers representation of the other.  
Facial expressions may be inherently ambiguous 
Does the strong impact of bodily expressions on judging facial expressions provide evidence 
for drawing the more radical conclusion that judgments of facial expressions are entirely 
context sensitive?   Some recent studies have indeed suggested so. Adopting our methodology 
Aviezer et al. (2008) used disgust pictures with an average recognition of 65.6% in 
combination with contrasting upper body postures and contextual object cues like dirty 
underpants. Such low recognition rate does in fact provide a large margin for external 
influences on the face. Indeed, their results show that disgust faces are no longer viewed as 




expressing disgust when perceived with an incongruent body. This result is consistent with 
what  has been known for a long time that the effect of the secondary information is the 
biggest where recognition rates of the primary stimulus are poorest (Massaro & Egan, 1996). 
This doesn’t seem that this study provides good evidence that judgments of facial expressions 
are entirely malleable, since the effects it shows are for facial expressions that are rather 
ambiguous when they are viewed on their own. 
Aviezer et al. (2008) rightly remark that a crucial issue is whether the context effects are post-
perceptual rather than truly perceptual (B. de Gelder & Bertelson, 2003). Their experiments 
unfortunately do not allow a conclusion one way or the other. They did not use rapid 
presentation or masking, the two classical means of exercising strategic control over the 
perceptual process. In all experiments they used untimed presentation with free exploration of 
the compound stimulus which allows the viewer to attend to the face and the body and 
ultimately to choose what information to base the response on, either on an ad hoc basis or 
also possibly depending on the particular emotion combination. The eye movement data they 
recorded do not settle the issue of rapid perceptual procedures in the observer. The eye 
movements effect they report cannot be deemed to reflect an underlying fast or rapid process, 
as the fixation latencies to enter either the upper or lower face area are on average around 
1000 ms. In view of the fact that the latency to make a saccade is around 150-200 ms the 
reported latencies are very long indeed. Moreover, comparing their saccade latency values 
with RTs reported in Meeren et al. (2005) shows that on average RTs are about 200ms faster 
and even more for the congruent conditions. This is remarkable since RTs are by definition a 
slower measure than saccades (Bannerman, Milders, de Gelder, & Sahraie, 2009). The 
findings indicate that the long eye gaze latencies reflect gaze fixation under voluntary-
attentional control. Participants look at the compound stimulus and as we have shown, rapidly 
(in EEG time at the P1, which is in the window around 100ms) realizing the oddity of the 
compound stimulus and then explore and reassess the facial expression intentionally and 
apply a verbal label.  
 
In fact, it is easy to imagine the opposite situation where the bodily expression completely 
loses its categorical expression identity in favor of the facial expression. In view of our 
limited understanding of what the critical components of bodily expressions are, it is currently 
still difficult to create stimuli where information from body and face is well balanced with 




respect to the informational content such that what each contributes can reliably be compared. 
More importantly, the relative predominance of the face vs. the body when both are present 
and are equally attended to may very well depend on the specific emotion. This is already 
suggested by data from eye movement studies indicating that observers’ fixation behavior 
during perception of bodily expressions is also a function of the emotion displayed. During 
perception of joy the observers tend to fixate on the head region, whereas during anger and 
fear most attention is devoted to the hands and arms. For sadness the subjects fixate on heads, 
arms, and hands and the legs almost never attract the subjects' attention. This fixation 
behavior is emotion-specific and remains stable under different conditions: whether the 
subjects were asked to recognize the body postures or were just watching; for both incorrectly 
and correctly recognized emotions; for pictures with different response times; and during the 
time progression of the experiment (perceptual learning) ( Ousov-Fridin, Barliy, Shectman, de 
Gelder, Flash, submitted).  
 
One explantion may be provided by comparing the physical characteristic of different facial 
expressions. Components of different facial expressions may resemble each other, for 
example, upturned corners of the mouth characterizes both a smile and pain expression. An 
example of this strategy is provided by the study just discussed. The role of the context would 
then be to glue the components together in the configuration reflecting the information from 
the context. But such a view prima facie goes against notion that facial expressions are 
perceived configurally, and that ERP data indicate that they are rapidly processed.  
 
Emotional expressions involve the whole body in action 
 Bodyless heads are incomplete visual stimuli just as headless bodies are. To us the body to 
face context effects primarily suggest not that facial expressions are vague, imprecise or 
noisy, but that there is a very close link between both. An important aspect to consider when 
trying to explain that bodily postures influence the expression recognized on a face is 
provided by recent findings of overarching similarity in the perceptual (configural processing) 
(Reed et al., 2003) and neurofunctional (spatial and temporal overlap as shown in fMRI, EEG 
and MEG) signature of facial and bodily expressions (Meeren, Hadjikhani, Ahlfors, 
Hamalainen, & de Gelder, 2008; Stekelenburg & de Gelder, 2004; van de Riet, Grezes, & de 




Gelder, 2009). This suggest that faces as well as bodies can rapidly convey the same message 
and do so in very similar ways. The brain mentally completes the headless body or the 
bodyless head. This can obviously not be based on missing physical information as would for 
example be the case when only part of the face was shown or one component was missing. 
What triggers the brain’s filling in may be, in the case of emotional body postures, the 
adaptive action the person is engaged in.  
From a Darwinian evolutionary perspective, emotions are closely related to actions and 
therefore likely to involve the whole body rather than only the facial expressions. One view is 
that emotion provoking stimuli trigger affect programs (Darwin, 1872; Frijda, 1986; 
Panksepp, 1998; Russell & Feldman Barrett, 1999; Tomkins, 1963), which produce an 
ongoing stream of neurophysiologic change (or change in a person’s homeostatic state) and 
are associated with evolutionary-tuned behaviors for dealing with stimuli of significant value. 
Along with the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) and amygdala, the insula and somatosensory cortex 
are involved in the modulation of emotional reactions involving the body via connections to 
brain stem structures (Damasio, 1994, 1999; LeDoux, 1996) . This function of the insula and 
somatosensory cortex may contribute to their important role in emotion perception.  
 
Facial and bodily expressions share largely overlapping neurofunctional 
basis  
Do the results just mentioned indicate that activation to facial expressions and to bodily 
expressions will almost always show complete overlap? As a matter of fact there is hardly any 
evidence in the literature to answer this question. For this reason we designed an fMRI study 
to investigate whether the brain shows distinctive activation patterns for perception of faces 
and bodies. We presented pictures of faces and faceless bodies that either showed a neutral, 
fearful or happy expression and asked participants to categorize the emotion expressed by the 
stimulus. To untangle brain activation related to faces and bodies, we compared how the brain 
responds to both categories (irrespective of emotional expression). Surprisingly, the results 
showed that the middle part of the fusiform gyrus (FG) that is typically associated with the 
perception of facial identity, is more activated for bodies than for faces (van de Riet et al., 
2009). Previous studies have shown that there was at least partial overlap between the face-
selective and body selective region within the FG (Hadjikhani & de Gelder, 2003; Peelen & 
Downing, 2005), and van de Riet et al. (2009) were the first to directly compare face and 




body related activation. In fact, perception of whole body expressions elicited a wider 
network of brain areas compared to faces, including other areas previously associated with 
perception of facial expressions, like STS. Other brain regions that were more active for 
bodies than for faces included the middle temporal/middle occipital gyrus (the so called extra-
striate body area, EBA (Downing, Jiang, Shuman, & Kanwisher, 2001), the superior occipital 
gyrus and the parieto-occipital sulcus. When we consider more specifically the emotional 
information conveyed by the bodies and faces, again we observed a wider activation pattern 
specific for emotional bodies than for emotional faces. Interestingly, emotional body 
expressions activate cortical and subcortical motor areas like caudate nucleus, putamen and 
inferior frontal gyrus (IFG). This motor related activation may reflect the adaptive action 
component implied in the body expression, which is less pronounced in facial expressions (B. 
de Gelder, Snyder, Greve, Gerard, & Hadjikhani, 2004).  
 
Since we used static images in this study, one may argue that the activity in areas associated 
with movement is related to the fact that there is more implied motion in the body 
expressions, compared to facial expressions. We therefore performed a follow up study in 
which we presented video clips of dynamic facial and bodily expressions that conveyed a 
neutral, fearful or angry expression instead of static picture stimuli. The results were 
nonetheless in the same line: bodies compared to faces activated more areas than vice versa, 
including the FG. Again, motor related areas were more activated by emotional body 
expressions (Kret et al. submitted). 
 
Taken together these findings support the conclusion that while separating perception of faces 
and bodies may be somewhat artificial, bodily expressions activate a wider network of brain 
areas, including motor and action related regions. 
 
Facial and bodily expressions in the context of scenes 
 
When observing a stimulus that consists of a face and body with congruent expression (for 
example a fearful face on a fearful body) one might expect that recognition will  be 100% 
correct. But this is not necessarily the case. In fact, perception and recognition of an  
emotional action is also influenced by the particular setting or scene in which it occurs. For 
example, viewed in isolation the sprint to the finish of a man shaking off a competitor  looks 




quite similar to the flight of a man running away from a robber holding a knife. Without the 
context information, the emotional valence is ambiguous. Faces and bodies routinely appear 
as part of natural scenes and our perceptual system seems to be wired to make the link 
between the expression and the environment in which it appears to us. But little is known 
about the mechanism underlying this. Older appraisal theories of emotion (e.g. Scherer, Shorr, 
& Johnstone, 2001) acknowledge the importance of a visual event for our interpretation and 
evaluation of it and propose explanations for how we (emotionally) react to it. However, the 
primary focus in appraisal theories regards the emotional response of the observer to a 
stimulus, rather than the mere perception of the stimulus.  
 
Hierarchical perception models tend to investigate the possible effects of a scene context as 
semantic effects which occur relatively late and take place in relatively middle to higher 
cognitive levels of processing (Bar, 2004). However, there is evidence that supports an early 
perceptual and neuro-anatomical analysis of a scene. Tachitoscopic presentation of a scene 
contributes to subsequent processing of the spatial relations across the scene (Sanocki, 2003), 
and the rapid extraction of the gist of a scene may be based on low spatial frequency coding 
(Oliva & Schyns, 1997). The more semantic effects of scene processing occur at a later stage, 
around 400ms after stimulus onset. For example, objects presented in their usual context are 
identified better (Davenport & Potter, 2004) and faster (Ganis & Kutas, 2003) and EEG data 
show the interaction occurs at about 390 ms after stimulus-onset. The functional neuro-
anatomy of contextual associations of objects comprises a network including 
parahippocampal cortex (PHC), retrosplenial cortex, and superior orbital sulcus (Bar, 2004). 
 
However, the effects of the emotional gist of a scene may occur at an earlier level, in line with 
the evolutionary significance of the information. Few experimental studies currently exist on 
the influence of emotional scenes on the perception of faces and bodies. In the first 
explorations of this issue, we presented fearful, disgusted and happy faces embedded in a 
natural scene (see Figure 3 for an example). The affective valence of the scene was either 
fearful, disgusted or happy, and the face-scene combinations were emotionally congruent (e.g. 
fearful face in fearful scene) or incongruent (e.g. fearful face in happy scene). Participants 
were required to categorize the emotion expressed by the face. The results revealed faster 
response times and higher accuracies for the congruent stimulus pairs, showing that the 
emotional expression of a face is recognized better when it is embedded in a congruent scene 




(Righart & de Gelder, 2008b). The context effects hold up under different attentional 
conditions: it can be observed when participants are explicitly decoding the emotional 
expression of the face (Righart & de Gelder, 2008a) but also when they are primarily focussed 
on the orientation of the face (Righart & de Gelder, 2006).  
 
Figure 3. Stimulus examples of congruent and incongruent face-scene compounds (Righart & 
de Gelder, 2008b) 
 
This indicates that it reflects an early and mandatory process and suggests a perceptual basis. 
Our EEG studies support this view: when fearful faces are presented in a fearful scene, EEG 
recordings show a higher N170 amplitude compared to when the same faces are presented in a 
neutral scene (Righart & de Gelder, 2006).  
To investigate how the emotion conveyed by scenes influences brain activity associated with 
perception of faces we used fMRI while subjects were shown neutral and fearful faces in both 
neutral and emotional scenes. We ran a parallel version of the experiment with neutral and 
fearful bodies instead of faces. The results showed that the activation level in FFA is 
modulated by the kind of scene in which it is presented. In particular, fearful faces elicit more 
activity than neutral faces, but more interestingly, fearful faces in threatening scenes trigger 
more activity than fearful faces in neutral scenes. Also, activity in body areas, like the 
extrastriate body area (EBA) (Downing et al., 2001) is influenced by the scene in which it is 
embedded: overall, fearful bodies trigger more activity than neutral bodies, but interestingly, 
neutral bodies in threatening scenes trigger more activity than in neutral scenes. On the other 
hand, the presence of a face or a body influences brain activity in areas that are associated 
with the processing of scenes, like the retrosplenial complex (RSC) and the parahippocampal 
cortex (PHC) (Sinke & de Gelder, submitted; Van den Stock & de Gelder, submitted). In 
general, neutral scenes trigger higher activation in the PHC and RSC, but the presence of a 
neutral body boosts activity in these areas. In a behavioural experiment we presented 




participants with stimuli depicting an emotional body seen in the foreground against an 
emotionally congruent or incongruent background. Participants were instructed to categorize 
the emotion expressed by the foreground body and the results showed that especially negative 
emotions (fear and anger) were recognized faster in a congruent background, whereas this 
was not the case for happy expressions (Kret & de Gelder, submitted). 
These findings suggest that the emotion conveyed by the scene ‘spills over’ to the embedded 
face or body, and vice versa. Stated simply, a fearful face makes a neutral scene appear 
threatening, while a threatening scene makes a neutral face fearful. 
 
Facial expressions in the context of the affective prosody of voices 
 
Research focussing on human face and emotion perception has primarily targeted how visual 
stimuli are perceived, although in daily life facial expressions are typically accompanied by 
vocal expressions.  
Human emotion recognition can be based on isolated facial or vocal cues (Banse & Scherer, 
1996; Scherer, Banse, Wallbott, & Goldbeck, 1991) but combining both modalities results in 
a performance increase as shown by both increased accuracy rates and shorter response 
latencies (B. de Gelder, Bocker, Tuomainen, Hensen, & Vroomen, 1999; B. de Gelder & 
Vroomen, 2000; B. de Gelder, Vroomen, & Teunisse, 1995; Dolan, Morris, & de Gelder, 
2001; Massaro & Egan, 1996). Detailed behavioural investigations into crossmodal influences 
between vocal and facial cues requires a paradigm in which both modalities are combined to 
create audiovisual pairs. The manipulation ideally consists of altering both the emotional 
congruency between the two modalities and a task that consists of emotion categorization 
based on only one of both information streams. For example, de Gelder and Vroomen (2000) 
presented facial expressions that were morphed on a continuum between happy and sad while 
at the same time a short spoken sentence was presented. This sentence had a neutral semantic 
meaning, but was spoken in either a happy or sad emotional tone of voice. Participants were 
instructed to attend to and categorize the face and ignore the voice in a 2 alternative forced 
choice task. The results showed a clear influence of the task irrelevant auditory modality on 
the target visual modality. For example, sad faces were less frequently categorized as sad 
when they were accompanied by a happy voice. In a follow up experiment, vocal expressions 
were morphed on a fear-happy continuum and presented with either a fearful or happy face, 




while participants were instructed to categorize the vocal expression. Again, the task 
irrelevant modality (facial expressions) influenced the emotional categorization of the target 
modality (vocal expressions). Furthermore, this experiment was repeated under different 
attentional demands, but the facial expression influenced the categorization of vocal 
expression in every attentional condition (Vroomen, Driver, & de Gelder, 2001).  
These findings suggest that affective multisensory integration is a mandatory and automatic 
process. However, based on these behavioral data, no direct claims can be made about the 
nature of this crossmodal bias effect. The findings could either reflect an early perceptual or 
later more cognitive or decisional effect. Neuro-imaging methods with high temporal 
resolution are needed to provide information on the time course of when this bimodal 
crosstalk occurs. Studies addressing neural substrates of vocal expressions are few (B. de 
Gelder, Vroomen, & Pourtois, 2004; George et al., 1996; Ross, 2000) and primarily point to 
involvement of the right hemisphere. Electroencephalogram (EEG) investigations show that 
recognition of emotional prosody occurs already within the first 100-150 ms of stimulus 
presentation (Bostanov & Kotchoubey, 2004; B. de Gelder, Bocker et al., 1999; Goydke, 
Altenmuller, Moller, & Munte, 2004). The possibility that ecologically relevant audiovisual 
expressions may rely on specialized neural mechanisms has long been recognized in animal 
research and several studies have explored the relation between auditory and visual 
processing streams in non-human primate communication (Ghazanfar & Santos, 2004; Parr, 
2004).  
EEG studies addressing the time course of audiovisual integration point to an early integration 
of both modalities (around 110 ms after stimulus presentation) (B. de Gelder, Bocker et al., 
1999; Pourtois, de Gelder, Vroomen, Rossion, & Crommelinck, 2000), which is compatible 
with a perceptual effect. Supporting evidence for a mandatory nature of this integration is 
provided by studies with blindsight patients, who are unable, due to cortical damage, to 
consciously perceive visual stimuli presented in a segment of the visual field. When they are 
presented with auditory vocal expressions and at the same time visual facial expressions in 
their blind field, fMRI and EEG recordings are influenced by the facial expression of which 
they are unaware. This shows that the unconscious emotional information displayed by the 
face is processed by alternative brain pathways through which it influenced the brain 
responses to the consciously perceived vocal expressions. 




Another question concerns where in the brain the integration of perceived vocal and facial 
expressions takes place. Heteromodal cortex is a logical candidate for multisensory 
integration (Mesulam, 1998). Superior temporal sulcus (STS) (Barraclough, Xiao, Baker, 
Oram, & Perrett, 2005) and ventral premotor cortex (Kohler et al., 2002) have been shown to 
be involved in multisensory integration of biological stimuli. Functional imaging studies 
addressing the combined perception of emotional face-voice pairs (Dolan et al., 2001; Ethofer 
et al., 2006) show that fearful faces simultaneously presented with fearful voices activate the 
left amygdala. The role of the amygdala in emotional and face processing is well established 
(Zald, 2003) and connectivity data show that it receives inputs from both auditory and visual 
cortices (McDonald, 1998). These findings make this brain structure an important location for 
integration of affective bimodal inputs. 
Recent studies have shown that next to facial expressions, bodily expressions are also prone to 
crossmodal affective influences. For example, recognition of dynamic whole body 
expressions of emotion are influenced not only by both human and animal vocalizations (Van 
den Stock, Grezes, & de Gelder, 2008), but also by instrumental music (Van den Stock, 
Peretz, Grèzes, & de Gelder, 2009), suggesting the brain is well organized to combine 
affective information from different sensory channels. 
 
Summary and conclusions 
 
Real faces are part and parcel of their context and this consideration must play an important 
role in future models of face processing. Recent data show that bodily expressions, affective 
prosody, as well as the emotional gist of a natural scene all influence the recognition of facial 
expression. When a face is accompanied by a body or voice expressing the same emotion, or 
when it is presented in a congruent emotional scene, the recognition of facial expression 
typically improves, i.e. both the judgment accuracy and speed increase. Hence, both the 
immediate visual and auditory contexts function to disambiguate the signals of facial 
expression. Our behavioral and electrophysiological data suggest that this perceptual 
integration of information does not require high-level semantic analysis occurring relatively 
late at higher cognitive centers. Instead, the integration appears to be an automatic and 
mandatory process, which takes place very early in the processing stream, before full 




structural encoding of the stimulus and conscious awareness of the emotional expression are 
fully elaborated.  
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Chapter 2: Standing up for the body. Recent progress in uncovering the networks 




Perception of bodies and bodily expressions is a relatively novel topic in affective 
neuroscience, a field dominated so far by investigations of facial expressions. Faces and 
bodies are equally salient and familiar in daily life and often convey some of the same 
information, leading one to expect that many of the same issues arise about both. Yet research 
on faces still tends to be dominated by the issue of category specificity. Historically, patients 
with pure face deficits have proven hard to find and as a consequence the debate on the 
existence of a pure deficit is still going on. But since the early days of functional brain 
imaging considerable efforts have been devoted to argue for category specificity as opposed 
to distributed object representation. Should body researchers follow this well trodden path and 
focus on uncovering THE body specific brain area(s)? Given the massive evidence positive as 
well as negative, about categorical representation of faces and the little information we have 
so far about bodies, it is likely that the case for or against body specificity will remain 
stronger for faces and this for a long time to come. This is indeed the conclusion reached in a 
recent paper (Minnebusch & Daum, 2009). Is this the right conclusion? 
 
The goal here is to consider all the available evidence in more detail than done so far but also 
to argue for a theoretically motivated comparison of faces and bodies that is sensitive to 
broader issues than only category specificity. Faces, bodies but also many other objects are 
multidimensional information bearers. Indeed, without a theoretical motivation and a focus on 
one or a few specific dimensions, it is hard to decide upon the appropriate control category 
and the results of such somewhat arbitrary comparisons will fail to convince researchers using 
a different one. For example, emotion expression and action representation are two very 
important aspects in body representation. The first has an equivalent for faces, but the second 
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does not. But even the equivalence concerning the emotional dimension of face and body 
stimuli may be less straightforward than it seems. We typically relate a facial expression to 
mental states and feelings, but we tend to associate a bodily expression with the action a 
person is involved in. So even if from the vantage point of emotion expression they 
superficially convey the same affective signals, facial and bodily expressions may trigger very 
different processes in the observer. The facial expression may predominantly produce 
empathy in the observer while a bodily expression may be a call for action (de Gelder, 2009). 
And the stimulus equivalent of a body engaged in a neutral action is also difficult to find in 
the domain of facial information. For example, neutral facial movements often used as control 
condition are speech, chewing or making a grimace but each triggers other processes than 
does the observation of a body crossing the street, gardening or playing tennis, all of which 
count as neutral events but none of which has a clear equivalent in the face domain.  
 
Similarities in perceptual routines: configuration and feature based perception of 
faces, bodies and other visual objects 
 
The major concepts used to argue for the specificity of perceptual processes involved in face 
perception are those of configuration vs. feature based processes. Note that configural and 
holistic are often used interchangeable now, but for a while the notion of holistic processes 
referred to the strong claim that in some cases of complex stimuli the composing parts or 
(misleadingly called) the features are not encoded separately (Farah, 1990) and therefore not 
available for perceptual processes. The more general notion of configural processes does not 
make the claim that facial features or parts are not represented. So at present there is no 
reason to refer to holistic processes as different from configural ones (see also below) and it is 
not clear whether this term will be of any future use in body research. In any case, it is also 
informative to put the questions about configural processing in the broader context of major 
theories of object perception and relate them to a classical effect in the visual perception 
literature, the object superiority effects, generally defined as the influence of whole object 
recognition on recognition of the parts. Configural processing of faces then appears as a kind 
of object superiority effect. This puts the debate on configural processing in a broader context 
because the argument cannot be that faces are special because they are processed configurally. 
It is worth keeping in mind that the very first reports noting this effect (Yin, 1969) already 




used a large number of visual objects besides faces and reported inversion effects for some of 
them (e.g. landscapes).  
 
To come back to the question raised earlier, similarities between configural processing of 
faces and bodies were reported as soon as this issue was addressed. There is clear evidence 
that both faces and bodies are processed configurally, rather than as an assemblage of 
features. This is typically assessed by measuring the perceptual processes that are triggered by 
tasks in which faces are presented upside-down (the inversion effect): faces and bodies 
presented upside-down are relatively more difficult to recognize than inverted objects, like for 
example houses (Reed, Stone, Bozova, & Tanaka, 2003). By and large evidence from brain 
imaging studies has since confirmed these first findings of a body inversion effect while also 
providing information about its time course. Here however, the evidence points to interesting 
differences with the face inversion effect, as far as time course but also as far as neural 
generators are concerned (Meeren, Hadjikhani, Ahlfors, Hamalainen, & de Gelder, 2008).  
 
The neurophysiology of body perception. Implications for neural representation 
and time course of processing 
 
Neurophysiological studies of body processing started with single cell recording studies in 
the monkey. In the late 1960’s Gross et al. (1969; 1972) showed neurons in the inferior 
temporal cortex (IT) that selectively fired to silhouettes of monkey hands, a result which was 
later confirmed for drawings of human hands and faces (Desimone, Albright, Gross, & 
Bruce, 1984). Subsequently, neurons responding to static images of whole bodies, body 
postures that imply some form of body motion, body orientations, and body movements were 
discovered in superior temporal sulcus (STS) (Barraclough, Xiao, Oram, & Perrett, 2006; 
Jellema & Perrett, 2003a, 2003b; Oram & Perrett, 1996; Perrett et al., 1985; Wachsmuth, 
Oram, & Perrett, 1994).  
 
Strong evidence for body shape specificity was found recently by Kiani et al. (2007) who 
recorded from a large population of single cells in monkey IT. The response pattern of the cell 
population as a whole was far more category-selective than that of single cells, implying that 
not only cell responses to the preferred category but also responses to the suboptimal 




categories carry important information. The population responses formed category clusters 
that resembled our intuitive object categories, with a first main division between animals and 
inanimate objects. The animal-characteristic responses could be divided into face- and body-
related responses, and these could be further subdivided on the basis of certain animal classes, 
with the body population code forming three distinct clusters, i.e. for human bodies, four-
limbed animals and birds, and lower animals.  
 
Intracranial recordings from the ventral and lateral temporal cortex in epileptic patients 
showed a first hint of body-related processing in the human brain with distinct electrode sites 
being responsive only to photographs of hands and not faces or other objects (McCarthy, 
Puce, Belger, & Allison, 1999). Since there is strong evidence for distinct representations of 
faces, bodies and hands with whole bodies and hands forming completely non-overlapping 
clusters (Kiani et al., 2007), we will further focus on whole body-selective processing and will 
not discuss studies on hand perception. Using a subdural grid on the lateral occipital cortex, 
Pourtois et al. (2007) observed highly spatially-specific body-selective responses in the 
human brain. One electrode site positioned at the junction of the middle temporal and middle 
occipital gyrus (see table 1 and 2 to compare coordinates) showed strong local field potentials 
peaking at 260 ms elicited by photographs of whole human bodies (without heads) and not by 
faces, animals or tools.  
Further information on the time-course of body-selective processing in the human brain has 
been obtained from non-invasive electrophysiological recordings. The deflections in the Event 
Related Potentials (ERP) of face and body perception show several similarities (Gliga & 
Dehaene-Lambertz, 2005; Meeren, van Heijnsbergen, & de Gelder, 2005; Righart & de 
Gelder, 2007; Stekelenburg & de Gelder, 2004; Thierry et al., 2006). ERPs for faces as well 
as for bodies show a P1 and a prominent N1 component with similar scalp topography 
(Stekelenburg & de Gelder, 2004). The N1, better known as the “N170” in the case of face 
processing, a negative deflection at occipitotemporal electrodes peaking between 140-220 ms 
post stimulus onset, is thought to reflect a late stage in the structural encoding of the visual 
stimulus (Bentin, Allison, Puce, Perez, & et al., 1996; Eimer, 2000). The mean peak latency 
of the N1 component for body processing has been found to range between 154 and 228 ms 
after stimulus onset (Gliga & Dehaene-Lambertz, 2005; Meeren et al., 2005; Minnebusch & 
Daum, 2009; Righart & de Gelder, 2007; Stekelenburg & de Gelder, 2004; Thierry et al., 




2006; van Heijnsbergen, Meeren, Grezes, & de Gelder, 2007), similar as found for faces (see 
Table 1). 
 
When faces and bodies are directly compared, the peak latency of the N1 for whole human 
bodies that include heads (with faces masked) was found to be faster than that for faces 
(Meeren et al., 2005; Righart & de Gelder, 2007; Stekelenburg & de Gelder, 2004). When 
headless bodies are presented however, the N1 response slows down to become slower than 
that for faces (Gliga & Dehaene-Lambertz, 2005; Thierry et al., 2006). When analyzed at a 
higher spatial resolution, the body and face N1 showed a slightly different spatial pattern, 
both in their potential distribution on the scalp (Gliga & Dehaene-Lambertz, 2005) and their 
corresponding source localizations in the brain (Thierry et al., 2006). For both stimulus 
categories, the sources were located in the right posterior extrastriate cortex, but with a 
slightly more dorsal distribution for bodies as compared to faces. Different underlying neural 
generators for face and body perception in the N1 time-window were recently confirmed by 
us using magnetoencephalography (MEG) with anatomically-constrained distributed source 
modeling (Meeren et al., submitted). The ventral inferior temporal cortex, including middle 
fusiform gyrus (FG) showed strong differential activation to face stimuli compared to bodies 
and different classes of control stimuli (i.e. scrambles and houses) between 120-180 ms after 
picture onset. Body stimuli, on the other hand, elicited selective responses in the right lateral 
occipitotemporal cortex, a location corresponding to the EBA. No evidence could be found 
for early activation of the ventral temporal cortex during body perception. These 
neuromagnetic findings strongly argue against the proposed functional analogies between the 
face-sensitive and body-sensitive areas in the FG (Minnebusch & Daum, 2009; Taylor, 
Wiggett, & Downing, 2007).  
 
The well-known electrophysiological inversion effect for faces, i.e. an increase in amplitude 
and latency of the N170 has also been found for bodies (Minnebusch & Daum, 2009; Righart 
& de Gelder, 2007; Stekelenburg & de Gelder, 2004; Taylor et al., 2007). The earlier 
inversion effect as observed for faces on the P1 component (~120 ms), could however not be 
found for bodies (Righart & de Gelder, 2007). Note in this context that the inversion effect 
needs to be assessed as the relative difference in latency and amplitude between a given 
stimulus and its upside down presented counterpart. Because of the sensitivity of ERP to 
physical stimulus differences direct comparisons between faces and bodies are misleading. 




Adopting that criterion we see that the inversion effect is of the same magnitude for faces and 
bodies (Stekelenburg & de Gelder, 2004).  
 
This matter may be pursued by taking advantage of the sensitive time measurements that 
MEG provides. We recently investigated the earliest onset of the electrophysiological 
inversion effect for face and body stimulus categories (Meeren et al., 2008). Anatomically-
constrained distributed source analyses revealed that both faces and bodies already show 
inversion effects between 70-100 ms post stimulus with larger responses for the inverted 
images. Interestingly the cortical distribution of this early inversion effect was highly 
category-specific. For faces it was found in well-known face-selective areas (e.g. the right 
inferior occipital gyrus (IOG) and mid FG), whereas for bodies it was found in the posterio-
dorsal medial parietal areas (the precuneus / posterior cingulate). Hence, whereas face 
inversion modulates early activity in face-selective areas in the ventral stream, body inversion 
evokes differential activity in dorsal stream areas, suggesting different early cortical pathways 
for configural face and body perception, and again different time courses of activation in the 
common neural substrate in the FG.  
 
Taking together all currently available information on the time course of body and face 
processes brings us to the conclusion that  reports of time courses and a fortiori comparative 
ones of different visual objects cannot be confined to the presence/absence of a pre-defined 
marker (e.g. the face specific N170). We need to look at different time windows in different 
brain areas, some of which also activate during more than a single window. 



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































   
   



































































































































































































































































































































































































Similarities and differences in neurofunctional basis of faces and bodies 
 
This last decade brain imaging has been the method of choice for researchers interested in 
category specificity. There is evidence that apart from face-selective areas there exist body-
selective areas in the brain. In monkeys functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) 
revealed specialized patches for faces and bodies within the object-selective cortex (Pinsk, 
DeSimone, Moore, Gross, & Kastner, 2005; Tsao, Freiwald, Knutsen, Mandeville, & Tootell, 
2003) . In addition, faces and bodies, like the other categories tested, elicited unique 
distributed response patterns outside these specialized patches (Tsao et al., 2003). Whether 
these fMRI-defined body-areas consist entirely of body-selective cells as was the case for 
faces (Tsao, Freiwald, Tootell, & Livingstone, 2006) remains to be investigated. An important 
comparative study that builds on the single cell recording study of Kiani et al. (2007) 
provided evidence for the similarities in object representation in the monkey and the human 
brain (Kriegeskorte et al., 2008). Computations of dissimilarity for distributed blood 
oxygenation level dependent (BOLD) response patterns in the human brain revealed that these 
response patterns form category clusters corresponding to animate and inanimate objects. 
Within the former, subclusters are formed by faces and bodies, and the response patterns 
distinguish similarly between within-category exemplars in the monkey and the human brain.  
 
Two areas in the body perception network have been the target of categorical selectivity 
research. The one reported first was an area at the junction of the middle temporal and middle 
occipital gyrus, labeled the extrastriate body area (EBA) (Downing, Jiang, Shuman, & 
Kanwisher, 2001). A later added one is in the FG, at least partly overlapping the so-called 
fusiform face area (FFA) (Kanwisher, McDermott, & Chun, 1997) and termed the fusiform 
body area (FBA) (Peelen & Downing, 2005b) (see Table 2). Note that as the findings about 
FBA suggest, face and body category representation may be very closely related. It is a 
reasonable question whether the sight of a body activates face representations and vice versa 
because it is well known that when shown familiar stimuli presented in an unusual fashion the 
brain will automatically fill in the missing information. This issue is important for the notion 
of category specific representation and has not extensively been addressed (but see Cox, 
Meyers, & Sinha, 2004).  
 




There are only a few fMRI investigations in humans presenting a direct comparison between 
faces and bodies. In one such study, subjects were scanned while they viewed static images of 
neutral and emotional (fearful and happy) faces and bodies and categorized the emotion 
expressed by the stimulus, irrespective of category. When we compared the hemodynamic 
brain responses of faces vs. bodies (irrespective of emotional expression) we observed that 
perception of bodies triggers a broad network of brain areas, including areas previously 
associated with perception of faces, like the FG, STS, and the middle occipital gyrus (MOG) 
(van de Riet, Grezes, & de Gelder, 2009). Next to these, also the superior occipital gyrus 
(SOG), the parieto-occipital sulcus (POS) and the intraparietal sulcus responded more to 
bodies than to faces. Areas more responsive to faces than bodies were restricted to the 
calcarine sulcus, cerebellum, superior frontal gyrus and anterior cingulate gyrus. Other studies 
typically focus on the FG and compare areas that respond more to bodies than to objects with 
areas that respond more to faces than to objects (Peelen & Downing, 2005b; Schwarzlose, 
Baker, & Kanwisher, 2005; Spiridon, Fischl, & Kanwisher, 2006) rather than a direct 
comparison between faces and bodies. Using this indirect comparison approach, a previous 
study by Schwarzlose et al. (2005) with 7 subjects (in 5 of which a right FBA could be 
defined) found an effect of scanning resolution on the selectivity for either faces or bodies in 
the FG, with a positive correlation between selectivity and resolution. Their results showed a 
higher selectivity for faces in the FG, which is compatible with the results of a subsequent 
study of the same lab (Spiridon et al., 2006), but shows the inverse pattern of our results. This 
may be related to methodological issues, such as scanning parameters, applied contrasts or the 
different object categories that were presented.  
 
Other issues hamper a direct comparison of faces and bodies. First, the face is only a part of 
an object (person), whereas a body (even with the facial area blurred) constitutes a complete 
object. This may play a role when comparing faces with objects, but also when making the 
indirect comparison: faces vs. objects compared to bodies vs. objects. Second, perception of 
faces allows a detailed and fine-grained analysis of the tonus of the complex musculature of 
the face, whereas bodies are generally covered with clothing, which may conceal important 
information about muscle tension, especially when dealing with emotional expressions. Also, 
the presence of clothing implies perception of man-made objects, whereas faces are typically 
presented in isolation. 

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































   













































































































   
   





   


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































   
   
   












































































































































































   







































































































































































































































































   
   
   
   
 
 
   




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































   
   
  
  













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































   
   

















































































































































































































   





   

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































   
   
   





   
   
   


















































































































































































   








































































































































































   
   


































































































































































































































































































































































   































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































   
   





   
   
   













   
   
   





   
   
   
   




   
   














































































































































































































































































































































































































































Emotional modulation of body selective processing 
 
The studies discussed so far used still images as well as static bodies, i.e. bodies not engaged 
in any activity nor showing an emotional expression. As the case of faces illustrates, there are 
now many reports showing that facial expressions trigger activations that are earlier and 
spatially different from those typically obtained previously with neutral faces. These findings 
are clearly important  because they challenge accepted traditional models of face processing 
which typically start from structural face encoding and associate this with the e.g. the time 
window of N170.    
 
Using ERP recordings we found evidence for very fast automatic processing of bodily 
expressions. Images of fear expressions compared to neutral bodies shown as performing the 
same action already affected the ERP responses in the earliest stage of visual perception, i.e. 
the P1 component (van Heijnsbergen et al., 2007). In addition, this component showed 
sensitivity to emotional congruence of the body and face (Meeren et al., 2005). Using MEG 
and anatomically realistic distributed source modeling we were able to confirm and extend 
these first results (Meeren et al., in preparation). Within the first 120 ms after picture onset, 
bodies expressing fear differentially activated the occipital pole, regions in the anterior 
temporal lobe, the parieto-occipital sulcus, and the intraparietal sulcus as compared to neutral 
bodies.   
 
Similar to studies that reported emotional modulation of face specific areas, like FFA and 
OFA (occipital face area) (e.g. Breiter et al., 1996; van de Riet et al., 2009; Vuilleumier, 
Armony, Driver, & Dolan, 2001), effects of emotional information on activation levels of 
body areas in the brain have been investigated. The first study addressing this issue focused 
on the FG and amygdala (AMG) and found an increased activation for fearful bodies 
compared to instrumental bodies in both areas (Hadjikhani & de Gelder, 2003). This result 
was very similar to the most frequently observed result for faces and consistent with a 
connection AMG-FG. In a follow up experiment, we focused on the whole brain and 
compared the activation of fearful, happy and neutral body expressions (de Gelder, Snyder, 
Greve, Gerard, & Hadjikhani, 2004). The results confirmed our previous findings, but showed 
additionally the involvement of motor areas in the perception of emotional body expressions. 




Similar results were obtained in a direct comparison of neutral and emotional faces and bodies 
(van de Riet et al., 2009) in which we also observed that emotional bodies activate cortical 
and subcortical motor related structures, like inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), caudate nucleus and 
putamen. These motor areas were not active for emotional faces (van de Riet et al., 2009). 
Results of emotional modulation of EBA are less clear. We did not observe a difference 
between neutral and emotional bodies using static body images (van de Riet et al., 2009), but 
our data with dynamic body expressions show clear emotional modulation of EBA (Grèzes, 
Pichon, & de Gelder, 2007; Kret, Pichon, Grèzes, & de Gelder, submitted; Pichon, de Gelder, 
& Grezes, 2008; Sinke, Sorger, Goebel, & de Gelder, 2009). Recently, we demonstrated in 
monkeys, that perceiving body postures of conspecifics communicating threat increases the 
BOLD signal in a subset of body-sensitive voxels in the STS (de Gelder & Partan, 2009). 
 
 
Static vs. Dynamic body perception 
 
All studies discussed so far used static facial and bodily pictures. But in real life, we are 
confronted with faces and bodies in motion. Although static body pictures may imply motion, 
dynamic stimuli contain explicit movement information.  
 
Studies of bodily expressions reported better recognition rates for dynamic than static 
emotional body stimuli (Atkinson, Dittrich, Gemmell, & Young, 2004; de Meijer, 1989). Two 
studies designed to find out specifically what additional information is contributed by the 
dynamics used 3s video clips showing a person opening a door in either a neutral, a fearful 
(Grèzes et al., 2007) or an angry (Pichon et al., 2008) way, and compared them to still 
snapshots taken from the same video clips. Not surprisingly, the dynamic body expressions 
vs. the static expressions (irrespective of the emotional content) triggered activity in motor 
areas (bilateral activations of the premotor cortex (PM). Emotion processing areas (parietal 
cortex, STS and FG), but also EBA were active when comparing the emotional vs. the neutral 
stimuli, irrespective of whether they were presented in a dynamic or static mode. But the most 
interesting finding was an interaction between emotion and motion in STS and right PM, with 
stronger motion-related activation for the actions expressing fear as compared to the neutral 




actions. Interestingly, STS, PM and parietal cortex were activated during action observation 
and could be involved in action understanding (Grèzes & Decety, 2001). STS and PM may 
also be essential for bodily emotion understanding since they seem to represent the emotional 
action.  
A recent fMRI study takes research on body perception one step further by investigating the 
neurofunctional basis of observing interactions between two people. Sinke et al. (in press) 
used 3s video clips in which a male actor tries to grab the handbag of a female in either a 
threatening way (by which the girl is really frightened) or in a teasing way (as if they know 
each other). During each movie, three small dots appear each for 40ms. In one task condition, 
participants had to categorize the interaction as threatening or teasing, and in the other they 
had to ignore the bodies while monitoring the randomly appearing dots and categorize their 
color, this to try to get their attention away from what really goes on in each situation. This 
study showed that the right AMG reacts in both cases more to the threatening than teasing 
movies. When the observer’s attention is not explicitly directed to the interaction, this goes 
together with heightened activation in body sensitive visual regions in FG, posterior middle 
temporal gyrus and STS. In line with this activation pattern, participants showed a better 
behavioral performance during the threatening unattended interactions. Furthermore, regions 
involved in action observation (IFG, temporo-parietal junction (TPJ) and inferior parietal 
lobe) and preparation (PM, putamen) showed activation for threatening videos, even though 
the threat is not directed towards the observer. 
 
Following up on the direct comparison of still pictures of faces and bodies by van de Riet et 
al. (2009) we used dynamic stimuli (Kret et al., submitted) to record female and male 
participants’ hemodynamic brain activity while they observed short video fragments in which 
female and male actors expressed either fear, anger or neutral signals with the face or body. 
The AMG was sensitive to all expressions, but significantly more to faces. The areas for 
processing bodies included FG, EBA and STS. Besides that, we observed activation for 
threatening body expressions, whether fearful or angry, in EBA, right TPJ and the 
somatosensory cortex. Whereas studies using static stimuli failed to find evidence for emotion 
modulation in EBA (de Gelder et al., 2004; van de Riet et al., 2009), dynamic emotional 
stimuli generally trigger more EBA activity than neutral stimuli (Grèzes et al., 2007; Kret et 
al., submitted; Peelen, Atkinson, Andersson, & Vuilleumier, 2007). The role of the EBA in 




emotional processing has not been fully understood yet and it is too early to claim that EBA is 
specifically sensitive for bodily features and less to the configural representation of a body 
such as the FG. Moreover, some interesting effects of gender were observed in this area. EBA 
is more active for bodily than facial expressions, especially when threatening, even more so 
when expressed by a male actor and above all when observed by a male participant.  
 
Bodies may be processed without attention and visual awareness 
 
There is an extensive literature on implicit (i.e., nonconscious) processing of facial 
expressions (de Gelder, De Haan, & Heywood, 2001; Eastwood & Smilek, 2005; Johnson, 
2005; Vuilleumier, 2005). Nonconscious processing may occur either because attention is 
engaged elsewhere, so that the unattended stimulus also goes undetected (Mack, Pappas, 
Silverman, & Gay, 2002), or because conscious vision is directly prevented (Macknik & 
Livingstone, 1998; Weiskrantz, 2009). Research showing that faces and facial expressions are 
still processed under conditions of limited attention and awareness has contributed 
significantly to the view that faces have a special status. Recent evidence now shows a similar 
situation for bodily expressions. Two separate lines of evidence are provided by studies of 
neurological patients with attention disorders or with cortical blindness.  
 
Patients with hemi-spatial neglect following lesions to the right parietal cortex fail to report 
leftward stimuli because of a deficit to orient their attention toward the left (contra-lesional) 
side of the space (Rafal, Egly, & Rhodes, 1994). It has been previously shown that emotional 
facial expressions presented to the left side tend to call for attention and are more often 
detected than neutral faces or objects, therefore partially overcoming the attentional bias 
(Tamietto, Geminiani, & de Gelder, 2005; Vuilleumier, 2002; Vuilleumier & Schwartz, 
2001). We have replicated this effect by showing that also fearful bodily expressions may 
automatically summon spatial attention toward the neglected side, even under more stringent 
testing conditions than those previously used with faces (Tamietto, Geminiani, Genero, & de 
Gelder, 2007). Some differences, however, may be found in the neural correlates mediating 
conscious vs. nonconscious processing of faces and bodies in neglect patients. In fact, 
whereas in the case of faces the involvement of a fronto-limbic system seems relevant to 
recall attention and restore stimulus awareness (Vuilleumier, 2002), in the case of bodies 




sensory-motor and interoceptive areas (e.g., insula) appear more critical (Tamietto & de 
Gelder, 2008). 
 
Possibly the clearest example of processing bodily expression in the absence of stimulus 
awareness is provided by patients with damage to the visual cortex, because they literally 
cannot see the stimuli presented to the blind portion of their visual field. It is now established 
that under appropriate testing conditions such patients may reliably discriminate the visual 
properties of stimuli whose presence they are unaware (blindsight) (Weiskrantz, 2009). This 
ability to discriminate the attributes of unseen visual stimuli also extends to their affective 
valence (affective blindsight) (de Gelder & Tamietto, 2007). The initial reports used facial 
expressions and affective pictures, with positive results for the former stimuli and negative 
results for the latter, therefore suggesting a special status for faces in conveying nonconscious 
emotional information via subcortical pathways (Anders et al., 2004; de Gelder, Morris, & 
Dolan, 2005; de Gelder, Pourtois, van Raamsdonk, Vroomen, & Weiskrantz, 2001; de Gelder, 
Pourtois, & Weiskrantz, 2002; de Gelder, Vroomen, Pourtois, & Weiskrantz, 1999; Pegna, 
Khateb, Lazeyras, & Seghier, 2005). However, affective blindsight exists also for bodily 
expressions (de Gelder & Hadjikhani, 2006; Tamietto, Castelli et al., 2009; Tamietto & de 
Gelder, 2008). A comparison with bodies and faces is based on behavioral performance (i.e., 
response accuracy and latency) (de Gelder, Pourtois, & Hadjikhani, 2001; de Gelder et al., 
1999; Tamietto & de Gelder, 2008), peripheral responses (e.g., expressive or autonomic 
reactions to the stimuli) (Tamietto, Castelli et al., 2009), or neural underpinnings of 
nonconscious processing (Anders et al., 2004; de Gelder & Hadjikhani, 2006; de Gelder et al., 
2002; Morris, de Gelder, Weiskrantz, & Dolan, 2001; Pegna et al., 2005; Tamietto, Cauda et 
al., 2009). Analysis of all these response parameters in patients with affective blindsight 
indicates that faces and bodies induce highly similar responses. Therefore, the emerging 
picture shows that nonconscious processing of emotions is not specific for faces but it is 
clearly documented also for bodies. This indicates that the two types of stimuli share a 
common representation, possibly in subcortical structures such as the superior colliculus and 
amygdala responsible for coarse evaluation of the affective relevance of visual stimuli. 
 
Finally, an interesting issue is whether emotional meaning may be extracted nonconsciously 
from specific parts of the face or body, or whether this requires prior analysis of the overall 




configuration of the stimuli. There is initial evidence that specific regions of the face such as 
the eyes, may be sufficient in conveying the affective information outside visual awareness 
(Whalen et al., 2004). A recent study recording eye movements has found which specific 
body parts (hands, arms, legs  and the position of the trunk) attracts the gaze that varies with 
the specific emotion displayed. For example, when observing angry bodily expressions, 
subjects fixate primarily the hands while for sad expressions they look at the face (Fridin, 
Barliya, Schechtman, de Gelder, & Flash, submitted).   
 
Learning from lesions 
 
An argument in favor of the higher overall category specificity faces than of bodies may be 
that of a specialized neurofunctional substrate for faces but not for bodies. We have already 
reviewed this argument as far as the neurologically intact brain is concerned. But a strong 
impetus for face and more generally category specificity of neural substrates comes from 
neuropsychological reports of patients with brain damage acquired in adulthood. There is a 
well known neuropsychological deficit related to impaired face recognition, labeled 
prosopagnosia or face blindness. These patients are impaired in recognizing faces, and very 
often have no recognition at all of an individual by the face only. Brain damage occurring in 
the normally developed brain that affects face perception is often localized in 
occipitotemporal cortex and temporal cortex (mid FG and IOG) unilaterally or bilaterally. The 
developmental counterpart of acquired prosopagnosia is now also increasingly reported. 
There is substantial similarity between acquired and developmental prosopagnosia at the 
behavioral level but there are many other differences (see de Gelder & Rouw, 2000 for a 
comparison). 
 
It is important to specify the exact nature of the face disorder and this is still a matter of 
debate. The short definition of prosopagnosia characterizes it as a deficit in face recognition. 
But this is too broad and also too a-specific. We are in fact dealing with a deficit that affects 
recognition of personal identity from the sight of the face. Other dimensions of face 
information are processed mostly normally, like emotional expression, visual speech or 
gender. In fact, the reliable means of defining the typical face deficit of prosopagnosics is by 
establishing that there exists dissociation between the different dimensions of face perception, 




some of which are impaired while others are intact. In addition, a dissociation must be 
established requiring evidence that the perception and recognition impairment is not present 
for non face stimuli. But there are to date only very few cases of pure prosopagnosia, where 
the perception and recognition deficit is restricted to the face and does not affect other object 
categories. To establish the presence of developmental prosopagnosia (DP) the same 
dimensions of dissociation need to be assessed. Thus when making the parallel argument for 
‘body blindness’ the aspect of body perception that is impaired vs. the ones that are intact 
require evidence. These two dimensions of dissociation need to be taken into account. 
Therefore the equivalent of face deficit in the case of body perception is also likely to consist 
of one dimension of body perception and recognition.  
 
On the other hand, using body stimuli offers a chance to advance the debate on category 
specificity of faces. For example, the behavioral and neuro-functional similarities between 
perceiving faces and bodies in neurologically intact observers raise the issue how bodies are 
processed in DP. We investigated perception of emotional and neutral faces and bodies in 
DPs and normal controls (Van den Stock, van de Riet, Righart, & de Gelder, 2008). The 
results showed a lower activation for neutral faces in FFA in the DP-group compared to the 
control group, but there was no difference between both groups for the emotional faces in 
FFA. We also compared activation of body expressions in face selective regions and of facial 
expressions in body selective regions. Our findings indicate that perceiving neutral faces 
results in a higher activation of EBA in the DP group, compared to the control group. 
Combined with the lower activation in FFA for neutral faces, this increased activation in EBA 
may indicate an anomalous processing route in the brains of DPs. It may be the case that 
(neutral) faces are processed in the areas more dominantly dedicated to body perception. On 
the other hand, we found a higher activation for perceiving bodies in IOG. These combined 
findings indicate that the neural correlates of perceiving faces and bodies in IOG and EBA 
show a lower degree of specificity in DP. These results are clearly tentative. Further research 
is needed to determine whether these differences in face and body processing between DP and 
controls reflect differences in processing routes or may result from compensation for the face 
processing deficits of DP.   
 




Recently, a triple dissociation was demonstrated between faces, bodies and objects when 
different regions of the extrastriate occipital cortex were temporarily inactivated by 
transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) (Pitcher, Charles, Devlin, Walsh, & Duchaine, 
2009). Stimulating EBA resulted in a selective body-processing deficit, whereas stimulating 
OFA and LOC (lateral occipital complex) (Malach et al., 1995) resulted in a selective 
impairment of face and object discrimination respectively. These findings strongly support a 
(partly) modular organization of the human brain. But here also an important issue is the 
whether this picture remains the same when functional aspects like for example the emotional 
expression are taken into account. 
 
Models of body perception 
 
In the last 5 years a few theoretical models of body perception have been advanced. The first 
one in de Gelder et al. (2004) was based on the only whole brain fMRI data available at that 
time and systematized the brain areas that differentially activated to neutral body actions and 
bodily expressions. It distinguishes between processes involved in low level body detection 
on the one hand and body perception and recognition and provides room for contribution of 
subcortical structures to detection and expression recognition. Integration of those initial 
results with new information provided by other techniques as well as by lesion studies led to 
the model in de Gelder (2006) in which body perception is envisaged along three 
interconnected networks: a predominantly subcortical one sustaining reflexive reactions, a 
cortical one sustaining visual analysis and reflective action and an interface system of bodily 
awareness.  
 
Models addressing a more specific range of data provided by studies of neutral still bodies 
and focussing on the issue of part vs whole processes in body perception are provided in 
Taylor et al. (2007), Urgesi et al. (2007) and Hodzic et al. (2009). These models of neutral 
body perception are reminiscent of the earlier models of face processing in which typically a 
number of separate stages were distinguished. They tend to be hierarchical and serial and 
address functional and neural questions about face perception mainly from the vantage point 
of how recognition of personal identity is achieved. But as convergence grows between the 
researchers of face recognition in this narrow sense and those working on facial expression 




recognition a rapprochement is seen between the two kinds of models. A major impetus for 
this rapprochement came from findings that facial expressions were perceived “earlier” than 
encoding of the face structure and that there was residual face processing ability in patients 
with cortical damage. These findings and others led to extended models of face processing 
encompassing both early and late processes, both expression and identity (Adolphs, 2002; de 
Gelder, Frissen, Barton, & Hadjikhani, 2003; de Gelder & Rouw, 2000; Haxby, Hoffman, & 
Gobbini, 2000) and involving conscious as well as unconscious, cortical but also subcortical 
structures and detection and recognition routes (de Gelder et al., 2003; de Gelder & Rouw, 
2000). 
 
Two sets of results available already about body perception allow us to anticipate that 
something similar is likely to be needed for bodies and for bodily expressions. One is that 
bodily expressions seem to trigger earlier activation in striate and extrastriate visual cortex, 
anterior temporal areas, but also more dorsal structures like parieto-occipital sulcus and 
intraparietal sulcus (Meeren et al., in preparation). Consistent with this and similar to findings 
about facial expressions, bodily expressions already show an emotional action trigger at the 
P1 component in the 100-120 window (Meeren et al., 2005; van Heijnsbergen et al., 2007), 
before the structural encoding of the stimulus has taken place. Importantly, those early 
activations testify to configural processing of the body stimulus as reflected in the fact that 
there is an early inversion effect (Meeren et al., 2008). The second important set of findings is 
the existence of residual processing of body stimuli in patients with cortical damage (de 
Gelder & Hadjikhani, 2006; Tamietto, Castelli et al., 2009; Tamietto & de Gelder, 2008) 
which is again similar to face processing, calling for body perception models that also 
acknowledge the contribution from subcortical structures which are important for rapid visual 
analysis and reactive behavior.  
 
Of course, all models are tentative till more research is available. As our overview illustrates, 
a focus on isolated, single function areas is difficult to maintain when issues of control 
conditions and task demands are acknowledged. For example, when considering the function 
of EBA in itself, one issue is puzzling though. Urgesi et al. (2007) as well as Taylor et al. 
(2007) and Hodzich et al. (2009) attribute featural but not configural processing to EBA. Yet 
it emerges from studies of bodily expressions mentioned already (Grèzes et al., 2007; Pichon 




et al., 2008) that EBA is sensitive to whether there is affective information in the body 
stimulus. This modulation by emotion may be compatible with EBA as a feature processor, 
in which case one would need to investigate which specific body part conveys the affective 
information. Alternatively, EBA does process the configuration of the stimulus after all. This 
alternative is consistent with our findings that  EBA is differentially sensitive to affective 
information in the body (Grèzes et al., 2007; Pichon et al., 2008) when videos are used. This 
ambiguity as well as that concerning FG suggests that the role of an area is best investigated 




For at least three decades faces occupied the most prominent position on the research agenda 
of psychologists, neuropsychologists, neurophysiologists and cognitive neuroscientists. The 
reasons for this situation are diverse. They range from recognition of the evolutionary and 
communicative importance of the face to conceptual and philosophical considerations about 
the need for a modular organization of the brain refelcted in specialized perceptual abilities. 
Modular theorists have typically used the case of language and that of face perception as the 
clearest examples. In this paper we have tried to put current findings in perspective without 
however pushing them in the framework of the traditional question of modularity. We have 
argued that a number of different dimensions need to be considered when comparing the 
behavioral, neurofunctional and neuropsychological basis of faces and bodies. The debate is 
open, but it would be a pity to limit it to the traditional questions  and  debates about 
specilized modules and categorical representation in the brain. When viewed in a broader 
perspective, faces and bodies are comparable because they both convey information that is 
essential for social interaction.  Yet they each fulfill this role in a different way. It seems 
likely that faces are used for fine-grained analysis of communication intention and possibly 
also convey a broader range of subtle emotions in a setting of close-by person to person. In 
contrast, while body language is still important for close-by interaction, bodily expression 
allow for appraisal of action intention and emotions over larger distances. These differences 
are lost when one focuses only representations issues.   
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In everyday life we interact with people as we encounter them in their natural environment 
and react to their facial and body expression.  Observers are capable of reacting rapidly to the 
gist of a scene (Thorpe, Fize, & Marlot, 1996). Similarly, affective information from body 
postures is processed rapidly (B. de Gelder et al., 2009). There is now also evidence from 
behavioral studies and from EEG recordings that observers attending to the central face 
stimulus or the central body stimulus still process the affective gist of the surrounding scene. 
For example, the face sensitive N170 is modified by the presence of a scene that is affectively 
congruent with the facial expression (Righart & de Gelder, 2006). Similarly, observers are 
more accurate in rapidly categorizing a bodily expression when it is affectively congruent 
with the affective gist of the surrounding scene (Kret & de Gelder, submitted).  
 
In this study we used magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), to investigate the neural basis of 
processing bodily expressions presented against the background of a natural scene. We 
combined fearful and neutral bodies with threatening and neutral scenes to create realistically 
looking compound stimuli and focused on the known category sensitive brain areas for bodies 
(the so-called EBA: extrastriate body area (Downing, Jiang, Shuman, & Kanwisher, 2001) 
and FBA: fusiform body area (Peelen & Downing, 2005)) and scenes (the PPA: 
parahippocampal place area (R. Epstein & Kanwisher, 1998) and RSC: retrosplenial complex 




Subjects. Twenty-one subjects (7 males; mean age (SD): 25.14 (9.5)), took part in the fMRI-
experiment. All subjects had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and no neurological or 
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psychiatric history. Informed written consent was obtained in accordance with the declaration 
of Helsinki. 
 
Task and procedures. 
a) Body-scene experiment 
Pictures of whole body expressions with the faces blurred were taken from our own validated 
database (Van den Stock, Righart, & de Gelder, 2007). Twenty-four images (12 identities, 
each with a neutral and a fearful expression) were selected for use in the present study (all 
recognized accurately above 80% in the pilot study). Scenes of happy, threatening, neutral, 
sad or disgusting everyday situation were downloaded from the internet. We selected three 
familiar scene categories (houses, cars and landscapes) that involve the same objects but with 
the different affective significances. For example, a house on fire or a holiday cottage, a 
damaged car in an accident or a shiny new convertible. None of the scenes displayed humans 
or animals. In a pilot study the scenes were presented one by one for 4000 ms with a 4000 ms 
interstimulus interval. Participants were instructed to categorize as accurately and as quickly 
as possible the pictures according to the emotion they induced in the observer. Based on the 
results we selected 24 scenes (12 threatening   and 12 neutral) for the present experiment (all 
recognized correctly above 70%). Each category contained 4 exemplars with a car, 4 with a 
building and 4 with a landscape. We created scrambled versions of every scene, by dividing it 
in 10 000 (100 x 100) squares and randomly rearranging the squares. Each  of the 24 scenes 
was combined into a compound stimulus in four different combinations (with a fearful male 
body, a fearful female body, a neutral male body and a neutral female body) resulting in 96 
realistically looking compound stimuli. The control stimuli consisted of scrambled scenes 
with natural bodies and of natural scenes with triangles instead of bodies. The 24 scrambled 
scenes were combined once with a fearful body and once with a neutral body, leading to an 
additional 48 compound stimuli. We also paired every scene with a white triangle (24 intact 
scenes + 24 scrambled scenes). These scene-triangle combinations were used as a control 
condition instead of only the scenes in order to maintain the same task in all conditions (see 
below) and to ensure all stimuli had a clear foreground/background structure. This procedure 
results in 192 unique compound stimuli. (See Fig. 1 for examples.) 
Stimuli were presented in blocks of 9000 ms, separated by fixation blocks of 15750 ms. 
Within a block, eight stimuli were presented for 800 ms with an ISI of 370 ms, during which a 




grey screen was shown. In fixation blocks, a gray screen with a black fixation cross was 
presented. We used a 3 (body: fearful, neutral and triangle) x 3 (scene: threatening, neutral 
and scrambled) factorial design. Participants were given an oddball detection task and 
instructed to press the response button when the foreground figure (body or triangle) was 
shown upside-down. A run lasted 711s and consisted of 31 experimental blocks and 32 
fixation blocks. The order of the blocks was randomized. In 4 of the 31 blocks (13%) an 
oddball stimulus occurred, while the other 27 blocks consisted of 3 blocks of every condition. 
The experiment consisted of 4 runs.  
 
b) object category localizer 
Stimuli for the object category localizer consisted of images of neutral faces taken from the 
Karolinska Directed Emotional Faces set (Lundqvist, Flykt, & Öhman, 1998), neutral human 
body postures with the faces blurred that came from the Bodily Expressive Action Stimulus 
Test (BEAST) (B de Gelder & Van den Stock, 2008), buildings (courtesy of R. Goebel) and 
handheld tools (courtesy of M. Peelen). There were 20 exemplars of each category. Half of 
the face images and half of the body images were male.  
Stimuli were presented in a blocked design. Stimulation blocks (12000 ms) were alternated 
with fixation blocks (14000 ms) on which a dark screen with white fixation cross was shown. 
Within a stimulation block, 12 stimuli were presented one by one with a duration of 450 ms 
and an inter stimulus interval of 600 ms, during which a gray screen was presented. The 
localizer run was pseudo-randomized with five consecutive series. A series contained one 
block of every stimulus category presented in a randomized order, resulting in five blocks per 
stimulus category. Half of the subjects were scanned with a parallel version in which the order 
of the stimulation blocks was reversed. The total duration of the run was 534 s (8.9 min). 
Participants performed a one-back task. The mean number of one back targets per block was 1 
(range 0-2) with an equal distribution among conditions.  
 
c) behavioral experiment 
After the scanning session, 15 of the subjects (6 male; mean age (SD): 23 (4.0)) participated 
in a behavioral experiment. All body–scene stimuli were randomly presented twice one by 
one for 800 ms while subjects were instructed to categorize the emotion expressed by the 




body in a two alternative forced choice task (fearful or neutral). No response time limited was 
given, but the instructions stated to respond as accurately and quickly as possible. 
 
fMRI scan acquisition and data analysis. Brain imaging was performed on a Siemens 
MAGNETOM Allegra 3T MR head scanner at the Maastricht Brain Imaging Center, 
Maastricht University. 
a) scan protocol and analysis 
All participants underwent four experimental runs, in which 348 T2*-weighted BOLD 
contrast volumes were acquired. On the basis of structural information from a 9-slice localizer 
scan, 42 axial slices (slice thickness=2.5 mm; no gap; inplane resolution= 3.5x3.5mm; matrix 
size=64x64; FOV=224 mm) were positioned to cover the whole brain (TE=25; TR=2250 ms; 
flip angle=90°). Slices were scanned in an interleaved ascending order. A high-resolution T1-
weighted anatomical image (voxel size=1x1x1 mm) was acquired for each subject using a 
three-dimensional magnetization-prepared rapid acquisition gradient echo (MP-RAGE) 
sequence (TR = 2250ms; TE = 2.6 ms; matrix size=256x256; 192 slices). Two functional runs 
were followed by the structural scan, after which the two remaining functional runs were 
completed.  
 
The object category localizer run came at the end of the session.  267 T2*-weighted BOLD 
contrast volumes were acquired, consisting each of 28 axial slices (slice thickness=2 mm; no 
gap; inplane resolution= 2x2 mm; matrix size=128x128; FOV=256 mm) were positioned to 
cover the (ventral) occipito-temporal cortex (TE=30; TR=2000 ms; flip angle=90°). Slices 
were scanned in an interleaved ascending order. 267 functional volumes were acquired.  
 
Imaging data were analysed using BrainVoyager QX software (Brain Innovation, Maastricht, 
Netherlands). Structural scans were segmented to delineate white matter from grey matter and 
we performed cortex-based inter-subject alignment based on the gyral/sulcal pattern of 
individual brains (Goebel, Esposito, & Formisano, 2006) to maximize anatomical between-
subjects alignment. On the bases of this, an average cortical reconstruction was made of all 
individual brains. The first two volumes of every functional run were discarded to allow for 




T1 equilibration. Preprocessing of the functional data included slice scan time correction 
(cubic spline interpolation), 3D motion correction (trilinear/sinc interpolation) and temporal 
filtering (high pass GLM-Fourier of 2 sines/cosines). Functional data were then co-registered 
with the anatomical volume and transferred into Talairach space (Talairach & Tournoux, 
1988). Analysis of cortical activation included cortex based inter-subject alignment (Goebel et 
al., 2006). The statistical analysis was based on the General Linear Model, with each 
condition defined as a predictor plus one for the oddball.  
 
Results and Discussion 
 
We focused on cortical activation in the right hemisphere, since previous studies have shown 
that categorical selectivity is observed most clearly in the right hemisphere (Kanwisher, 
McDermott, & Chun, 1997; Peelen & Downing, 2005). Subcortical activation in both 
hemispheres was also inspected. 
We explored the cortical areas that are sensitive to perception of both factors in a 3 (body: 
fearful, neutral or triangle) x 3 (scene: threatening, neutral or scramble) random effects 
ANOVA on the blood oxygenation level-dependent (BOLD) measurements (P <0.001, 
corrected for multiple comparisons (Forman et al., 1995)). The resulting beta-values of the 
different clusters were normalized and submitted to a 3 (body) x 3 (scene) repeated measures 
ANOVA. Planned comparisons post hoc tests were administered to follow up on the main and 
interaction effects. Brain areas sensitive to body perception included a large L-shaped area in 
the occipito-temporal cortex (most of the fusiform gyrus), extending dorsally at the junction 
of the occipital and temporal lobe (see Fig1). This area comprises the well known body 
selective surfaces in the middle temporal and occipital gyrus (EBA (Downing et al., 2001)) 
and in the fusiform gyrus (FBA (Peelen & Downing, 2005)). To extract these areas from the 
large cluster on a subject-level, we defined in every subject EBA and FBA on the basis of an 
object category localizer (bodies vs tools and houses; P < 0.05, uncorrected). For EBA we 
selected the set of contiguous voxels at the junction of the middle temporal and middle 
occipital gyrus (TAL: 41<x<48; -75<y<-54; -6<z<12) and for FBA in the middle part of the 
fusiform gyrus (TAL: 26<x<46; -51<y<-29; -17<z<12). A full list of activation foci and post 
hoc analysis results is presented in Table 1.  




The neural network sensitive to scene perception contained the well known parahippocampal 
place area (PPA) (R. Epstein & Kanwisher, 1998), and the retrosplenial cortex (RSC) (Bar & 
Aminoff, 2003). We localized these regions in every subject using the object category 
localizer by comparing buildings with tools, bodies and faces (P < 0.05). For PPA we selected 
the significant voxels in the parahippocampal gyrus (TAL: 19<x<28; -58<y<-34; -12<z<6) 
and for the RSC in the region of the parieto-occipital sulcus (TAL: 7<x<19; -62<y<-36; -
4<z<19).  
 





Left: Cortical activations of main and interaction effects following a 3 (body) X 3 (scene) ANOVA. 
(a) and (b): main effect of body, (c) and (d): main effect of scene and (e): body x scene interaction. 
Right: beta-values of the conditions with bodies and scenes. The values of (a) to (d) are extracted from 
subject based contrasts from localizer data (bodies vs tools and buildings for EBA (a) and FBA (b) and 
buildings vs tools, bodies and faces for RSC (c) and PPA (d). The beta-values for the interaction ROI 
(e) are extracted from the 3x3 group analysis. Conditions are represented on the X axis (from left to 
right: fearful body in threatening scene; fearful body in neutral scene; neutral body in threatening 
scene; neutral body in neutral scene. Error bars represent one standard error of the mean (SEM). *P < 
0.05; **P < 0.001.



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Fearful bodily expressions triggered higher activation levels than neutral bodies in EBA (P< 
0.0001) and FBA (P< 0.0134) (see Fig1). Furthermore, EBA activation was higher for neutral 
bodies in threatening scenes than neutral bodies in neutral scenes (P < 0.0335). This affective 
scene effect in EBA was not found for fearful bodies or control stimuli (triangles) (P < 
0.2640). The activity bias of neutral bodies in threatening scenes towards the activity level of 
fearful bodies is consistent with an emotional spillover effect from threatening scenes on 
neutral bodies. Behavioral data showed a compatible pattern: median reaction times (RT) 
showed a significantly higher RT for neutral bodies in a fearful context than for neutral bodies 
in a neutral context (P < 0.0292). A perceptual explanation may be that neutral bodies are 
emotionally ambiguous and that the emotional gist of the background scene colors the 
observers perception of the body stimulus in the foreground. This crossmodal bias effect 
reducing stimulus ambiguity is known from multisensory audiovisual perception studies (B. 
de Gelder & Bertelson, 2003) and obtains equally in the visual-visual domain. 
Secondly, in PPA neutral scenes surprisingly elicited higher activity than threatening scenes 
(P< 0.0167). Research on PPA has centered on its role in spatial, navigational and contextual 
processing (Bar, 2004; R. A. Epstein, 2008) and little is known about its response to 
emotional scenes. Our data show that neutral scenes trigger more activity than threatening 
ones. This may indicate that threatening scenes trigger less spatial/navigational processing or, 
alternatively. It may also be the case that threatening scenes evoke fewer spatial contextual 
associations than neutral scenes, because the processing focuses more on the affective gist. A 
further important observation in PPA is that neutral bodies elicit higher activity than fearful 
bodies (P< 0.0269) compatible with body to scene affective coloring. The results in RSC 
show a similar pattern, but only when the bodies are presented in neutral scenes: neutral 
bodies in neutral scenes trigger more activity than fearful bodies in neutral scenes (P< 
0.0274). There was no difference in RSC between fearful and neutral bodies when they were 
presented in a fearful or scrambled scene (P< 0.2955).  
Finally, an area in the inferior occipital gyrus (IOG), in the region corresponding to the object 
selective lateral occipital complex (LOC (Malach et al., 1995)) was sensitive to body x scene 
interactions. Threatening or neutral scenes containing a fearful or neutral body elicit more 
activation compared to when the same scenes contained a control stimulus (triangle). The 
finding that the presence of a body in a natural scene boosts activation in IOG may reflect 
attentional processing consistent with recent findings from Peelen and colleagues showing 
that attention towards particular object classes like bodies mediates activity in LOC when 




natural scenes are presented (Peelen et al., 2009). We found evidence for a body emotion 
effect in IOG, as there was higher activation for fearful than for neutral bodies (P < 0.0445). 
Again, this may point to increased visual attention to emotional stimuli, consistent with a 
recent study showing that emotional hand gestures trigger higher activity in LOC, compared 
to neutral ones (Flaisch, Schupp, Renner, & Junghofer, 2009). 
  
In conclusion, our results show clear condition specific interactions between category 
selective scene and body areas and these interactions appear to be driven by the valence of the 
scenes and the body postures. This affective contamination between bodies and scenes 
observed here is compatible with early interaction between body and scene processing as well 
as with later convergence models. Previous reports that the emotional gist of a scene in which 
a face is presented influences the face specific N170 ERP component (Righart & de Gelder, 
2006)  suggest a rapid interaction between the two processing streams. Detailed information 
about the time course of this reciprocal contamination is needed to clarify this matter further.  
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Imagine yourself taking a walk in the woods with a friend. You’re talking to each 
other and suddenly he sees a snake approaching. His behavior changes immediately: his eyes 
open widely, his shoulders move backward, and his tone of voice changes. Over the last 
decade considerable progress has been made in understanding the functional and neuro-
anatomical basis of human emotions. The combined findings from psychophysical 
investigations, lesion studies and brain imaging in neurologically intact observers have 
already provided a wealth of insights in how viewers process emotional information. Yet, it 
is noteworthy that our present understanding of how emotions are processed in humans is 
almost entirely based on studies investigating the perception of facial expressions (Adolphs, 
2002). 
 Considering the emotional value of bodily expressions, it is somewhat surprising that 
the study of perception of whole body expressions lags so far behind that of facial 
expressions. Whole body expressions provide information about the emotional state of the 
producer, but also signal his action intentions. For example, a fearful body expression can 
signal the presence of a threat, but also how the producer intends to deal with it: flee, fight or 
freeze. Therefore, body expressions reveal a close link between emotion and (adaptive) 
behavior. Despite the early work of (Darwin) (1872), who described in detail the body 
expressions of many different emotions, there have been only a few isolated studies on 
human body postures in the past decades (Argyle, 1988; Ekman, 1965; Sprengelmeyer et al., 
1999). 
Our ability to perceive these emotional behaviors and how they are represented in the 
brain are now becoming important research topics. The findings so far have revealed striking 
similarities between how we process facial and whole body emotions (de Gelder, 2006).     
For instance, at the behavioral level, some of the well-explored perceptual 
mechanisms involved in face processing also play a role in perception of bodies. Faces and 
bodies seem to be processed as invariant configurations inducing so called configural 
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processing strategies, whereas other complex stimuli are more processed as an assemblage of 
features. Configural processing is often measured by the inversion effect (configural stimuli 
presented upside-down are more difficult to recognize than other complex inverted stimuli) 
and this effect has recently also been reported for bodies (Reed, Stone, Bozova, & Tanaka, 
2003). Similar to the face inversion effect, the body inversion effect has also been measured 
with Event Related Potentials (ERP). A strong ERP inversion effect similar to what obtains 
for faces was observed for bodies (Stekelenburg & de Gelder, 2004).    
Recent developmental findings now also underscore the important role of perceiving 
bodies for infants. For example, preferential processing of either faces or bodies might be a 
function of the distance to the stimulus. If a face is present at close range, especially the eyes 
are important, but when the distance increases, the configural properties of the whole face 
play a role (Johnson, 2005). This argument can be extended to whole bodies and suggests 
that whole body expressions are preferentially processed when the perceiver is further away 
from the stimulus. In line with this, behavioral data indicate specific expectations about the 
canonical properties of static faces and bodies at around 18 months (Slaughter, Stone, & 
Reed, 2004) and of dynamic bodies at three months (Bertenthal, Proffitt, & Kramer, 1987). 
Furthermore, ERP recordings provide evidence for similar processing of the configuration of 
faces and bodies at 3 months of age (Gliga & Dehaene-Lambertz, 2005).  
At the functional neuro-anatomical level, a brain area in lateral occipital cortex has 
been described as responding selectively to neutral bodies or body parts (Downing, Jiang, 
Shuman, & Kanwisher, 2001). The fact that this area is very close to the motion sensitive 
area MT may explain its sensitivity to movement (Astafiev, Stanley, Shulman, & Corbetta, 
2004), but see, (Peelen & Downing, 2005; Schwarzlose, Baker, & Kanwisher, 2005).  Also, 
recent observations indicate significant proximity between faces and bodies in fusiform 
cortex (Schwarzlose, Baker, & Kanwisher, 2005) consistent with the finding that fearful 
bodies activate the face area in middle fusiform cortex  (de Gelder, Snyder, Greve, Gerard, & 
Hadjikhani, 2004; Hadjikhani & de Gelder, 2003) and the finding that watching video images 
of angry hands and angry faces activate largely overlapping brain areas (Grosbras & Paus, 
2006).  
Recently, we proposed a model for the underlying circuitry of perception of 
emotional body language (de Gelder, 2006), advocating a two-system network, with the 
amygdala at the core: a primary subcortical one (including amygdala, striatum, pulvinar and 
superior colliculus) involved in rapid automated reflex-like perception of whole body 
expressions and a more cortically based one involved in explicit recognition. The latter 




system comprises amygdala, superior temporal sulcus, presupplementary motor area, inferior 
parietal lobule and inferior frontal gyrus (Grèzes, Pichon, & de Gelder, 2006; Grosbras & 
Paus, 2006) 
The present study investigates emotional body postures, how they are perceived and 
what their influence is on recognition of facial and vocal expressions of emotion.  In 
Experiment 1 we investigate how well emotions are recognized from bodily expressions. In 
Experiment 2 we address the issue of synergies between facial expressions and bodily 
expressions. In Experiment 3 we explore the impact of bodily expressions on recognition of 
emotional voices.  
Experiment 1: recognition of bodily expressions 
 
The goal of this experiment was to test recognition of body expressions with a newly 
developed set of emotional body images. We asked participants to match a validated set of 
whole body expressions in a two alternative forced choice task. We used a matching task 
instead of a naming or categorization task because we wanted to investigate how well the 
different emotions are recognized on the basis of similarities with other stimuli in the same 
category and not mediated by the use of verbal labels. 
Method 
Participants. 17 neurologically intact volunteers, between the age of 18 and 28 (mean 
age was 21.3), participated in the experiment.  
Materials and procedure. Materials consisted of 72 grayscale photographs 
representing semiprofessional actors (half male) expressing different emotions with their 
whole body (anger, fear, happiness and sadness) but with the face blurred. Selection of 
materials for use in the present experiment was based on the results of a pilot study in which 
the images were presented one by one on a screen and shown for 4000 ms with a 4000 ms 
interval. Participants were instructed to categorize each stimulus in a forced-choice procedure 
choosing one among five emotions as quickly and as accurately as possible and indicating the 
response on an answering sheet. For use in the present study, we only used images recognized 
above 70% accuracy. 
A stimulus consisted of a target picture presented at the top and two probes left and right 
underneath (see Figure 1A for an example). There were always three different identities all 
three of the same gender and one of the probes had the same expression as the target. We 




balanced the design in the way that for example when fear was the target expression, there 
were two trials (one with male actors and one with female actors) with an angry distracter, 
two trials with a happy distracter and two trials with a sad distracter. A total of 72 images was 
used, arranged in 24 trials (4 emotion categories x 3 distracter categories x 2 different 
genders). To avoid identity based matching, we used three different identities on each trial.  
 Stimuli were presented on a computer screen and participants were requested to 
match (as accurately and fast as possible) one of the bottom pictures to the one on top, based 
on similarity of expressed emotion. No instructions were given about which emotions could 
be expected. They responded by pressing the corresponding button, indicating their choice for 
the left or right probe. The stimulus was presented until response . During the 1000 ms 
intertrial interval, a blank screen was shown. 
Results 
Mean accuracy data are shown in Figure 1B, mean reaction time data in Figure 1C. 
One-sample t-tests show that recognition of all body emotions is above chance level (50%), 
t(16) ≥ 12.33, p ≤ 0.001.  
A repeated measures ANOVA was carried out with expression (4 levels: anger, fear, 
happiness and sadness) as within subjects variable. This resulted in a significant effect, F(3, 
48) = 10.37, p < 0.001. Bonferroni corrected post-hoc paired samples t-tests showed 
significant differences between anger and sadness, t(16) = 3.79, p < 0.002; fear and 
happiness, t(16) = 4.40, p < 0.001; and fear and sadness, t(16) = 5.22, p < 0.001.  
A repeated measures ANOVA on the same data, but with expression of the distracter 
as within subjects factor also showed a significant effect, F(3,48) = 4.69, p < 0.006. 
Bonferroni corrected post-hoc paired samples t-tests showed significant differences between 
anger and sadness as distracters, t(16) = 3.85, p < 0.001; and fear and sadness as distracters, 
t(16) = 3.05, p < 0.008. This is in line with the findings of the analysis with target body 
expression as within subjects variable, since it shows that angry and fearful bodily 
expressions are recognized less accuratly than sad bodily expressions. 
In order to find out which emotion the expression fear was most often confused with, 
we calculated the number of errors as a function of distracter emotion on the trials where fear 
was the target emotion. Seventy-nine percent of the errors were made when anger was the 
distracter, indicating fear was most frequently confused with anger.  
We calculated the median reaction times per participant per condition and conducted a 
repeated measures ANOVA with expression (4 levels) as within subjects variable. This 




showed a significant effect, F(3, 48) = 17.18, p < 0.001. Bonferroni corrected post hoc paired 
sampled t-tests revealed significant differences between anger and sadness, t(16) = 5.10, p < 
0.001; fear and happiness, t(16) = 3.92, p < 0.001; and fear and sadness, t(16) = 3.94, p < 
0.001. 
 
Figure 1. (A) Stimulus example of a trial in Experiment 1, showing an angry expression on 
top (target) and bottom right and a sad expression on the bottom left. Graphs show accuracy 






The results of Experiment 1 indicate that the stimuli from our newly developed set body 
expressions are well recognizable without the help of verbal labels. The data also provide 
evidence for fear as the most difficult bodily expression to recognize in a forced choice 
paradigm. This finding has also been reported for facial expressions (Milders, Crawford, 
Lamb, & Simpson, 2003). Fearful expressions can be variable, depending on the kind of 
threat: one can be afraid of the dark, of getting hit, of making a public appearance, of being 




rejected, etc. These different kinds of fear are associated with different defensive behaviors. 
This may explain why fearful whole body expressions are more difficult to recognize. 
However, Atkinson, Dittrich, Gemmell and Yong (2004) presented static and dynamic whole 
body expressions (face-blurred) at three levels of intensity and both in full light and point 
light displays. They asked participants to verbally label the stimuli in a five alternative forced 
choice task (anger, disgust, fear, happiness and sadness). For the static full light displays, they 
found anger to be more poorly recognized than fear, happiness and sadness, with little 
difference between the latter. In the present study, we found no significant difference between 
angry and fearful bodies, but fear was more poorly recognized than happiness and sadness (as 
indicated by both accuracy and reaction time data). Apart from the methodological differences 
(like for example the number of presented emotions and the type of task), the differences 
between emotions reported by Atkinson et al. may be due to differences in how well the 
stimuli are recognized. We accounted for this possibility by selecting the photographs on the 
basis of the results of a pilot study, in which we tested how well they are recognized. 
 
Experiment 2: the influence of body expressions on recognition of facial 
expressions 
Only one study has investigated the combined perception of human facial and bodily 
expressions (Meeren, van Heijnsbergen, & de Gelder, 2005). Participants were presented 
compound images of faces on bodies and their emotional content was either congruent or 
incongruent. The participants’ task was to categorize the facial expression. Electrical brain 
responses were measured with EEG. The behavioral results showed participants were more 
accurate and faster when face and body expressed the same emotion. The ERP data provided 
evidence for an early perceptual integration of emotions expressed by face and body (around 
115 ms post stimulus onset). Here, we extend on those earlier findings by investigating 
whether the effects observed by Meeren et al. (2005) also apply to the emotions fear and 
happiness (as opposed to fear and anger). Further, morphed faces were used in order to test 
whether individuals use information from bodies differently when facial expressions are 









Participants. Participants were 14 first year psychology students (mean age 19.1 years).  
 Materials and procedure. Grayscale photographs of a male actor with a fearful and happy 
body expression were selected from our own validated database (recognized correctly 100 and 
90% respectively). One identity of the Ekman and Friesen (1976) facial expressions database 
was selected. We used the happy and fearful expression as extremes to create a 5-step 
continuum between the two expressions. The morphing of the expressions was done 
according to the procedure developed by Benson and Perrett (1991). The faces were edited in 
size and pasted on the body to create a realistically looking “identity” (see Figure 2B, for 
examples). Every facial expression was paired with every bodily expression. This resulted in 
10 compound stimuli: the five facial expressions pasted on the happy bodily expression and 
the same 5 faces pasted on the fearful bodily expression. 
All compound stimuli were presented on a computer screen 15 times in random order in 3 
identical blocks. Presentation time was 150 ms, after which a blank screen appeared. 
Participants were instructed to indicate whether the face expressed fear or happiness. Intertrial 
interval was 2000 ms. 
 
Results 
 The proportion happy responses was calculated for each participant and for each 
compound stimulus. Results are displayed in Figure 2A. A 5 x 2 repeated measures ANOVA 
was carried out with face (5 levels) and body (2 levels) as within subjects variables. This 
revealed a main effect of face, F(4, 52) = 106.65, p < 0.001, body, F(1, 13) = 37.56, p < 0.001 
and a significant interaction, F(4, 52) = 4.78, p < 0.002. To follow up on the interaction effect 
we compared for each of the 5 facial expressions, the difference between the proportions 
‘happy’ responses as a function of the accompanying bodily expression. Bonferroni corrected 
t tests showed a significant difference on three adjacent levels of the facial expression 
continuum, starting from the fear end (p < 0.006; p < 0.001; p < 0.001 respectively). The other 
two differences were not significant (p < 0.018 and p < 0.265). 
 A trend analysis showed there was a linear trend in the face factor , F(1,13) = 554.33, p < 
0.001, indicating the distances between the face morphs were perceived as equal. The body x 




face interaction showed a quadratic trend, F(1,13) = 23.65, p < 0.001, indicating the influence 
of the body is smaller at the extreme ends of the face continuum. 
 We calculated the median reaction times by participant and condition and performed the 
same 2 x 5 ANOVA on the reaction time data. This revealed no significant effects, indicating 
the results are not biased by a speed-accuracy tradeoff. 
 
 
Figure 2. (A) Mean proportion happy responses in Experiment 2 as a function of facial 
expression. Error bars represent 1 standard error around the mean. *p < 0.01; **p < 0.001. (B) 
Stimulus examples of Experiment 2, showing a happy body expression with a morphed face 




The results of Experiment 2 provide clear evidence  that recognition of facial expressions is 
influenced by the accompanying body language. A happy face on a happy body is categorized 
more frequently as happy, compared to when the same happy face appears on a fearful body. 
And a fearful face on a fearful body is categorized as more fearful, compared to when it 
appears in combination with a happy body expression. It should be stressed that the 
instructions explicitly stated to categorize the facial expression, so there was no ambiguity as 
regarded to the ‘target’ for classification. 




These results are consistent with a previous study using compound stimuli of angry and 
fearful facial and whole body expressions (Meeren et al., 2005) and extend those findings to 
the emotions fear and happiness. 
Moreover, the interaction and trend analysis reported in this study indicate that the influence 
of the body expression is a function of the ambiguity of the facial expression: the whole body 
expression has the most influence when the face ambiguity is highest and decreases with 
reduced facial ambiguity.  
 
Experiment 3: The influence of body language on recognition of voice prosody 
 
Multisensory integration is considered adaptive, since it reduces stimulus ambiguity 
(de Gelder & Bertelson, 2003). Previous studies have indicated that facial expressions and 
emotional tone of voice or emotional prosody influence each other (de Gelder & Vroomen, 
2000; Massaro & Egan, 1996). Emotional prosody refers to the variations in melody, 
intonations, pauses, stresses and accents of speech. Factors that play a role in voice prosody 
of some emotions are duration and intonation. For example a happy sentence is of normal 
duration, the pitch is high and there is a major change in pitch. Acoustically, ‘fear’ is very 
similar to happiness and the duration is also normal, the mean pitch is also high but the 
change in pitch is smaller than in a happy sentence. Integration of affective information from 
different sensory channels seems to be essential for accurate and fast recognition of 
emotions.  
Developmental studies on recognition of prosody typically present facial expressions 
with either prosodic congruent or incongruent vocal expressions, while measuring the 
looking time at the faces (Soken & Pick, 1992; Walker-Andrews, 1986; A.S. Walker, 1982; 
A. S. Walker & Grolnick, 1983). The results indicate that already at three months of age, 
infants can detect changes in prosody (A. S. Walker & Grolnick, 1983).  
In a study with static facial expressions and emotional spoken sentences, de Gelder 
and Vroomen (2000) observed a crossmodal influence of the affective information. 
Recognition of morphed vocal expressions was biased towards the simultaneously presented 
facial expression, even when the participants were instructed to ignore the visual stimuli. A 
follow up study suggests that this crossmodal integration of affective information takes place 
automatically, independent of attentional factors (Vroomen, Driver, & de Gelder, 2001) and 




works also when the observer is unaware of the expression of the face, as observed in a 
cortically blind patient (de Gelder, Morris, & Dolan, 2005). Investigations of the time course 
of this integration with ERP have indicated that affective information from different sensory 
channels is combined early in the perceptual process (de Gelder, Bocker, Tuomainen, 
Hensen, & Vroomen, 1999). In Experiment 3, we used a similar paradigm as de Gelder and 
Vroomen (2000) (experiment 3), but we tested for the effect of whole body expressions 




Participants. The group consisted of 16 neurologically intact participants (mean age 32.9).  
 
Materials and procedure. The visual stimuli were the same fearful and happy whole body 
expressions as in experiment 2, but with the faces blurred (see Figure 3A for an example). 
The auditory stimulus materials consist of a spoken sentence, edited as to express different 
levels of emotion on a 7-step continuum between fearful and happy. The editing consisted of 
adjusting of the duration, pitch range and pitch register (see (de Gelder & Vroomen, 2000), 
for details). For the present study, we only used the last 4 words of the sentence (“kwam met 
het vliegtuig”, meaning “arrived by plane”). The auditory stimuli lasted about 600ms. 
Audiovisual stimuli were created by pairing each body expression with each of the seven 
auditory stimuli, thus resulting in 14 audiovisual stimuli: the 7 vocal expressions paired with 
the fearful body and the same 7 vocal expressions paired with the happy body.  
The visual stimuli were presented on a computer screen. Auditory stimuli were presented at a 
comfortable listening level over loudspeakers. The on- and offset of the visual stimulus was 
synchronized with the auditory stimulus. Participants had a maximum of 4000ms to respond, 
followed by an intertrial interval of 1000ms. 
The task was to categorize the expression of the voice (fearful or happy) in a two alternative 
forced choice task. On catch trials, a white “X” appeared on the body and participants were to 
refrain from responding. We included these catch trials to make sure participants saw the 
body. The experiment was run in two sessions of both 49 randomized trials (3 presentations of 
all 14 audiovisual stimuli + 7 catch trials). The sessions were preceded by 10 practice trials. 
 






Only the participants that missed no more than 5 catch trials were selected for the analyses. 
For this reason, 2 participants were excluded from the analysis. The proportion of happy 
responses was calculated for each participant for every combination of voice prosody and 
body expression on the experimental trials. Results are displayed in Figure 3B.  
The data were submitted to a repeated measures ANOVA with voice (7 levels) and 
body (2 levels) as within subject factors. This showed a main effect of voice, F(6, 78) = 
24.90, p < 0.001, and body, F(1,13) = 9.94, p < 0.008, but no interaction.  
We calculated the median reaction times by participant and condition. Reaction time 
data are shown in Figure 3C. The 7 x 2 repeated measures ANOVA on the reaction time data 
only showed a main effect of voice, F(6, 78) = 9.43, p < 0.001. This simply reflects the fact 
that reaction times increase as the vocal expression becomes more ambiguous, as can be seen 
in Figure 3C. 
 





Figure 3. (A) Fearful whole body expression as presented in Experiment 3. (B) Mean 
proportion happy responses in Experiment 3 as a function of vocal expression. (C) Mean 
reaction time in Experiment 3 as a function of vocal expression. Error bars represent 1 





The results of experiment 3 indicate an influence of a perceived whole body 
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emotion conveyed in a voice, recognition is biased towards the simultaneously perceived 
whole body expression. The task required attention to be focused towards the voice, but 
nevertheless, there is a systematic influence of body expression.  
  The crossmodal affective bias effect has also been observed between voice prosody 
and facial expressions and seems to be mandatory and automatic (de Gelder & Vroomen, 
2000; Vroomen et al., 2001). Vroomen et al. (2001) investigated whether bimodal integration 
of affective faces and voices required limited attentional resources. Subjects judged whether a 
voice expressed happiness or fear, while instructed to ignore a concurrently presented static 
facial expression. Additional tasks were added, to manipulate the attentional load. However, 
the crossmodal bias effect was independent of whether the subjects performed a demanding 
attentional task. In line with this, the present experiment suggests perceptual integration of 
bimodal emotion expression rather than integration of the two sources based on a later post-
perceptual and more cognitive process as suggested by previous literature. ERP-studies with 
audiovisual affective stimuli point to an early integration of sensory modalities (within 110 
ms post-stimulus onset), also suggesting a perceptual mechanism, instead of a later more 
cognitive process (Pourtois, de Gelder, Vroomen, Rossion, & Crommelinck, 2000). A study 
with intracranial recordings in monkeys indicated integration of facial and vocal signals in 
primary auditory cortex through enhancement and suppression of field potentials (Ghazanfar, 
Maier, Hoffman, & Logothetis, 2005). Most importantly, the combination of a fearful face 
with a fearful tone of voice increases activation in amygdala (Dolan, Morris, & de Gelder, 
2001) indicating that the merging of information across stimulus categories is driven by the 
perception of the meaning irrespective of the medium through which the meaning is 
conveyed. These questions need to be addressed in follow-up studies using methods that 
provide a better insight in the temporal dynamics.  
   
General discussion 
 
Experiment 1 showed that the newly developed stimuli are easily recognized when no 
verbal labels are provided. We also found fear to be the most difficult emotion to be 
recognized, consistent with previous reports on facial expressions (Milders et al., 2003).  
In Experiment 2, we found perception of facial expressions to be biased towards the 
not explicitly attended and task irrelevant body language. This replicates our findings of a 
similar previous study (Meeren et al., 2005), but additionally extends the obervations to other 




combinations of emotions and indicates that the magnitude of  the influence of the body 
expression depends on the facial expression ambiguity. The data of Experiment 3 show that 
when participants are asked to identify the emotional tone of a voice, while ignoring a 
simultaneously presented body, they are nevertheless susceptible to be influenced by the 
bodily expression.  
The results of the present study clearly indicate the importance of whole body 
expressions as significant emotional stimuli and reveals similarities with findings from facial 
expression research. The presence of an unattended expressive body influences recognition of 
faces and auditory stimuli.  
From an evolutionary perspective, an important adaptive function of body language is 
communication of relevant information to other members of the species. Especially in social 
species, there are considerable adaptive benefits in the ability to interpret emotional displays 
by conspecifics (Dawkins & Krebs, 1978). This is especially the case when the facial 
expression of the producer is not visible, for example because of the viewers’ perspective or 
because of a too great distance to the stimulus.   
In the case of emotional body language, perceiving dynamics seem to be particularly 
important. Recognition of dynamic whole body expressions is easier than static stimuli 
(Atkinson et al., 2004) and seems little affected by cultural factors (Hejmadi, Davidson, & 
Rozin, 2000; Rozin, Taylor, Ross, Bennett, & Hejmadi, 2005).  The present studies used static 
images, in line with the large majority of studies of facial expressions, but there is reason to 
believe that the important dynamic emotion information may not need to be present explicitly 
to create a dynamic percept.  When viewing two successive presentations of a stimulus object 
with implied motion, subjects fail to notice the difference between them if the second one 
represents the same event, but a moment later in time (Freyd, 1983). Moreover, viewing 
implied motion stimuli activates brain area MT/MST, involved in the processing of movement 
(Kourtzi & Kanwisher, 2000). For the case of emotional whole body expressions, we 
observed that viewing static fear images yield strong activity in motor areas (de Gelder et al., 
2004).  More recently, we compared activation for static versus dynamic presentation of the 
same images and observed no difference in amygdala activity for the two presentation 
conditions (Grèzes et al., 2006).  Thus there is reason to believe that the sight of  a bodily 
expression of emotion  affects the viewer profoundly even when motion is not explicitly 
shown. Creating this emotional movement illusion is indeed what the visual arts have excelled 
at since a very long time.    
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When Hitchcock shows Norman Bates stabbing his victim to death in the shower or 
when the dorsal fin of a shark surfaces in “Jaws”, the soundtrack is always there to underscore 
the message. Movie directors rely heavily on the extra dimension added to the movie 
experience by the soundtrack to convey emotion and aim at creating a multimodal experience 
in the viewer. 
Experimental research on combined perception of auditory and visual stimuli has a 
long history (Müller, 1840), and there is now considerable evidence that multisensory stimuli 
presented in spatial or temporal proximity are bound by the brain into a unique perceptual 
gestalt (for reviews see de Gelder & Bertelson, 2003; Welch & Warren, 1986). Studies 
investigating the recognition of bimodal human emotional expressions typically consist of 
presenting audiovisual stimulus pairs in which the emotional content between the visual and 
auditory modality is either congruent or incongruent (de Gelder, Bocker, Tuomainen, Hensen, 
& Vroomen, 1999; de Gelder & Vroomen, 2000; Ethofer et al., 2006; Massaro & Egan, 1996; 
Spreckelmeyer, Kutas, Urbach, Altenmuller, & Munte, 2006; Van den Stock, Righart, & de 
Gelder, 2007). For example, de Gelder and Vroomen (2000) presented a static face expressing 
sadness or happiness combined with a spoken sentence with an emotionally neutral meaning 
but with either a sad or happy tone of voice. Participants were asked to ignore the voice and to 
indicate whether the face expressed happiness or sadness. The results indicated a clear 
crossmodal bias, e.g. a sad facial expression paired with a happy voice was recognized more 
as happy, compared to when the same facial expression was paired with a sad voice. In a 
follow up experiment, the task was reversed and participants were instructed to categorize the 
vocal expression and ignore the face. The results showed that the voice ratings were biased 
towards the emotion expressed by the face. The findings from de Gelder and Vroomen (2000) 
are consistent with other studies on bimodal perception of affect expressed in face and voice 
(de Gelder et al., 1999; Ethofer et al., 2006; Massaro & Egan, 1996).  
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We know from daily experience that emotions are not solely expressed in the face and 
the voice, but also conveyed very forcefully and over considerable distance by postures and 
movements of the whole body. Research on whole body perception is emerging as a new field 
in neuroscience (e.g. Atkinson, Dittrich, Gemmell, & Young, 2004; de Gelder, 2006; Grezes, 
Pichon, & de Gelder, 2007; Peelen & Downing, 2007). In view of these new findings a 
question is whether similar interactions as previously observed for facial expressions and 
auditory stimuli will also be obtained when observers are shown body-voice pairs. Recently, 
we presented static happy and fearful whole body expressions with faces blurred and each 
combined with a happy or fearful voice. Participants were asked to ignore the body expression 
and rate the emotion expressed by the voice. The results indicated that recognition of voice 
prosody was biased towards the emotion expressed by the whole body (Van den Stock et al., 
2007, experiment 3). Here, we take that line of research a step further and investigate whether 
similar effects can be obtained with a dynamic body images. Also, we address the question 
whether as suggested by the familiar movie viewer’s experience there is crossmodal influence 
if both modalities are unmistakably and recognizably produced by a different source as is 
indeed often the case in naturalistic circumstances in which we observe the bodily expressions 
with the audio track accompanying the visual images.  
In this study, we present dynamic whole body expressions of emotion, showing persons 
engaged in an everyday activity and in a realistic context. In contrast to earlier studies we 
used nonverbal auditory information consisting of human vocalizations and also of animal 
sounds, two conditions that befit the naturalistic circumstances of viewing emotional body 
expressions from a relative distance. By using these two kinds of auditory information we 
may address the issue whether environmental sounds (i.e. auditory stimuli originating from a 
source other than the visual stimulus) have a similar influence on recognition of visual 
human expressions as we expect voices to have. 
Thirdly, to minimize semantic or verbal processing, which is initiated automatically 
when verbal information is presented, we used nonverbal auditory materials. Until now, only 
verbal vocalizations have been used to investigate crossmodal bias effects in processing 
human expressions. Nonverbal utterances have been used recently in scene-voice pairs. 
Spreckelmeyer et al. (2006) presented an emotionally sung syllable (“ha”) paired with an 
emotional scene and asked participants to rate the valence of the scene. The authors did not 
observe an influence of the nonverbal vocalization on the ratings of the visual stimulus. 
However, pairing scenes with a sung syllable has limited ecological value. Also, a number of 




scenes in this study evoke an emotional experience, rather than showing an emotional 
expression (for example a picture of a baby or bunny).  
Here, we investigate the influence of human and environmental emotional auditory 
information on the recognition of emotional body expression. For the case of the 
environmental auditory stimuli, we presented animal vocalizations inducing fear or happiness, 
creating realistic bimodal stimuli in the congruent conditions. Participants were presented 
video clips of happy or fearful body language. These were simultaneously presented with 
either congruent or incongruent human or animal vocalizations, or without auditory 
information. The experiment used a two alternative forced choice task and the instructions 





Participants. Twenty-seven adults (14 male; 23 right-handed; mean age 31.5, range 18-50) 
participated in the experiment. They all gave written consent according to the Declaration of 
Helsinki. None of them had a history of neurological or psychiatric disorders. All had normal 
or corrected to normal vision and normal hearing. 
Stimulus materials.  
Visual stimuli. Video recordings were made of 12 semi-professional actors (6 women), 
coached by a professional director. They were instructed to approach a table, pick up a glass, 
drink from it and to put it back on the table. They performed this action once in a happy and 
once in a fearful manner. A continuous fragment of 800 ms was selected from each video 
showing the actor grasping the glass. Facial expressions were blurred using motion tracking 
software. See Figure 1 for an example. 
 





Figure 1. An example of frames from the video clips. The frame selection on the top row 
shows an actor grasping a glass in a fearful manner, the one on the bottom row performs the 
same action in a happy manner. The faces are blurred to minimize facial expression. 
 
In a pilot study the 24 edited dynamic stimuli (20 frames) were presented 4 times to 14 
participants. Participants were instructed to categorize as accurately and as fast as possible the 
emotion expressed by the actor (fear or happiness). The pilot session was preceded by eight 
familiarization trials. Sixteen stimuli were selected (2 gender x 4 actors x 2 emotions). Since 
we expected that recognition of the body language improves when the body stimuli are 
combined with congruent auditory information, body stimuli that were recognized at ceiling 
were not selected. Mean recognition of the selected stimuli was 86.1 percent (SD 9.7). A 
paired t-test between the fearful and happy body language showed no significant difference, 
t(13) = 1.109, p < .287. 
Auditory stimuli. Audio recordings were made at a sampling rate of 44.1 kHz of 22 
subjects (14 women), while they made non-verbal emotional vocalizations (fearful and 
happy). Specific scripts were provided for every target emotion. For example, for fear the 




actors were instructed to imagine they were going to be attacked by a robber and to react to 
such an encounter in a nonverbal manner.  Video clips were edited and the most 
representative 800 ms fragment from each recording was cut and digitally stored on a PC. In a 
pilot study the sounds were presented to 15 participants. Every sound was presented 4 times 
in a randomized order. The participants were instructed to categorize as accurately and as fast 
as possible the emotion expressed by the voice (fear or happiness). The pilot session was 
preceded by 3 familiarization trials. Based on these results, eight fearful and eight happy 
sounds were selected. Mean recognition of the stimuli was 94.6 percent (SD 6.7). A paired t-
test between the fearful and happy vocalizations showed no significant difference, t(14) = 
0.474, p < .643. 
Environmental sounds consisted of aggressive dog barks and joyful bird songs and were 
downloaded from the internet. Stimuli were selected on the basis of their emotion inducing 
characteristics. In a third pilot study, these sounds were presented 4 times to 13 participants. 
They were instructed to categorize as accurately and as fast as possible the emotion induced 
by the sound (fear or happiness). The pilot session was preceded by 3 familiarization trials. 
Eight fear inducing and eight happiness inducing sounds were selected. Mean recognition of 
the stimuli was 94.8 percent (SD 5.7). A paired t-test between the fearful and happy 
vocalizations showed no significant difference, t(12) = 1.469, p < .168. 
For each emotion we compared the ratings of the animal vocalizations with those of the 
human vocalizations. Independent samples t-tests showed no differences between the pairs 
t(26) ≤ 1.195, p < .243. 
Experimental stimuli were then constructed with these visual and auditory materials. For this 
purpose each video file was paired once with a fearful and happy human vocalization, 
resulting in a total of 32 bimodal stimuli (human video/human audio) and once with a fear 
(dog barking) and happiness inducing (birdsong) animal vocalization, resulting in a total of 32 
bimodal stimuli (human video/animal audio). 
Procedure. The experiment consisted of a visual (V) and an audio-visual (AV) block. 
In each block all stimuli were presented twice in random order. The order of the blocks was 
counterbalanced. The AV-block consisted of 128 trials (2 presentations of 64 stimuli: 16 
fearful videos with congruent human sounds, 16 fearful videos with incongruent human 
sounds, 16 videos with congruent animal sounds and 16 videos with incongruent animal 
sounds), the V-block of 32 trials (2 presentations of 16 stimuli, 8 fearful and 8 happy clips). A 




trial started with the presentation of a white fixation cross in the center of the screen against a 
dark background. The fixation cross had a variable duration to reduce temporal predictability 
(2000-3000 ms) and was followed by presentation of a stimulus (800 ms) after which a 
question mark appeared until the participant responded. A two alternative forced choice task 
was used requiring the participants to categorize the emotion expressed in the body by 
pressing the corresponding button (happy or fearful). Response buttons were counterbalanced 
across participants. Because we wanted to make sure participants saw the full length of the 





Trials with reaction times below 1000 ms and above 3000 ms (post stimulus onset) were 
excluded. One participant responded outside this time window on more than 10 % of the trials and was 
therefore excluded from the analysis. We computed the proportion happy responses of the different 
conditions. Results are shown in Figure 2.  
 




Figure 2. Proportion ‘happy’ in the bimodal and unimodal conditions, separated by emotion, auditory 
category and congruence. Error bars represent 1SEM. * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001. 
 
  Human vocalizations: 
A repeated measures ANOVA was performed on the proportion happy responses with visual 
emotion (fearful and happy) and (human) auditory emotion (fearful, happy and no auditory 
stimulus) as within-subjects factors. This revealed a significant effect of visual emotion 
F(1,25) = 85.993, p < .001, auditory emotion, F(2,50) = 16.523, p < .001, and a significant 
interaction between visual emotion and auditory emotion, F(2,50) = 5.761, p < .006.  
To follow up on the interaction effect and to test the influence of the auditory stimuli 
on the recognition of the visual stimuli, we performed paired sample t-tests. Against the 
background of our previous experiments using faces and voices (e.g. de Gelder & Vroomen, 
2000), we expect expression recognition performance on the congruent stimulus combinations 
to be better, compared to the unimodal combinations. Likewise, performance on the unimodal 
conditions is expected to higher than on the incongruent conditions. Therefore, we performed 
one tailed t-tests, comparing the unimodal conditions (V) with their respective bimodal 




conditions. For the happy body language, there was a difference between baseline [V(happy)] 
and both congruent AV, t(25) = 2.935, p < .01, and incongruent AV, t(25) = 2.945, p < .01. 
For the fearful body language, there was a significant difference between baseline [V(fear)] 
and incongruent AV, t(25) = 4.217, p < .001.  
Animal vocalizations:  
A repeated measures ANOVA on the proportion happy responses with visual emotion (fearful 
and happy) and (animal) auditory emotion (fearful, happy and no auditory stimulus) as 
within-subjects factors, revealed a significant effect of visual emotion F(1,25) = 92.050, p < 
0.001, auditory emotion, F(2,50) = 3.405, p < .041, and an interaction between visual emotion 
and auditory emotion, F(2,50) = 5.040, p < .010. The post-hoc paired t-tests (one tailed) 
showed significant differences between V(happiness) and congruent AV, t(25) = 1.823, p < 
0.040; between V(happiness) and incongruent AV, t(25) = 1.948, p < 0.032 and between 
V(fear) and incongruent AV, t(25) = 1.726, p < 0.050. 
human and animal vocalizations: 
To compare the influence of human with animal vocalizations, we ran a 2 (video emotion: 
fearful and happy) x 2 (auditory emotion: fearful and happy) x 2 (auditory source: human and 
animal) repeated measures ANOVA on the proportion happy responses. This revealed a 
significant main effect of visual emotion F(1,25) = 56.048, p < 0.001; auditory emotion 
F(1,25) = 11.001, p < 0.005, a two-way visual x auditory emotion interaction F(1,25) 
=11.564, p < 0.005; a two-way auditory emotion x source interaction F(1,25) = 16.088, p < 
0.001, a two-way visual emotion x source interaction F(1,25) = 5.140, p < 0.05; and a three-
way visual emotion x auditory emotion x source interaction F(1,25) = 5.532, p < 0.05. The 
two-way auditory emotion x source interaction indicates a different influence of the human 
and animal vocalizations. To follow up on this effect, we compared the influence of the 
human with the animal vocalizations, by computing the difference between the congruent and 
incongruent combinations, for the human and animal sounds separately (namely the human 
congruent conditions minus the human incongruent conditions and the animal congruent 
conditions minus the animal incongruent conditions). This difference was significantly larger 
for the human audio (mean 0.27, std 0.32) than for the animal audio (mean 0.12, std 0.31), as 
revealed by a two-tailed paired sample t-test t(25) = 4.011, p < 0.001. The three-way 
interaction indicates the differential influence of the sources varies across visual emotion. We 
therefore computed the difference between the congruent and incongruent conditions for 
every auditory source and visual emotion. Paired t-tests showed for both happy and fearful 




body language a significant difference between the human congruent minus incongruent 
measure and the animal congruent minus incongruent measure. 
 




The first aim of the present study was to investigate whether auditory information 
influences recognition of the emotion expressed in a simultaneously presented dynamic body 
expression. To test whether such crossmodal influence obtains, we presented video clips 
paired with nonverbal vocalizations and presented these stimuli with the instruction to 
categorize the emotion expressed by the body while ignoring the information provided by the 
auditory channel. Our results clearly indicate that recognition of body expressions is 
influenced by nonverbal vocal expressions. These findings are consistent with previous 
reports of crossmodal bias effects of vocal expressions on recognition of facial expressions, 
so far all using verbal stimuli (de Gelder et al., 1999; de Gelder & Vroomen, 2000; Ethofer et 
al., 2006; Massaro & Egan, 1996).  
Our second aim was to investigate whether crossmodal influence is dependent on the 
perceived source of the auditory information or also obtains when different sources (human 
or animal sounds) have a similar signal function. Indeed, we find a clear influence of task 
irrelevant human voices on recognition of body language. However, the results also 
demonstrate that recognition of body language is influenced by environmental sounds. Happy 
body language is recognized better in combination with joyful bird songs, and recognized 
worse in combination with aggressive dog barks, compared to when the same happy body 
language is presented without auditory information. Human bodies are more intimately 
linked to human vocal expressions than animal vocalizations, which suggest that crossmodal 
influences are more probable in body-voice pairs, even if both can be perceived as carrying 
the same meaning, a typical example being danger signaling. The significant auditory 
emotion x source two-way interaction indicates that the impact of human vocalizations on the 
recognition of body language is larger than the impact of animal vocalizations. In view of the 
results of the pilot study which showed that human and animal vocalizations are recognized 
equally well, one may take this result as indicating that in general, human sounds influence 




recognition of human body language to a greater extent than animal sounds. Such an 
interpretation would be consistent with views in the literature on the importance of semantic 
and cognitive factors in multisensory pairing. A more finely tuned comparison of the impact 
of both sources would need a more detailed balancing of both sources, for example on the 
basis of the variability in pitch and volume. Much as such controls are needed in future 
research, we would like to point out that controlling the physical dimensions does not settle 
questions on the role of semantic and cognitive factors affecting crossmodal bias (de Gelder 
& Bertelson, 2003). The nature of the privileged link between a facial or a bodily expression 
and auditory affective information produced by a person is at present not well understood. 
Similarly, comparisons between human sounds and the ones present in the environment have 
so far not been undertaken frequently. One recent suggestion is that the link between human 
face-body expressions and human vocalizations is based on premotor and motor structures in 
charge of producing the seen as well as the heard actions (Kohler et al., 2002). This would 
indeed explain the special status of human vocalizations observed here. But clear evidence in 
support of this view is currently not available. On the other hand, if at present there were a 
body of evidence, as for example could be provided by brain imaging studies,  in support of 
the notion that heard and seen emotional expressions activate similar brain areas, alternative 
explanations come to mind.  In fact, seen and heard emotion expressions may both activate 
the same “affect program” as argued for example by Tomkins (1962, 1963) and later Ekman 
(1982). Known convergence of auditory and visual afferents on the amygdala support this 
view (Dolan, Morris, & de Gelder, 2001).  The latter alternative can accommodate easily the 
similarity in emotional signal function between human and animal sounds without appeal to a 
perception/production link. The present study raises these questions as topics for future 
research in the relatively novel field which will need to address the issues raised for three 
decades concerning the links between seen and heard speech perception.  In the same vein 
future research will address the question whether the crossmodal bias also obtains between a 
visual image and a written word instead of its sound referent. This is again a matter that has 
been investigated in the area of audiovisual speech and been answered negatively (Vroomen 
& de Gelder, 2000) 
The crossmodal influence we observe here is slightly different depending on whether 
the bodily expressions are fearful or happy. A comparison of the AV-conditions with the V-
condition yielded a performance increase in AV-congruent condition and a performance 
decline in AV-incongruent condition for happy bodily expressions. For the fearful body 
language, we observe only a performance decline in AV-incongruent condition. So we find 




for the happy body language both a congruency and incongruency effect, but for the fearful 
body language, we find only an incongruence effect. The lack of a congruency effect for 
fearful body language cannot be explained by a ceiling effect given the results of the pilot 
data. We have currently no solid explanation for this differential crossmodal influence on the 
happy and fearful body language. An interesting topic for future research concerns the 
question whether the magnitude of emotional crossmodal influence differs between different 
emotions. 
The results from the present study clearly indicate that crossmodal influences also 
occur even if both modalities are unmistakably produced by a different source. A relevant 
question would be what the conditions are for bimodal stimuli to be susceptible to 
crossmodal influences. Next to the obvious conditions of temporal and spatial congruence, 
animacy could play a role in the case of social stimuli. A recent event related potential (ERP) 
study compared brain waveforms when perceiving human faces paired with either a human 
burp, or a monkey scream or a squeaking door. Results pointed to animacy specific neural 
responses, next to species-specific brain waveforms (Puce, Epling, Thompson, & Carrick, 
2007).  
An important issue concerns the nature of the crossmodal influence. On the basis of a 
behavioral study, no direct inference can be made that the observed crossmodal influence has 
a perceptual basis. However, the instructions explicitly stated to base the emotional 
categorization solely on one modality (i.e. the visual), which is standard procedure in 
research dealing with conflicting multimodal inputs (Bertelson, 1998) and suggests an 
integrative perceptual process (de Gelder & Vroomen, 2000). Crossmodal integration of 
face-voice pairs seems unaffected by attentional resources (Vroomen, Driver, & de Gelder, 
2001) and a study with event-related potentials (ERP) indicates a very early integration of 
emotional faces and voices (around 110 ms after stimulus onset) (Pourtois, de Gelder, 
Vroomen, Rossion, & Crommelinck, 2000). To examine the possible perceptual basis of a 
crossmodal bias effect with a behavioral paradigm, the ratings of unimodal stimuli in a pre-
test could be compared with the ratings of a post-test, with repeated presentations of bimodal 
pairs between the pre-test and post-test. The presence of after-effects of the bimodal 
presentations on the post-test unimodal ratings would point to a perceptual influence of the 
auditory information. The present study indicates the occurrence of crossmodal influences of 
both human and animal vocalizations on the recognition of dynamic body language, but does 
not allow conclusions concerning the nature of the effects. 




Ecological validity is an important factor in multisensory integration (de Gelder & 
Bertelson, 2003). Multimodal inputs reduce stimulus ambiguity and the brain has primarily 
evolved to maximize adaptiveness in the real world, and this is one of the reasons why we 
choose visual stimuli with high ecological validity, namely the performance of an everyday 
action in the context of a realistic situation. 
Recent functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies looked at the neural 
correlates of integrating emotional faces and voices (Dolan et al., 2001; Ethofer et al., 2006; 
Kreifelts, Ethofer, Grodd, Erb, & Wildgruber, 2007) and found increased activity in the left 
amygdala, when a fearful face was presented with a fearful voice (Dolan et al., 2001; Ethofer 
et al., 2006). The amygdala receive inputs from visual and auditory association cortex in the 
mammalian brain (McDonald, 1998) and its role in processing emotional stimuli is well 
established (see Zald, 2003 for a review).  The amygdala therefore seems a primary candidate 
brain structure for integrating emotional information from different modalities. 
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The movie ‘2001: A Space Odyssey’ is a landmark in the science-fiction genre. A classic scene 
shows a man-ape smashing a skeleton with a bone, while Richard Strauss’s Also Sprach Zarathustra 
blasts in the background. It is the combination of these visual and auditory inputs that results in a 
unique experience in the viewer. 
Research on multisensory perception has a long history (Müller, 1840) and focussed on 
audiovisual speech (McGurk & MacDonald, 1976). However, multisensory research on emotional 
events is scarce and was until recently limited to investigations into the perception of facial and vocal 
expressions (e.g. de Gelder & Vroomen, 2000). In the latter type of studies two modalities are 
typically combined to create emotionally congruent and incongruent face-voice pairs and to provide a 
window into the integration process (de Gelder & Bertelson, 2003). Participants are instructed to rate 
the emotion in one of the two modalities while ignoring the other. The results have shown that 
recognition of the emotion in the target modality is typically influenced towards the emotion expressed 
in the task irrelevant modality.  
In two recent studies we have taken this issue beyond facial expressions and investigated 
affective crossmodal influences in whole body expressions (Van den Stock, Grezes, & de Gelder, 
2008). Here we investigated naturalistic actions that are part of everyday life and focussed on 
instrumental actions, like grasping and drinking. Our data showed that affective crossmodal effects 
occur with body-voice pairs, but also when body expressions are presented with animal vocalizations 
(Van den Stock et al., 2008). In the present study, we take the issue of affective crossmodal influence a 
step further and focus on bimodal stimuli that are not normally associated with each other, namely 
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Participants. Fifteen adult participants (7 male) were recruited through the local newspaper and 
were paid 20€. Mean age (SD) was 44.0 (12.6) years. Guidelines of the Declaration of Helsinki were 
followed. 
Materials. Visual materials consisted of video recordings of 12 actors (6 male) (1998) who 
performed an everyday action (picking up a glass, drinking from it and putting it back on the table) 
and were shown in full body view. See Fig 1 for examples. They performed this action with different 
emotional expressions (anger, disgust, fear, happiness, sadness and neutral). Before the performance, 
they were briefed with a specific scenario. For example, the happy scenario specified that the glass 
contained the favourite drink of the actor. The scenarios for all emotions are shown in Table 1. 
3000ms fragments were taken from the recordings and the faces of the actors were blurred. We used 
video editing software (Adobe Aftereffects 8.0) to track the trajectory of the face in the movie and we 
replaced the face by a blurred mask. In a pilot study, all edited stimuli were presented 4 times in 
random order to 14 participants. They were instructed to categorize the emotion expressed by the actor 
in a 6 alternative forced choice task (anger, disgust, fear, happiness, sadness and neutral). On the basis 
of these, we selected 10 happy videos (5 male) and 10 sad videos (5 male) that were all correctly 
recognized above 75%. 
Table 1: scenarios provided to the actors to perform the action with different emotions 
Emotion Scenario 
Anger You just had an intense quarrel with a friend and you are very angry when you drink 
from the glass 
Disgust The glass contains a stomach-turning liquid and you are very disgusted 
Fear The content of the glass is extremely hot and you are afraid to drink it 
Happiness The glass contains your favourite drink and this makes you very happy 
Sadness You are returning from the funeral of a loved one and feel very sad, while you drink the 
glass 
Neutral Drink from the glass without any specific emotional state of mind 
 





Figure 1.  Examples of frames from the video clips. The top row shows frames from a happy 
video, the bottom row shows frames from a sad video 
 
Auditory materials consisted of fragments from the classical repertoire that expressed a 
happy or a sad tone and are described and validated in Peretz et al. (1998). We selected a 
3000ms fragment from 10 happy and 10 sad excerpts. Results in Peretz et al. (1998) show that 
distinct happy and sad ratings are already elicited after 500ms. 
 
Procedure 
Each of the 20 auditory stimuli was randomly paired once with a happy video and once 
with a sad video. This resulted in 40 unique bimodal stimuli of which 20 were congruent (e.g. 
happy audio paired with happy video) and 20 were incongruent (e.g. happy audio paired with 
sad video).  




The experiment consisted of a visual (V), an auditory (A) and an audiovisual (AV) 
block. The order of blocks was randomized. A trial always started with presentation of a white 
fixation cross against a dark background shown for a variable duration of 1000-3000ms to 
reduce temporal predictability. This was followed by presentation of a stimulus (V, A or AV 
3000ms) after which a dark screen with a white question mark was shown until a response 
was given. In the V-block, the stimuli consisted of the 20 videos that were randomly 
presented one by one while the participants were instructed to categorize the emotion 
expressed by the actor. In the A-block the 20 auditory stimuli were randomly presented under 
the instruction to categorize the emotion expressed by the music. In the AV-block, all 40 
bimodal stimuli were randomly presented and the instructions explicitly stated to categorize 
as accurately and as fast as possible the emotion expressed by the body language of the actor. 
The on- and offset of the visual and auditory stimuli in the AV-block were synchronized. 
Auditory stimuli were delivered through pc speakers located on the left and right of the 
screen. The volume was set at a comfortable listening level. 
 
Results 
The results are displayed in Fig 2. We calculated the proportion happy responses for 
every condition in every block. A paired samples t-test showed there was no significant 
difference between the proportion happy responses in the happy audio condition and the 
proportion sad responses in the sad audio condition (t(14) = .168, p<.869), indicating both 
expressions are equally well recognized. A repeated measures ANOVA on the proportion 
happy responses with visual emotion (2 levels: happy and sad) and auditory emotion (3 levels: 
happy, sad and no audio) as within-subjects factors revealed a significant main effect of visual 
emotion (F(1,14) = 506, p<.001) and of auditory emotion (F(2,28) = 4.734, p<.017). The 
interaction was not significant (F(2,28) = .278, p<.760). The main effect of visual emotion 
indicates that the proportion happy responses is higher in the conditions with happy body 
language. This is to be expected since the task involved categorization of the emotion 
expressed by the body. Therefore, the main effect of visual emotion merely indicates that 
happy body expressions are more frequently rated as happy compared to sad body 
expressions. The main effect of auditory emotion indicates that the proportion happy 
responses differs according to auditory condition. Pairwise post-hoc comparisons (LSD 
corrected) on the main effect of auditory emotion showed that the proportion happy responses 
is significantly higher in the conditions with happy audio, compared to both sad audio 




(p<.039) and to no audio (p<.005). This means that both visual conditions, namely happy and 
sad dynamic whole body expressions are categorized more frequently as expressing happiness 
when they are presented simultaneously with happy music compared to when each of these 
visual conditions are presented with sad music or without auditory information. 
 
 
Fig 2 Proportion ‘happy’ responses as a function of body expression and auditory 
information. Error bars represent 1 SEM. 
 
The absence of a visual emotion x auditory emotion interaction effect indicates that the effect 
of auditory information is of equal magnitude in both visual conditions. The results also show 
that the proportion happy responses is lowest in the condition with sad audio, but the 
difference with the other audio conditions was not significant (p<.086). 
Since the task stated to respond when the question mark appeared, no reaction time data were 
analysed.  
 






The results show that emotional dynamic whole body expressions presented with happy 
music are recognized more as happy compared to when the same body expressions are paired 
with sad classical music or without auditory information. Even when instructions explicitly 
state to categorize the emotion expressed by the visual stimulus, the ratings are influenced 
towards the emotion expressed by the auditory stimulus. Our findings show that the influence 
of happy music is equally pronounced in both happy and sad body language. Moreover, body 
expressions presented with sad music are recognized more frequently as sad compared to 
when the bodies are presented in isolation or with happy music, but this effect is only 
marginally significant. The stronger influence of the auditory material on the happy body 
expressions compared to the sad expressions might be related to the level of intensity, 
valence and/or arousal expressed in the visual stimuli. Another possibility regards the 
matching of visual and auditory dynamics. It is not unlikely that congruence between 
changes in musical tempo and visual movement contributes to crossmodal influences. In 
previous studies, we have shown that whole body expressions of emotion can influence 
recognition of vocal emotional expressions (Van den Stock, Righart, & de Gelder, 2007), but 
also that whole body expressions are influenced by both human and animal vocalizations 
(Van den Stock et al., 2008). The rate of co-occurrence of body-voice pairs in natural 
circumstances is high, since both are produced by the same source. Presumably the 
perceptual system is well versed in the simultaneous processing of jointly produced or at 
least naturalistically co-occurring visual and auditory inputs and may therefore rely on 
specialized mechanisms for crossmodal binding (de Gelder & Bertelson, 2003). The 
combination of whole body expressions and animal vocalizations is less frequent and by this 
reasoning crossmodal influence between these stimulus categories is less evident. Still, 
simultaneous perception of a fearful body expression and a fear inducing dog bark can be 
perceived as one event, especially considered from an evolutionary perspective. However, 
the evolutionary significance of watching a person grasping an object while hearing 
instrumental classical music is less direct and less understood. The importance of the present 
findings lies in the fact that even multimodal inputs with no direct strong adaptive association 
can modulate the affective interpretation of clearly separate information streams. 
Nevertheless, instrumental music and body movements certainly occur frequently in dance, 
movies, social situations, etc. Our results show it is worth considering that the brain is 




organized for maintaining these flexible associations. Music may also mimic prosodic cues 
that otherwise communicate emotion vocally or through ambient environmental sounds. 
Even if the effectiveness of music for conveying emotion is entirely a learned process shaped 
by culture, it is interesting that the brain has found a way to link music to emotion and 
furthermore to cross-modally link music and bodily cues. 
 
The pilot validation study consisted of a 6 alternative forced choice design. The primary aim 
of this pilot study was to assess how well the stimuli expressed the target emotion and 
therefore we offered the participants a range of response alternatives.  In the main experiment, 
we choose to administer a design with 2 response alternatives in keeping with the design of 
our previous experiments (Van den Stock et al., 2008; Van den Stock et al., 2007). The aim of 
the main experiment was to investigate crossmodal influence and we believe that a more 
limited number of response possibilities is preferable when making affective judgments in this 
context. Increasing the number of response alternatives may involve a higher appeal to more 
cognitive processes. 
Despite the fact that the data from the pilot validation study show that the visual stimuli are 
easily recognizable when it comes to emotional categorization, one can not entirely exclude 
that the action in itself, i.e. drinking has an emotionally neutral association. For example it 
may be that drinking is associated with relief of thirst and is thereby biased towards a positive 
valence. However, the main interest of the present study concerns crossmodal influence 
elicited by the auditory information and this is measured by the difference between visual and 
audiovisual conditions. The primary focus of this study is the change between how congruent, 
incongruent and unimodal stimuli are categorized and the valence of the action itself 
(drinking) is equal in all the conditions. 
One possible explanation for the observed effects might be that both visual and auditory 
emotional information elicit a similar affect program (Panksepp, 1998; Tomkins, 1962, 1963), 
which is neuro-anatomically supported by the involvement of premotor structures in 
perception of both body expressions (de Gelder, Snyder, Greve, Gerard, & Hadjikhani, 2004) 
and music (Minati et al., 2008).  
An alternative but not incompatible explanation at the neuro-anatomical level implies a link 
between production and perception of emotional actions. Bimodal mirror neurons in monkey 
premotor and motor structures display an increased firing rate when an action is either 




performed, seen or heard (Kohler et al., 2002). Indirect evidence from functional Magnetic 
Resonance Imaging (fMRI) supports the existence of a similar mirror (Grèzes, Armony, 
Rowe, & Passingham, 2003) and bimodal mirror (Lahav, Saltzman, & Schlaug, 2007) system 
in premotor cortex in humans. The latter study shows that the premotor cortex of non-
musicians is more activated by listening to musical excerpts that they have recently learned to 
play on the piano than by music they have never played. Although this study does not focus 
on the affective features of the music, it indicates that more complex auditory stimuli like 
classical music activate right premotor structures in humans. We have shown previously that 
perception of emotional body language also activates right premotor structures (de Gelder et 
al., 2004; Grezes, Pichon, & de Gelder, 2007). These combined findings may provide a neuro-
anatomical framework to explain the crossmodal effects observed in the present study. 
However, the focus of the present study concerns the multimodal integration of emotional 
information and the role of the amygdala in processing emotional information has been well 
established (see Zald, 2003 for a review). Moreover, previous studies using face-voice pairs 
have shown that crossmodal binding of affective information involves the left amygdala 
(Dolan, Morris, & de Gelder, 2001; Ethofer et al., 2006) and this brain structure receives both 
visual and auditory inputs (McDonald, 1998). Therefore, this may be a critical brain region 
involved in the unique experience one has when watching the ape-man in ‘2001: A Space 
Odyssey’. 
The results of our behavioural study do not allow to formulate hypotheses about the 
perceptual underpinnings of the observed effects. We used a similar paradigm as our previous 
study (Van den Stock et al., 2008) but investigation of the stage at which affective crossmodal 
influence occurs, i.e. either a visual-perceptual level, a semantic post-perceptual level or even 
a response selection level, requires the complimentary use of imaging techniques, preferably 
with a high temporal resolution like electroencephalography (EEG) or 
magnetoencephalography (MEG). 
Another issue concerns what it is in a dynamic whole body expression that makes it happy or 
sad. Sadness is typically more associated with lower muscle tonus and slower movements, 
whereas happiness usually involves quick and rapid movements, mostly involving raising of 
the arms. The movement parameters that are related to emotional communication have been 
extensively described earlier (e.g. Argyle, 1988; Darwin, 1872). 




Our study makes a beginning with exploring how music influences the message 
conveyed by body language. The different levels at which music and body language make 
contact and the neurofunctional basis of our embodied music experience are just some of the 
many questions to be addressed in future research.  
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Chapter 7: Moving and being moved. The relative importance of dynamical information 




In encountering a person, what we are most easily conscious of is that the face gives us access 
to the person’s identity. But at the same time the face provides many other kinds of 
information like gender, age, emotional expression, attractiveness, trust and the like. It is 
likely that some kinds of information are relatively better conveyed by moving than by static 
faces. Some of these typical face attributes, like for example identity or affect, are also 
conveyed by other stimuli than faces, for example whole bodies. And as is the case with faces, 
they may be conveyed by a still image as well as by its dynamic counterpart. Thus the relative 
importance of dynamic information is not an issue restricted to face recognition but is 
encountered just as well in investigations of object recognition in general.  
 
Of course, it may very well be the case that not only faces are “special” but that also the 
perception of dynamic information is special in the case of faces. Very few focussed 
comparisons are available to answer this question because this is a challenging task. A proper 
comparison of face perception recognition abilities with other object perception and 
recognition abilities requires comparable task settings between the two object classes 
(Damasio, Damasio, & Van Hoesen, 1982; Damasio, Tranel, & Damasio, 1990; B. de Gelder, 
Bachoud-Levi, & Degos, 1998; Farah, 1990; Gauthier, Behrmann, & Tarr, 1999; Van den 
Stock, van de Riet, Righart, & de Gelder, 2008). Available comparisons have almost all used 
still images and this makes it all the more difficult to assess the relative importance of 
dynamic information for face perception.  
 
 
                                                        
7
 This chapter is based on de Gelder, B., & Van den Stock, J. (in press). Moving and being moved. The relative 
importance of dynamical information for residual face processing in clinical populations and brain damaged 
patients. In Giese, M., Curio, C., & Bülthoff H.H. (Eds.), Dynamic Faces: Insights from Experiments and 
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Face perception: some antecedents 
 
The high salience of faces in everyday life is taken for granted and is reflected in the number 
of studies devoted to face recognition. Research targeting face recognition got a significant 
boost from the discovery of face specific deficits after brain damage reported by Bodamer 
(1947). Investigations into the functional properties of face processing began with the first 
neuropsychological studies of Yin (1969) reporting a strong inversion effect for faces and has 
been growing exponentially since the beginning of brain imaging studies of face recognition. 
More and more clinical cases are also reported this last decade with specific impairments in 
face recognition abilities. An overview of findings from functional Magnetic Resonance 
Imaging (fMRI) studies in these clinical cases can be found in Van den Stock et al. (2008) and 
an overview of EEG studies in Righart & de Gelder (2007). 
 
The combined findings from behavioural, clinical and neuro-imaging studies are integrated in 
theoretical models of face perception, of which the model of Bruce & Young (1986) has been 
one of the most influential. Since then a few other models of face perception have been 
proposed (Haxby, Hoffman et al. 2000; Adolphs 2002; de Gelder, Frissen et al. 2003; Johnson 
2005). They have moved our understanding ahead mainly by integrating new findings about 
face recognition deficits, the neurofunctional basis, category specificity, relative separation of 
subsystems like identity and expression, genetic basis, the importance of movement 
information and the contribution of real world and context elements. The central notion in 
contemporary models is that different aspects of face perception, like identity, expression and 
direction of gaze are processed in a brain network of which the different areas show relative 
functional specialization. 
 
The neurofunctional basis of facial identity processing in neurologically intact individuals is 
reasonably well understood. Sergent & Signoret (1992) first described the middle lateral 
fusiform gyrus (FG) to be responsive to faces. Kanwisher and colleagues later dubbed this 
region the fusiform face area (FFA) (1997). The occipital face area (OFA) is another very 
important face sensitive area located in the inferior occipital gyrus (Gauthier, Skudlarski, 
Gore, & Anderson, 2000; Hoffman & Haxby, 2000; Puce, Allison, Asgari, Gore, & 




McCarthy, 1996). While these areas have been related to identity processing the main area 
that comes into play when the face carries an emotional expression is the amygdala (AMG). 
The AMG plays a critical role in mediating emotional responses and actions (see Zald, 2003 
for a review). Several studies support the notion that activity in FFA increases as a result from 
feedback from the AMG (e.g. Breiter, Etcoff et al. 1996; Vuilleumier, Richardson et al. 2004) 
and anatomical connections between amygdala and visual cortex have been established in 
primates (Amaral & Price, 1984; Freese & Amaral, 2006). Faces expressing emotions 
additionally modulate OFA activity (Rotshtein, Malach, Hadar, Graif, & Hendler, 2001). On 
the other hand, AMG driven threat-related modulations implicate also earlier visual areas such 
as V1 and other distant regions involved in social, cognitive, or somatic responses (e.g., STS, 
cingulate, or parietal areas) (Amaral 2002; Amaral, Behniea et al. 2003; Catani, Jones et al. 
2003). The rapid activity and/or the involvement of posterior visual areas in normals have 
been related to coarse processing of salient stimuli in subcortical structures. Support for 
subcortical processing of salient stimuli of which facial expressions are a salient example is 
also provided by residual face perception in patients with striate cortex lesions (Morris, de 
Gelder et al. 2001; de Gelder 2005).  
 
The brain basis of face perception in neurologically intact individuals: Perceiving 
movement 
 
It needs no argument that in daily life, the faces we perceive and interact with are almost 
continuously in motion and our perceptual systems has therefore more experience with 
dynamic than with static faces. Movements generated by the complex musculature of the face 
or body make a substantial contribution to nonverbal communication. Moreover, there are 
several characteristics of a person that are almost exclusively revealed by its dynamic 
properties displayed in the face or body: looking at a photograph of Marlon Brando playing 
Don Corleone in the Godfather, results in an experience quite different from that of watching 
his whole performance in the scene in which he addresses the heads of the families. This 
difference is illustrative of the clear additive value that lies in the temporal unfolding of 
dynamic facial expressions.  
 




Before developing this point though it is worth mentioning that using still images to probe 
face processing may have unique advantages to probe the neurofunctional basis in normal as 
well as in neurological patients. Static patterns get moving the mind as the brain processes the 
incoming still image by mapping it actively onto a representation that incorporates the 
movement and its temporal dynamics normally associated with this visual stimulus in the 
external world. Well known studies by e.g. Sheppard (1983) and by Freyd (1983) have shown 
convincingly that still images can be very fruitfully used to probe movement perception in the 
brain. Using still images of whole body expressions we observed activation in brain areas that 
are normally sensitive to movement like STS in human observers (B. de Gelder, Snyder, 
Greve, Gerard, & Hadjikhani, 2004) and macaques (B. de Gelder & Partan, 2009). 
 
Although the importance of dynamic expressions and its interpretation by conspecifics has 
long been recognized in animal literature (Dawkins & Krebs, 1978), it is quite surprising there 
are still only very few neuro-imaging investigations with neurologically intact participants 
that used dynamic expressions. The dynamic information in facial expressions represents a 
specific kind of biological motion (Johansson, 1973). Therefore it is reasonable to expect that 
perceiving facial and bodily movements will activate areas known to be involved in 
movement perception like the hMT/V5 complex and in socially relevant movement 
perception like superior temporal sulcus (STS) (Bonda, Petrides, Ostry, & Evans, 1996; 
Grèzes & Decety, 2001; Grossman et al., 2000). Furthermore, socially relevant and 
emotionally laden movement is likely to involve AMG.  
 
A few studies throw light on these issues but many open questions remain. For example, it is 
not known whether the neurofunctional basis of biological movement in faces and bodies is a 
special case of the more general ability for processing biological as contrasted with non 
biological movement. Alternatively, facial movement patterns that are specifically at the 
service of facial expressions may be a sui generis specialisation of the brain which only 
minimally overlaps with the neurofunctional mechanisms sustaining biological movement 
perception in general. The former possibility evokes the notion of a specialized speech 
module exclusively at the service of the analysis of visual speech. Liberman and colleagues 
developed the argument for such a phonetic gesture analysis module in the seventies and 
eighties. A review of the pro and contra arguments is provided in the volume dedicated to Al 




Liberman. More recently, this approach to speech has been viewed as an example of action 
perception by researchers in the field of mirror neuron based action perception. But once 
relatively complex stimuli are considered, it remains unclear so far what the relation is 
between the movement and action perception (Pichon, de Gelder, & Grezes, 2009). 
Furthermore, the motor theory of speech perception was motivated by the ambition to start 
from but reach beyond the available linguistic description of phonetic features and define the 
set of motor primitives that may be at the basis of speech perception. Neither for the more 
general case of biological movement, nor for the specific ones of human facial movements do 
we have at present descriptive theories available. And studies of mirror neuron activation 
have so far been restricted to individual single actions that do not yet allow insight into action 
primitives. Possibly the analysis of facial motor patterns (FACS, Ekman) and bodily 
emotional motor patterns (BACS, de Gelder & van Boxtel) that implement emotional 
expressions may provide input for a future theory of emotional movement primitives.  
 
With these caveats in mind, let us turn to available research. In a positron emission 
tomography (PET) study by Kilts et al. (2003) participants were presented angry, happy and 
neutral facial expressions and also non-face objects that were either static or dynamic. 
Perception of dynamic neutral faces compared to dynamic non-face objects triggered activity 
in AMG, STS and FG, but none of these areas were active when dynamic neutral faces were 
compared with static neutral faces. However, dynamic angry faces elicited more activity in 
these areas compared to static angry faces. This highlights the importance of emotional 
information conveyed by facial expressions in the comparison between dynamic and static 
faces. The increased recruitment of AMG, STS and FG in dynamic facial expressions might 
be specific for expressions with a negative valence, since there was no difference in these 
areas between dynamic and static displays of happy faces. Similar findings are reported with 
fMRI data: dynamic facial expressions (neutral, fear and anger) yielded more activity than 
static emotional faces in AMG and FG (LaBar, Crupain, Voyvodic, & McCarthy, 2003). An 
overview of currently available functional imaging studies with dynamic facial expressions is 
given in Table 1. The general findings show that comparisons between dynamic faces and 
dynamic non-face stimuli typically activate brain areas known already to be involved in 
perception of static faces. Taken at face value this result suggests that the difference in brain 
basis between seeing still and dynamic faces is quantitative rather that qualitative. However, a 




more focussed comparison between dynamic and static faces shows a less clear picture, and 
the contrast becomes stronger when emotional expressions are part of the comparison.  
 
Table 1. Overview of dynamic facial expression neuroimaging studies. D=dynamic; S=static; 
Fang=angry face; Fdis=disgusted face; Ffea=fearful face; Fneu=neutral face; Fhap=happy 
face; Femo=emotional face; Fall=all faces; nonF=non-face; R=rest; (s)=synthetic; (l) line 
drawing; Bang=angry body; Bfea=fearful body; Bneu=neutral body; Ball= all bodies. 1The 
conditions reported involve the motoric expression of the stimuli, not the semantic content of 
the stories told by the actor. 2No modulation of AMG activity by emotional content of faces 
 Method Stimuli Task Contrast AMG FG STS OFA 






















































Puce (2003) fMRI FneuD 
FneuD(l) 
nonFD 
Passive viewing [FneuD+FneuD(l)]>nonFD  X X  
Decety (2003) PET FneuD1 
FhapD1 
FsadD1 
Mood rating FhapD>FneuD 
FsadD>FneuD 
    
Wicker (2003) fMRI FneuD 
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Sato (2004) fMRI FfeaD 
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In a recent study we investigated the neural correlates of perceiving dynamic face 
images using a design built on a close comparison of face videos with body videos. To arrive 
at a better view of dynamic neutral vs. emotional (fearful and angry) facial expressions we 
used both categories and compared each with its counterpart (Kret, Grezes, Pichon, & de 
Gelder, submitted). The face versus body comparison showed activation in the AMG and 
hippocampus. Dynamic emotional faces compared to dynamic neutral faces yielded more 
activity in FG and STS. We found no emotional modulation of the AMG by dynamic 
emotional compared to neutral faces, a result that is consistent with a study that focussed on 
amygdala activation (van der Gaag, Minderaa, & Keysers, 2007a).  





Neurophysiological studies in monkeys 
Single cell recordings in monkeys have shown that cells in IT and STS are responsive to 
different aspects of face perception (Baylis, Rolls, & Leonard, 1987; C. Bruce, Desimone, & 
Gross, 1981; De Souza, Eifuku, Tamura, Nishijo, & Ono, 2005; Desimone, Albright, Gross, 
& Bruce, 1984; D.I. Perrett, Hietanen, Oram, & Benson, 1992; D. I. Perrett, Rolls, & Caan, 
1982), including emotional expression (Hasselmo, Rolls, & Baylis, 1989).  However, the use 
of dynamic face-stimuli in neurophysiological monkey studies is rare. Evidence exits of 
neurons that are sensitive to specific movements of the head (Hasselmo, Rolls, Baylis, & 
Nalwa, 1989), and dynamic whole body expressions (Jellema, Maassen, & Perrett, 2004; 
Jellema & Perrett, 2003; Oram & Perrett, 1996). One neurophysiological study reported 
neurons in monkey STS that are sensitive to facial dynamics like closing the eyes (Hasselmo, 
Rolls, Baylis et al., 1989). Other cells have been described that are sensitive to threatening 
open mouths (D.I.  Perrett & Mistlin, 1990 ). 
Neurons that are selective for the appearance and motions of conspecifics have been described 
in the temporal lobes of macaque monkeys. Cells in the superior temporal sulcus (STS) of the 
macaque brain react to important social signals like threatening expressions. Other cells have 
been found to be selective for dynamic components of expressions such as raising the 
eyebrows, head and body movements (see Allison, Puce, & McCarthy, 2000 for a review). 
Similarly in humans, the STS was found to be active following social information when 
dynamic images were used (see Table 1). Neurons in the amygdala have also been reported to 
be responsive to social information in monkeys (Brothers & Ring, 1993; Brothers, Ring, & 
Kling, 1990).  
 
Visual object agnosia and face agnosia or prosopagnosia 
 
Prosopagnosia was first reported by Bodamer (1947). The deficit involves recognition of 
personal identity but not of facial expression and this dissociation has long been the 
cornerstone of the models of face processing in the neuropsychological literature of the last 
two decades and is at the basis of the face recognition model of Bruce & Young (1986). The 
typical complaint of a prosopagnosic regards the inability to recognize a person by the face. 




This symptom is far more pronounced than the phenomenon everybody sometimes 
experiences when have trouble remembering from where or how they know a certain face. 
Prosopagnosics can even have difficulties recognizing the persons they are very close to like 
their direct family members. 
 
The neural correlates of face deficits 
 
The focus on finding the neural correlate of the physically defined face category raised the 
expectation that patients with face recognition deficits would show lesions or anomalous 
activation in the normal face areas. This has not always turned out to be the case as shown by 
some recent patient studies using brain imaging (e.g. Steeves et al., 2006). When we turn to 
developmental prosopagnosia (DP), the situation is not clearer. Investigations into the neuro-
functional correlates of DP with fMRI have yielded inconsistent results. Several studies 
reported increased activity for perceiving faces compared to non-face stimuli in the well 
known face areas FFA and OFA (Avidan, Hasson, Malach, & Behrmann, 2005; Degutis, 
Bentin, Robertson, & D'Esposito, 2007; Hasson, Avidan, Deouell, Bentin, & Malach, 2003; 
Williams, Berberovic, & Mattingley, 2007) whereas the first fMRI-study including a DP case 
by Hadjikhani and de Gelder (2002) and a more recent study (Bentin, Degutis, D'Esposito, & 
Robertson, 2007) found no face-specific activation in these areas. These findings suggest that 
intact functioning of the FFA and IOG are necessary, but not sufficient for successful face 
recognition. An important issue concerns the emotional information contained by the 
perceived faces. Recently, we observed reduced activation levels in the FFA of three 
developmental prosopagnosics compared to control subjects when looking at neutral faces. 
However, there was no difference between both groups in the activation level of the FFA 
when the faces they viewed expressed either a happy or a fearful emotion (Van den Stock et 
al., 2008). In the same study, we investigated the neural correlates of perceiving neutral and 
emotional whole body expressions and the results showed that in prosopagnosics, perception 
of bodies is associated with increased activation in face areas and perception of faces elicits 
activity in body areas. Whole body expressions are quite eligible as control stimulus condition 
for faces, since they are comparable to faces on a number of variables, for instance, ability to 
express emotional information, gender, age, familiarity.  
 




Still vs. dynamic face images in patient studies 
 
Impairments in recognizing emotion or identity in facial expressions have been reported in a 
variety of syndromes like Huntington’s disease (Sprengelmeyer et al., 1996), Wilson’s disease 
(Wang, Hoosain, Yang, Meng, & Wang, 2003), Urbach-Wiethe disease (Adolphs, Tranel, 
Damasio, & Damasio, 1994), Parkinson’s disease (Sprengelmeyer et al., 2003), autism 
spectrum disorder (see Sasson, 2006 for a review), obsessive-compulsive disorder 
(Sprengelmeyer et al., 1997), schizophrenia (see Mandal, Pandey, & Prasad, 1998 for a 
review), Alzheimer’s disease (Hargrave, Maddock, & Stone, 2002), semantic dementia 
(Bozeat, Lambon Ralph, Patterson, Garrard, & Hodges, 2000), attention deficit hyperactivity 
disorder (Singh et al., 1998), amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (Zimmerman, Eslinger, Simmons, 
& Barrett, 2007) and frontotemporal dementia (Lavenu, Pasquier, Lebert, Petit, & Van der 
Linden, 1999). However, the bulk of these studies is based on the use of static stimuli and 
recognition of static facial expressions urges a larger effort of the brain compared to dynamic 
expressions since the brain has to account for the missing information of temporal dynamics. 
It is therefore not surprising that several patient studies found superior recognition of dynamic 
facial expressions compared to static expressions (Tomlinson, Jones, Johnston, Meaden, & 
Wink, 2006). 
One study with a prosopagnosic reported impaired identity recognition of static face pictures, 
but not of dynamic faces (Steede, Tree, & Hole, 2007), a pattern that was not compatible with 
a similar previous study (Lander, Humphreys, & Bruce, 2004). 
 
As far as recognition of facial speech expressions is concerned, we tested a patient with 
prosopagnosia using still images of facial expressions as well as dynamic videos (Beatrice de 
Gelder & Vroomen, 1998). Her performance with still facial expressions was poor but 
improved significantly when short videos were shown instead. The same pattern was observed 
in another prosopagnosic patient using point light displays of emotional face expressions 
(Humphreys, Donnelly, & Riddoch, 1993). 
 




Being moved by still images 
It is often assumed that dynamic stimuli are easier to decode than still images and the most 
frequent argument is that dynamic images are more natural or more ecological and thereby 
more representative of the visual input the brain has evolved for. As we already pointed out, 
comparisons are complicated by the simple fact that dynamic stimuli contain much more 
information than do still images. On the other hand, there are arguments about the specificity 
of movement perception that speak against a simple comparison that takes higher information 
content of dynamic images into account. One of these is the fact that there are known cases in 
the neuropsychological literature of movement perception disorders. One of the best ones is 
Zihl´s patient with bilateral lesions to V5. This patient had a severe movement perception 
deficit but had no difficulty with recognizing people by the face and was not prosopagnosic. 
She was also able to read speech from static face images, but could not perceive speech from 
dynamic images (Campbell, Zihl, Massaro, Munhall, & Cohen, 1997). The reverse pattern 
was observed in a patient with lesions in V4 (Humphreys et al., 1993). 
 
 A convergent argument to which we have already alluded several times above in favour of a 
nuance to the distinction between still and dynamic images is that studies using still images 
have reported activation in motor and premotor areas. This clearly means the brain does not 
need to be shown movement for perceiving it. As a matter of fact, using still images may 
provide a tool for assessing the brains´ perceptual abilities beyond the strictly physically 
present information.  
 
Face perception in hemianope patients 
Of particular interest for understanding the neurofunctional basis of facial movement 
perception are patients with damage to primary visual cortex. Previous studies of such rare 
cases have illustrated the extent of residual movement vision that does not depend on intact 
V1. Interestingly, movement perception with vs. without awareness is correlated with 
different stimulus properties (for a review, see Weiskrantz, 2009).  
 




In our first investigation of residual vision of hemianope patients we used both still images 
and short video clips of faces and we found that only the video clips triggered a reliable 
recognition of facial expressions in the blind field. This suggested that the presence of 
movement may be a necessary condition for affective blindsight (B. de Gelder, Vroomen, 
Pourtois, & Weiskrantz, 1999). However in subsequent studies we used EEG and later fMRI 
measurements and found clear evidence that still images were processed also (Rossion, de 
Gelder et al. 2000; Morris, de Gelder et al. 2001; de Gelder, Pourtois et al. 2002). Returning 
to a more sensitive behavioural paradigm than direct guessing by using the redundant target 
effect based on the advantage derived from summation across the two hemifields, here the 
sighted and the blind one, we showed later that still face images are still reliable recognized 
(de Gelder, Pourtois et al. 2002; de Gelder, Morris et al. 2005). In a recent study we report 
that the presence of still facial and bodily images triggers muscular movements that can be 
measured by EMG (electromyography). These facial movements reflect the specific emotion 
expressed in the unseen stimulus, independently of whether it is a face or a body and have 
shorter latencies when triggered by an unseen than by a seen stimulus. But at no time are the 





The human perceptual system is eminently tuned to information provided by movement in the 
environment. But the corollary of this that when dealing with still images the brain will 
automatically represent the dynamic information that is not strictly speaking present in the 
stimulus. Perceptual deficits, either congenital or as a consequence of brain damage in the 
normally developed brain, challenge our current understanding of the neurofunctional basis of 
movement perception. On the one hand there is little doubt that moving images provide more 
and richer information which other things being equal may make it easier to access 
information for brains and perceptual systems weakened by disease. On the other hand, there 
is also little doubt that in the developed brain a certain division of labour underpins fluent 
perceptual abilities. To approach this neuronal division of labour as exclusively a matter of 
specialized face, movement or emotion modules may hamper our understanding of these 
perceptual abilities and of the active role of the perceptual system in dealing with stimuli.  
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Chapter 8: Prosopagnosia 
 
We often take for granted the ease with which we recognize friends and foes. However, 
imagine that every time you encounter an acquainted face, it would seem no more familiar 
than the face of a total stranger. This most peculiar symptom is known as prosopagnosia and 
not surprisingly it puts a heavy burden on the social life of the patients who suffer from it.  
 
Definitions and concepts 
 
The typical complaint from a prosopagnosic regards the inability to recognize a person by the 
face. This symptom is far more pronounced than the phenomenon everybody sometimes 
experiences when have trouble remembering from where or how they know a certain face. 
Prosopagnosics can even have difficulties recognizing the persons they are very close to like 
their direct family members. Prosopagnosics have to rely on other cues to identify a person, 
for instance clothing or voice. But when they look at photographs taken in close-up, 
recognizing the person they are looking at becomes a challenge, even when they are looking 
at their own child. In less radical cases prosopagnosics are helped by the context in which 
they routinely encounter individuals but they fail to recognize them when outside the normal 
context, for example when they meet a colleague in the supermarket.  
 
Prosopagnosia was first reported by Bodamer (1947). The deficit involves recognition of 
personal identity but not of facial expression and this dissociation has long been the 
cornerstone of the models of face processing in the neuropsychological literature of the last 
two decades and is at the basis of the face recognition model of Bruce & Young (1986). Until 
recently the dissociation between identity and expression was generally accepted and as a 
consequence researchers rarely investigated facial expression recognition itself nor was much 
attention paid to the possibility of an interaction between the face identity and the facial 
expression recognition system. When problems with faces are defined as problems with 
identity recognition, understanding face recognition may or may not be seen as a subproces of 
object recognition. A substantial effort has been devoted to find evidence for dissociations 
between face and object recognition. In the eighties and nineties the gold standard for 




supporting this kind of special or modular cognitive ability argument was to find a double 
dissociation. Patients with object recognition deficits that were not prosopagnosic vs. 
prosopagnosics without object recognition problems perfectly fitted this bill. Such pure cases 
have however proven to be extremely rare. Furthermore, the rich literature on reading 
difficulties provided a complementary window on the perceptual processing routes involved 
in face and object recognition. The most extensive review of available cases in the literature 
by Farah (1990) in the late eighties added a third category to the contrast. Patients with 
acquired dyslexia or inability to read words as a consequence of brain damage showed a 
pattern of letter by letter reading. 
 
It is interesting to note that the neuropsychological approach focussed on these patient 
categories as a means to understand not so much category specificity per se, but the 
underlying perceptual routes that may or may not be common to face and word recognition 
deficits which both can be characterized as loss of the ability to process the configuration.  
 
An older and often ignored effort at getting underneath the surface of a behavioural deficit 
was to understand prosopagnosia as a form of agnosia using a historical distinction between 
two types of agnosia, described by Lissauer (1890): apperceptive agnosia reflects impairment 
in consciously perceiving and recognizing stimuli and associative agnosia refers to a 
relatively preserved ability to perceive objects, but an inability to interpret what is seen. 
Apperceptive prosopagnosia therefore relates to an inability to perceive a face as a face and 
patients suffering from this type will be mostly impaired in tasks tapping into face detection 
and face discrimination, whereas associative prosopagnosia is in the first place associated 
with the recognition of individual faces and involves a deficit in the kind of encoding that 
allows telling individual exemplars apart and access stored representations and thereby also a 
memory component. It is the latter type that has been mainly reported and investigated as it is 
assumed that prosopagnosia arises at a higher object recognition and cognitive level. 
Questions on intact face detection typically are not raised about prosopagnosia and intact face 
detection is typically not seen as possibly a separate and earlier stage in face perception (but 
see B. de Gelder, Frissen, Barton, & Hadjikhani, 2003; B. de Gelder & Rouw, 2000a).  
 




Inability to process the face as a whole 
 
The most common functional characterisation of the core deficit of prosopagnosics is an 
impairment in processing the face at the level of its overall configuration or a deficit in 
configural processing. Yin (1969) showed that faces become much harder to recognize when 
they are presented upside down. This loss of performance for inverted presentation, named the 
inversion effect, has since provided researchers with a criterion for measuring the presence of 
configural processing skills. It is important to notice though that in the original study the 
inversion effect was defined not as unique to faces but as relatively more pronounced for 
faces. A number of other object categories tested, like for example landscapes were also 
recognized less well when presented upside down. The implication is that when using the 
inversion effect as a measure of intact configuration processing of faces, a task requirement 
needs to be used. Only when the inversion deficit is restricted to faces can one conclude to a 
face specific disorder at least as assessed by this effect (B. de Gelder & Rouw, 2000b).   
 
Acquired and developmental prosopagnosia 
 
Prosopagnosia can occur after a neurological antecedent, in which case it is known as 
acquired prosopagnosia (AP) and is most frequently associated with a lesion in a particular 
part of the visual cortex, namely the fusiform gyrus, especially in the right hemisphere (e.g. 
Barton, Press, Keenan, & O'Connor, 2002; B. de Gelder et al., 2003; Marotta, Genovese, & 
Behrmann, 2001), but other cases have been reported with more posterior lesions (Sorger, 
Goebel, Schiltz, & Rossion, 2007; Steeves et al., 2006) or following a head trauma but 
without evident brain lesions (B. de Gelder et al., 2003; Hadjikhani & de Gelder, 2002). 
Prosopagnosia can also be present without any neurological history. In that case it is known as 
developmental prosopagnosia (DP). Developmental prosopagnosics usually report life long 
problems in recognizing people by the face. Developmental prosopagnosia sometimes occurs 
in different generations of a single family, suggesting a genetic component, more particularly 
an autosomal dominant mode of inheritance (Grueter et al., 2007). The term ‘congenital 
prosopagnosia’ is sometimes used to refer to prosopagnosia without any neurological 
antecedents. However, the genetic basis of DP is a matter of debate and there is no evidence 




to conclude that all these cases have a genetic basis. The term ‘developmental prosopagnosia’ 
has a more descriptive connotation and includes, next to the genetic hypothesis, the possibility 
of a developmental disorder, for instance in the maturation of different cortical areas, like the 
fusiform gyrus. A study investigating the volumetric and morphological properties of DP 
brains has revealed a decreased size of the fusiform gyrus and this decrease correlated with 
the behavioral face recognition difficulties of the subjects (Behrmann, Avidan, Gao, & Black, 
2007). The prevalence of DP has been estimated at 2.47% (Kennerknecht, Plumpe, Edwards, 
& Raman, 2006).  
  
Face-specificity of prosopagnosia 
 
The face recognition deficit rarely occurs in isolation, but is usually accompanied by 
problems in recognizing other stimuli like cars or places. Faces provide many kinds of 
information like gender, age and emotional expression and a finely tuned comparison of face 
recognition abilities with other object recognition abilities calls for comparable task settings 
between the two object classes (Damasio, Damasio, & Van Hoesen, 1982; Damasio, Tranel, 
& Damasio, 1990; B. de Gelder, Bachoud-Levi, & Degos, 1998; Farah, 1990; Gauthier, 
Behrmann, & Tarr, 1999). This is a challenging task, since faces have many dimensional 
attributes and are all around us from the moment we are born, which means the perceptual 
system has been frequently exposed to them. Consequently, this has led to an ongoing debate 
about whether the perception of faces is qualitatively different from the perception of objects 
(modularity hypothesis) (Fodor, 1983), or on the other hand that the ‘special’ status of face 
processing merely reflects the level of perceptual expertise we have with them (expertise 
hypothesis) (Diamond & Carey, 1986; Gauthier, Skudlarski, Gore, & Anderson, 2000). 
One object category that has comparable properties to faces is human bodies, which also 
carry information about age, gender, emotional expression, etc (for reviews, see B. de 
Gelder, 2006; Peelen & Downing, 2007). A behavioural study with a single prosopagnosic 
case who was instructed to match the identity of computer generated bodies, found no 
evidence for impaired body recognition (B. C. Duchaine, Yovel, Butterworth, & Nakayama, 
2006), while an event-related potential (ERP) study with four developmental prosopagnosics 
(DPs) found abnormal brain activation in the early time window of the EEG for both faces 
and bodies in three of the four DPs (Righart & de Gelder, 2007). Only one study investigated 




the functional neuro-anatomy of  perceiving faces and bodies in three DPs and matched 
control subjects. The results showed that perceiving bodies activates face areas in the brains 
of DPs and also that perceiving faces activates body areas (Van den Stock, van de Riet, 
Righart, & de Gelder, 2008). This shows that the functional neuro-anatomy of perceiving 
either faces or bodies shows reduced specialization in DP. 
 
Although face recognition difficulties are the core feature of prosopagnosia, the visual 
problems are not always confined to the category of faces and patients also report difficulties 
in recognizing other object classes like houses or cars (e.g. Bobes et al., 2003). Although the 
term ‘prosopagnosia’ strictly does not exclude object recognition difficulties, standard 
procedures in prosopagnosia assessment must include at least a basic screening of the visual 
object recognition abilities with standard clinical test batteries like the Birmingham Object 
Recognition Battery (Riddoch & Humphreys, 1993) or the Visual Object and Space 
Perception Battery (E.K. Warrington & James, 1991). It is not exceptional that 
prosopagnosics score outside of the normal range on at least one of the tests (e.g. B. C. 
Duchaine, 2000; Righart & de Gelder, 2007). Standard clinical tests evaluating face matching 
and memory for faces include the Benton Facial Recognition Test (BFRT) (Benton, Hamsher, 
Varney, & Spreen, 1983) and the Warrington Recognition Memory Test (WRMT) 
(Warrington, 1984). While some prosopagnosics obtain deficient scores on these tests of face 
processing (e.g. Ariel & Sadeh, 1996; B. de Gelder & Rouw, 2000a; Righart & de Gelder, 
2007), others perform within the normal range (e.g. B. C. Duchaine, 2000; Nunn, Postma, & 
Pearson, 2001), hence the scores on these tests should be cautiously interpreted, especially 
when no reaction time data is available as is the case in the older studies. 
More modern tests and batteries are now available targeting specific aspects of face and 
object processing (e.g. B. de Gelder et al., 1998; B. de Gelder & Rouw, 2000a, 2000b; B de 
Gelder & Van den Stock, 2008; B. Duchaine & Nakayama, 2006). These provide a more 
detailed analysis of the intact and anomalous aspects of face and object processing. The Facial 
Expressive Action Stimulus Test (FEAST) (B de Gelder & Van den Stock, 2008) for example 
targets a range of specific abilities like face detection, emotional face memory, neutral face 
memory, facial emotion matching, face identity matching, object identity matching, face-part 
matching, configural face processing. The latter refers to the notion that faces are processed as 
a hole, whereas other objects are more processed as an assemblage of features. Configural 
processing is classically measured by the inversion effect: upside-down presented faces result 




in a (larger) decline in performance (than upside down presented objects). It has been shown 
that some DPs display the inverse pattern, namely a paradoxical inversion effect: they 
perform better when faces are presented upside down, but also when objects are presented 
upside down (B. de Gelder & Rouw, 2000b). 
  
Behavioural and neural correlates of prosopagnosia 
 
Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) studies investigating the neural correlates of 
DP have yielded inconsistent results (Avidan, Hasson, Malach, & Behrmann, 2005; Bentin, 
Degutis, D'Esposito, & Robertson, 2007; Hadjikhani & de Gelder, 2002; Hasson, Avidan, 
Deouell, Bentin, & Malach, 2003). In neurologically intact subjects, perception of faces 
selectively activates a network of brain areas in the right occipito-temporal cortex, namely the 
fusiform gyrus (FG): the so-called fusiform face area (FFA)  (Haxby et al., 1994; Kanwisher, 
McDermott, & Chun, 1997; Sergent, Ohta, & MacDonald, 1992) and the inferior occipital 
gyrus (IOG) (Gauthier et al., 2000; Hoffman & Haxby, 2000; Puce, Allison, Asgari, Gore, & 
McCarthy, 1996). In the first fMRI-study with a DP patient, these areas did not show the 
typical activation pattern as observed in normals (2002) when contrasting faces with objects. 
Similar results were obtained in another study with a DP (Bentin et al., 2007). A normal 
activation of these areas was found in two studies with respectively one and four DPs (Avidan 
et al., 2005; Hasson et al., 2003). However, only one study investigated the neural correlates 
of processing both neutral and emotional faces and found that there was no difference in FFA 
activation between controls and three DPs, but only when these faces express an emotion (fear 
or happiness). When perceiving neutral faces, the FFA of DPs showed a decline in activation, 
compared to the control subjects (Van den Stock et al., 2008).  
Since normal face-processing involves multiple hierarchical and parallel processes, 
impairments in different processes will result in different types of behavioral and neuro-
anatomical correlates. In developmental disorders like DP, heterogeneity is rather the rule 
than the exception and this is also reflected in the behavioral findings. Extensive evaluations 
of single cases or small groups of prosopagnosics have found different patterns of impairment 
on multiple aspects of face processing, including configural processing, modulation of the 
N170, within-object spatial relations, recognition of emotions, gender discrimination, 
recognition of famous faces, holistic face processing and facial attractiveness ratings.  
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Chapter 9: Neural correlates of perceiving emotional faces and bodies in developmental 




Recognizing faces of family and friends usually proceeds effortlessly. Yet a minority of 
people has difficulties telling apart who they are meeting with or remembering who they met 
previously when they can only go by the visual memory of the face. These problems can be 
quite dramatic, even to the point where they fail to recognize the face of their own spouse or 
child or for that matter their own face. The original reports of face recognition deficits for 
which the term prosopagnosia (Bodamer, 1947) was coined concerned cases of brain damage 
sustained in adulthood. More recently there have been reports of face recognition deficits that 
do not appear to be associated with any known neurological history. Although there are still 
only a few systematic reports of this condition, many more cases are described now compared 
to a decade ago and some authors have argued that as much as 2% of the population suffers 
from face recognition difficulties (Kennerknecht et al., 2006). In analogy with developmental 
dyslexia these cases are now commonly referred to as developmental prosopagnosia (DP), 
referring to the possible origin of the adult face recognition deficit in anomalous development 
of the full face recognition skills. This behavioral deficit may include an anomaly in the 
putative congenital basis involved in the acquisition of the skill, but so far very little is known 
about this genetic basis and its importance for explaining behavioral deficits (Grueter et al., 
2007).  
Recent research on behavioral face recognition deficits and their neural basis has 
followed the leads from the reports on the neural basis of face recognition in normals as 
mainly revealed in fMRI studies over the last decade. There is now a consensus in the 
literature that face recognition is implemented in a network of brain areas (B. de Gelder & R. 
Rouw, 2000a; Haxby, Hoffman, & Gobbini, 2000). Among these, an area in the fusiform 
gyrus (FG), labeled the fusiform face area (FFA) (Grill-Spector, Knouf, & Kanwisher, 2004; 
Kanwisher, McDermott, & Chun, 1997), has attracted most attention. Next to this area, the 
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role of the inferior occipital gyrus (IOG) is repeatedly stressed in normal (e.g. Gauthier, 
Skudlarski, Gore, & Anderson, 2000; Hoffman & Haxby, 2000; Puce, Allison, Asgari, Gore, 
& McCarthy, 1996) and anomalous face recognition (Hadjikhani & de Gelder, 2002). But it is 
fair to say that the functional significance of these two main areas for person recognition and 
its deficits is not yet entirely clear. 
Investigations of the neuro-functional correlates of DP with fMRI have yielded 
inconsistent results (Avidan, Hasson, Malach, & Behrmann, 2005; Bentin, Degutis, 
D'Esposito, & Robertson, 2007; Degutis, Bentin, Robertson, & D'Esposito, 2007; Hadjikhani 
& de Gelder, 2002; Hasson, Avidan, Deouell, Bentin, & Malach, 2003; Williams, Berberovic, 
& Mattingley, 2007) (see Table 1 for an overview). The first fMRI-study including a DP case 
by Hadjikhani and de Gelder (2002) found no face-specific activation in these two areas. A 
similar pattern was observed with another DP case (Bentin et al., 2007). On the other hand, 
other studies reported normal face-specific activation in developmental prosopagnosics (DPs) 
despite their severe behavioral deficits in face recognition (Avidan et al., 2005; Degutis et al., 
2007; Hasson et al., 2003; Williams et al., 2007). These findings suggest that intact 
functioning of the FFA and IOG are necessary, but not sufficient for successful face 
recognition. 
 
Table 1: Results from fMRI-studies on prosopagnosia. Abbreviations: n.a.: not applicable; 
FFA: Fusiform Face Area; FG: Fusiform Gyrus; IOG: Inferior Occipital Gyrus; SM, CR, GA 
& RP refer to subjects; +: significant activation; -: no significant activation; (l-): only left 
activation is observed 
 
Studies with developmental prosopagnosics 
 
 N Lesion localisation task comparison result 
FFA IOG 
Hadjikhani & de 
Gelder (2002) 
1 n.a. Passive viewing Faces>objects - - 
Faces>houses + - 
Hasson et al. (2003) 1 n.a. One back Faces>buildings + + 
Avidan et al. (2005) 4 n.a. One back Faces>(buildings & 
objects) 
+ + 
Bentin et al. (2007) 1 n.a. Oddball Faces>places - - 




 Faces>objects - - 
Degutis et al. 
(2007)9 
1 n.a. One back Faces>scenes + + 
Williams et al. 2007 1 n.a. One back Faces>scenes +  







Studies with acquired prosopagnosics 
 
 N Lesion localisation task comparison result 
FFA IOG 
Marotta et al. (2001) 2 SM: right temporal  oddball Faces>objects SM (+)  
CR: right temporal CR -  
Hadjikhani & de 
Gelder (2002) 
2 No evident lesions Passive viewing 
 
Faces>objects - - 
GA: Faces>scramble - - 
RP: Faces>houses - + 
Rossion et al. (2003) 1 Right posterior 
inferior occipital to 
posterior fusiform 
gyrus; left middle 
fusiform gyrus 
One back Faces>objects +  




Oddball Faces>scenes +  
Sorger et al. (2007) 1 Right ventral 
occipito-temporal; 
right middle 
temporal gyrus; left 
FG, IOG and lingual 
gyrus; left medial 
cerebellum (see also 
Rossion et al. 2003) 
One back Faces>objects + (l) 
 
In view of the many different kinds of information a face provides (gender, age, emotion, 
familiarity, attractiveness etc.) and the different ways in which this information is called 
upon and used in daily life (whether the context only requires rapid detection that there is a 
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face present, or on the contrary, full recognition of all facial attributes including name 
retrieval), it is worth stressing that the contextual requirements and the task settings are very 
important for evaluating face recognition problems and for understanding its neuro-
functional basis and possible deficits. A finely tuned comparison of face recognition skills 
with other object recognition skills at the behavioral and neuro-functional level requires 
comparable task settings whether the object categories to be matched are faces or any other 
category that is suitable (Damasio, Damasio, & Van Hoesen, 1982; Damasio, Tranel, & 
Damasio, 1990; de Gelder, Bachoud-Levi, & Degos, 1998; Farah, 1990; Gauthier, 
Behrmann, & Tarr, 1999). Since faces convey many different kinds of information it has so 
far been a daunting task to find a matching category to use as control stimuli. Previous 
approaches to find the best matching category have tended to explore either the physical 
similarity dimension (for example, using a continuum of more or less face like stimuli), the 
perceptual one or the functional one (for example, expertise with one or another specific 
object category). This has fed an ongoing debate about whether face processing mechanisms 
are qualitatively different from the processing mechanisms for objects (modularity 
hypothesis) (Fodor, 1983), or on the other hand whether relative face specificity reflects the 
level of perceptual expertise with the stimulus category (expertise hypothesis) (Diamond & 
Carey, 1986; Gauthier et al., 2000). As a matter of fact there are very few objects other than 
faces for which strong claims about category specific representation have been made. One 
exception concerns houses. Several studies report that this object category differentially 
activates a region around the collateral sulcus (Aguirre, Zarahn, & D'Esposito, 1998; Epstein 
& Kanwisher, 1998; Levy, Hasson, Avidan, Hendler, & Malach, 2001).  
 
An interesting object category not used so far concerns human bodies. Recently, it has been 
shown in normal subjects that perceiving human bodies or body parts activates an area in 
extrastriate cortex, labeled extrastriate body area (EBA) (Downing, Jiang, Shuman, & 
Kanwisher, 2001). More recently a second body specific area was defined in the FG 
(Hadjikhani & de Gelder, 2003; Peelen & Downing, 2005). This body sensitive area in FG 
overlaps at least partially with the face-sensitive one and it has been termed the fusiform 
body area (FBA). In parallel, recent findings show that the close similarities between face 
and body perception exist at the level of perceptual mechanisms as revealed by the inversion 
effect (a decline in performance for inverted stimuli compared to upright stimuli that is more 
pronounced for faces than for other object categories (Yin, 1969)), since the same inversion 




effect has been reported for bodies (Reed, Stone, Bozova, & Tanaka, 2003; Stekelenburg & 
de Gelder, 2004) (for reviews, see de Gelder, 2006; Peelen & Downing, 2007). 
 
These behavioral and neuro-functional similarities between perceiving faces and bodies in 
normals and the fact that bodies represent a distinct but yet very closely related object 
category, raise the issue how bodies are processed in DP. A study by Duchaine et al. (2006) 
presented natural faces and computer generated neutral body postures for testing face and 
body identity recognition in a DP patient using a sequential identity matching paradigm 
involving a minimal memory component. The performance of the patient was impaired for 
the faces, but within normal range for the bodies suggesting dissociation between face and 
body processing mechanisms with these task settings. Another study used event-related 
potentials (ERP) to investigate face and body perception in four DPs and found abnormal 
brain activation in the early time windows of the EEG (around 170 ms) for both faces and 
bodies in three of the four DPs (Righart & de Gelder, 2007). 
 
A second main objective of the present study is to investigate how the neural underpinnings 
of face and body processing in prosopagnosia are influenced by emotional information in the 
face and the body. As a matter of fact, the face-sensitive area in FG is well known from 
investigations of face recognition using neutral faces but it also figures predominantly in 
research on the neural basis of recognizing facial expressions. The presence of an emotion 
expression adds realism to the face but may also be an interesting developmental factor. 
Studies with younger subjects have predominantly reported higher activation for fearful 
faces, compared to neutral faces (Breiter et al., 1996; Dolan et al., 1996; Dolan, Morris, & de 
Gelder, 2001; Rotshtein, Malach, Hadar, Graif, & Hendler, 2001; Vuilleumier, Armony, 
Driver, & Dolan, 2001), but a recent study with both adolescents and adults found a reverse 
pattern in the FFA, namely higher activation for neutral than for fearful faces (Guyer et al., 
2008). The mechanism of this emotional modulation in the FFA may be based on feedback 
loops with the amygdala (Breiter et al., 1996; Vuilleumier et al., 2001). A similar explanation 
has been proposed for the increased activation in FG sensitive to body images representing 
an emotional expression (Hadjikhani & de Gelder, 2003).  
 
So far, the evidence concerning the neural correlates of processing emotional faces in DP is 
scarce. One study by de Gelder et al. (2003) investigated this issue in acquired 
prosopagnosics (prosopagnosia occurring after brain damage). The included patients had 




lesions in either the FG, IOG or both. The results showed that the patients more strongly 
activated other face sensitive areas like the superior temporal sulcus (STS) or amygdala when 
they perceive facial expressions compared to neutral faces. The patients were also more 
accurate and faster in processing emotional faces compared to neutral faces, a finding that 
has been reported previously (Duchaine, Parker, & Nakayama, 2003; Jones & Tranel, 2001; 
Nunn, Postma, & Pearson, 2001). Since the patients in de Gelder et al. (2003) had lesions in 
the ventral occipito-temporal cortex, the question arises how these brain areas respond to 
emotional information in prosopagnosics with severe face recognition problems but no 
known brain anomalies. To investigate this issue we presented the participants with neutral, 




Participants. The DPs were recruited after they had contacted us via our website or through 
reports in the popular press. All participants report life-long problems in recognizing people 
and typically complain about difficulties when meeting familiar persons unexpectedly and 
the ensuing social problems. AM (female) is a 54-year old housewife. She reports problems 
in recognizing others when meeting them outside the usual context, for example when she 
meets her parents in the supermarket. HV (male) is 43 years old and teaches writing and 
coaches in communication training. He experiences severe face recognition problems for as 
long as he can remember. LW (male) is a 48-year old university professor with 
longstanding difficulties for example in recognizing colleagues at conferences and students. 
None of the DPs had a neurological history and their structural MR-scans showed no 
abnormalities as judged independently by four experienced neurologists. The group of four 
control subjects was matched with the DP group on age, sex and educational level. All 
participants gave written informed consent according to the Declaration of Helsinki and the 










All participants were presented with an extensive face recognition battery. Visual 
object recognition and face recognition were assessed with standard clinical tests and 
additional face and object perception experiments were run in sessions preceding the fMRI 
measurements. The neuropsychological tests and normative data are described elsewhere 
(Righart & de Gelder, 2007). Face matching and face memory were tested with the Benton 
Face Recognition Test (BFRT) (Benton, Sivan, Hamsher, Varney, & Spreen, 1983) and the 
Warrington Face Memory Test (WFMT) (Warrington, 1984). We used a computerized 
version of the latter test to obtain information about speed-accuracy trade-off. Basic visual 
functions were measured with the Birmingham Object Recognition Battery (BORB) (line 
length, size, orientation, gap, minimal feature match, foreshortened views and object decision) 
(Riddoch & Humphreys, 1993). To investigate in detail different aspects of face perception, 
all participants were administered additional face and object perception experiments which 
have proven useful in previous investigations of face recognition and provided insight in 
processing strategies in prosopagnosia (de Gelder et al., 1998; de Gelder et al., 2003; B. de 
Gelder & P. Rouw, 2000; B. de Gelder & R. Rouw, 2000a, 2000b; Righart & de Gelder, 
2007).  
 
Like in our previous studies on prosopagnosia, the behavioral pattern of a normal 
inversion effects for faces compared to another single object category was measured with the 
faces and shoes task (de Gelder et al., 1998). Participants were required to select the probe 
that corresponded with the identity of a simultaneously presented target. The target was 
always a frontal picture and the two probes underneath consisted of pictures in three quarter 
profile. Faces and shoes were presented upright and inverted (for details, see de Gelder et al., 
1998; B. de Gelder & R. Rouw, 2000b). Feature-based processing was tested with a part-to-
whole matching task which required participants to select the face-part probe (i.e., mouth or 
eyes) that was the same as that in the simultaneously presented whole face. The same 
procedure was followed for house-part probes (i.e., door or upper window) that had to be 
matched to the corresponding part in a whole house stimulus. Faces and houses were 
presented once upright and once inverted (de Gelder et al., 2003; B. de Gelder & R. Rouw, 
2000a). Participants were instructed to respond as accurately and rapidly as possible. 
Accuracy and mean response-times were calculated for each test. We compared the accuracy 




and response times from the upright stimuli with the inverted stimuli in one-tailed paired-
sample t-tests. A significantly lower accuracy or longer response time for the inverted stimuli 
is defined as an inversion effect, whereas a higher accuracy or shorter response time for the 
inverted stimuli is defined as a paradoxical inversion effect. Data of the control group were 




The face and body stimuli were used previously in an fMRI investigation of the neural 
substrates of processing face and body perception in neurologically intact observers (van de 
Riet, Grèzes, & de Gelder, in press). Pictures of fearful, happy and neutral faces were taken 
from the Karolinska Directed Emotional Face database (Lundqvist, Flykt, & Öhman, 1998). 
From our own database, pictures of fearful and happy bodily expressions, instrumental 
(emotionally neutral) bodily expressions (pouring water into a glass) and houses were used. 
We used houses as stimuli for the control condition, because they constitute a single object 
category that has been extensively explored in other studies and is known to elicit activation 
in specific brain areas (Aguirre et al., 1998; Epstein & Kanwisher, 1998; Levy et al., 2001). 
Instrumental body expressions were used because, like emotional expressions, these displays 
elicit action representation and implicit movement (Johnson-Frey et al., 2003), and hence 
constitute a balanced comparison category for the emotional expressions. All images of faces 
and bodies were previously validated regarding emotional expression (minimum recognition 
rate: 75%). (For further details concerning the validation procedure, see van de Riet et al., in 
press). 
A total of 42 images was used, six in every condition (fearful faces, happy faces, neutral 
faces, fearful bodies, happy bodies, neutral bodies and houses). There was no identity overlap 
between faces and bodies or between the emotions. Faces were fitted inside a gray oval shape, 
which masked external aspects of the faces. Body and house stimuli were cut out, removing 
all background. The faces of the body stimuli were covered with a gray opaque mask. 
Additionally, one picture of a chair was used as an oddball stimulus. All stimuli were resized 
to 300 pixels in height and presented on a gray background.  
 





The design was adapted from our previous study (in press). In order not to exacerbate the face 
handicap of the DP group, we modified the experimental paradigm from a facial expression 
categorization task to an oddball detection task thereby also avoiding selective attention to the 
faces with an emotional expression. Moreover, this procedure excludes that activation profiles 
are contaminated by motor responses in the conditions of interest while still providing control  
data on attention to the stimuli. A trial started with the presentation of a fixation cross 
(200ms), followed by a stimulus (500ms) and finally by a gray screen (2200ms) (see Figure 
1). All stimuli were presented six times in random order in an oddball paradigm (participants 
were instructed to press a response button when a chair was shown). The session consisted of 
288 trials (7 conditions x 6 identities x 6 presentations, plus 36 oddball trials). Additionally, 
96 null-events consisting of a gray screen lasting the whole trial length were included to 
reduce stimulus onset predictability and to establish a baseline (Friston, Zarahn, Josephs, 
Henson, & Dale, 1999). The experiment was preceded by a short practice-session which used 











Figure 1. Schematic representation of the experimental design. Participants were instructed to 
press the response button when a chair was presented. 
 
Participants lay supine in the scanner with head movements minimized by an adjustable 
padded head holder. Stimuli were projected onto a mirror above the participant’s head. 
Responses were recorded via an MR-compatible keypad (MRI Devices, Waukesha, WI), 
positioned on the right side of the participant’s abdomen. A PC running Presentation 9.70 




 Images were acquired using a 1.5 Tesla Sonata scanner (Siemens, Erlangen, 
Germany). Blood oxygenation level depend (BOLD) sensitive functional images were 
acquired using a single shot gradient echo-planar imaging (EPI) sequence [TR (repetition 
time)= 3790ms, TE (echo time)=40 ms, 43 transversal slices, ascending acquisition, 2.5mm 
slice thickness, with 0.25mm gap, FP (flip angle)=90°, FOV (field of view)= 32cm]. An 
automatic shimming procedure was performed before each scanning session. A total of 312 
functional volumes were collected for each participant. Following the experimental session, 




structural images were acquired using an MP-RAGE sequence [TR/TE/TI (inversion time) 





All DPs scored outside the normal range for the BFRT and/or the WFMT, but none showed 
an anomalous score on more than one subtest of the BORB suggesting that the visual 
recognition difficulties of the DPs as measured by these two clinical tests are not due to basic 
visual perception problems diagnosed in the BORB (see Table 2). AM scored significantly 
below the mean on the BFRT and WFMT, for both accuracies and response times. HV had a 
borderline performance on the BFRT and prolonged response times on the WFMT. LW 
scored within normal range on the BFRT, but on the WFMT both accuracy and response 
times were anomalous. 
 
Table 2: Results from neuropsychological testing. Response times are shown for correct 
responses. Comparisons of DP’s and matched controls are made by z-scores on the basis of 
the following control groups: Control group for the Warrington face memory: N = 25 (18-27 
yrs);  Control group for the Faces and Shoes task: N = 11 (18-28 yrs); Control group for the 
Face- and Houseparts: N = 21 (18-29 yrs); Asterisks indicate P-values corresponding to the Z-
scores. * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001. SI: severe impairment; BL: borderline; A: average 
  Controls AM HV LW 
BFRT accuracy (/54)  45.4 (A) 28 (SI) 40 (BL) 44 (A) 
WFM accuracy (/50)  44.0 29*** 41 34** 
WFM RT (ms)  1778 3171*** 3853 *** 3171 *** 
Faces accuracy (/64) Upr 63.3 57*** 63 64 
 Inv 62.0 56** 62 57** 
Shoes accuracy (/64) Upr 62.5 64 64 61 
 Inv 62.8 62 64 58** 
Faces RT (ms) Upr 1146 3743 *** 2840 *** 1741** 




 Inv 1526 3406 *** 3640 *** 2112 
Shoes RT (ms) Upr 978 2533 *** 1757 *** 1450*** 
 Inv 1069 2849 *** 1689 *** 1673** 
Face-parts accuracy (/64) Upr 62.7 47*** 60* 59** 
 Inv 62.0 52*** 63 56** 
House-parts accuracy (/64) Upr 62.7 63 62 61 
 Inv 63.2 64 64 63 
Faceparts RT (ms) Upr 1562 2099** 4446 *** 3462*** 
 inv 1755 2224 4130 *** 3229*** 
Houseparts RT (ms) Upr 1192 1554* 1703 *** 1917*** 
 inv 1132 1361 1593 *** 1774*** 
 
To measure face and object recognition in a comparable way and assess relative configural 
processing routines, we compared upright and inverted stimulus matching for each object 
category (de Gelder et al., 1998; Righart & de Gelder, 2007). The control group showed an 
inversion effect for matching faces in both the accuracy (t(10) = 1.892, p < .05) and response 
time (t(10) = 3.164, p < .005). The controls showed no inversion effect for matching shoes. 
For the DPs, the response times were high as previously reported (B. de Gelder & R. Rouw, 
2000a; Righart & de Gelder, 2007). AM was impaired in matching both upright (Z < -5.75) 
and inverted (Z < -3.39) faces. Her response times showed a paradoxical inversion effect 
pattern for matching faces and a normal inversion for matching shoes. HV had accuracies 
within the normal range, but displayed a normal inversion pattern in the response times for 
matching faces and a paradoxical inversion effect in the response times for matching shoes. 
LW showed reduced accuracy for matching inverted faces (Z < -2.82) and inverted shoes (Z < 
-2.74). His response times for matching upright faces were prolonged (Z > 2.39), while the 
latencies for inverted faces were on average. He displayed the normal inversion pattern for 
matching faces and shoes in both accuracy and response times. 
Feature-based matching was tested with the faces and houses task (see B. de Gelder & R. 
Rouw, 2000a for details). The control group showed a normal inversion effect for matching 
face parts in accuracy (t(10) = 1.746, p < .05) and in response time (t(10) = 4.754, p < .001). 
However, they showed a paradoxical inversion effect for matching house-parts in accuracy 




(t(10) = 1.743, p < .05) and response time (t(10) = 2.667, p < .01). AM showed lower 
accuracies for matching both upright (Z = -11.81) and inverted (Z = -5.36) face-parts. Her 
latencies for matching upright face-parts (Z = 2.51) and house-parts (Z = 2.06) were higher 
than normal. She displayed a paradoxical inversion effect in the accuracy data for matching 
face-parts and house parts, and in the response times for matching house-parts. Her response 
times for matching face-parts showed a normal inversion pattern. HV had a reduced accuracy 
for matching upright face-parts (Z = -2.00). He also had highly prolonged response times for 
upright faces (Z = 13.46) and to a lesser extend for inverted faces (Z = 8.27). Latencies for 
upright houses (Z = 2.28) and inverted houses (Z = 3.31) were also prolonged, but less than 
for faces. HV showed paradoxical inversion effects in both the accuracy and response times 
for face-part and house-part matching. LW’s accuracy for matching upright (Z = -2.76) and 
inverted (Z = -3.16) faces was impaired. His responses for matching upright face-parts (Z = 
8.87), inverted face-parts (Z = 5.13), upright house-parts (Z = 4.12) and inverted house-parts 
(Z = 4.61) were prolonged. LW’s accuracy data showed a normal inversion pattern for 
matching face-parts and a paradoxical inversion pattern for matching house parts. He 
displayed a paradoxical inversion effect in his response times for matching face-parts and 
house-parts.  
 
fMRI analysis  
All participants performed flawlessly on the oddball detection task.  
Preprocessing 
Imaging data were analyzed using Brainvoyager QX (Brain Innovation, Maastricht, the 
Netherlands). The first five volumes of each functional run were discarded to allow for T1 
equilibration. Pre-processing of the functional data included 3D-motion correction, slice scan 
time correction, temporal data smoothing (high pass filter 3 cycles in time course) and spatial 
smoothing with an isotropic 6-mm full-width-half-maximum (FWHM) Gaussian kernel. 
Images were spatially normalized to Talairach space (Talairach & Tournoux, 1988) and 
resampled to a voxel size of 1 x 1 x 1mm. Statistical analysis was based on the general linear 
model (GLM), with each condition defined as a separate predictor. Null-events were modeled 
explicitly.  
 





We used a “split-half” method for defining regions of interest (ROI), in order to be sure that 
the observed effects are not due to a selection bias (Baker, Hutchison, & Kanwisher, 2007). 
The even trials were used to define the ROIs and the odd trials were used for the within ROI 
analysis. To localize face-sensitive activation in FG, i.e. FFA, we contrasted the even trials of 
all face conditions (fearful, happy and neutral) with houses (all trials) and identified 
significant voxels in each subject within a restricted region of the FG (Talairach y-coordinate 
between -25 and -65). The voxel set comprising this activation determined the ROI, in this 
case the FFA. The same procedure was followed in a restricted region of the IOG (Talairach 
y-coordinate < -70). To identify body sensitive areas, we compared the even trials of all 
bodies (fearful, happy and instrumental) with houses and mapped the selective activation in a 
restricted region of FG to determine the FBA (Talairach y-coordinate between -25 and -65) 
and the region around the junction of the middle temporal and middle occipital gyrus to 
determine the EBA (Talairach x-coordinate between 25 and 60; y-coordinate between -55 and 
-75; z-coordinate between -15 and 15). We used a liberal threshold (p<.05, uncorrected). 
Since previous studies reported that cortical face and body selective regions are often weaker 
or even absent in the left hemisphere (Kanwisher et al., 1997; Peelen & Downing, 2005), we 
restricted the analysis to the right hemisphere. 
Smoothed activation maps are projected on the inflated right hemisphere of one subject. For 
every ROI, the activation maps of the control subjects are collapsed and the result is displayed 
by the black contours. This procedure allows visualization of the spatial extent of the 
activation across different subjects. Activation of the individual DPs is plotted in color (see 
Figures 2 to 5). The Talairach coordinates of the activation maps are shown in Table 3. 






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Effects of emotional content 
The analyses were performed on the beta-values of the odd trials of the conditions. To 
investigate differences between the DP group and the control group, we used independent 
samples t-tests, corrected for unequal variances (in degrees of freedom). 
FFA 
Figure 2 shows the smoothed face-specific activation (left) and the beta-values of all 
conditions (right) in FG. The controls show the expected age-dependend higher activation for 
neutral than for fearful expressions (Guyer et al., 2008). We calculated the difference between 
fearful faces and neutral faces and this difference was significantly larger in the control group 
(t(4.946) = -2.583, p<.05). The difference between happy faces and neutral faces was 
marginally significantly different between groups (t(4.906) = -2.051, p<.097). Since previous 
studies showed a lower activation for faces in DPs compared to controls (Bentin et al., 2007; 
Hadjikhani & de Gelder, 2002), we used one-tailed post-hoc t-tests to compare the activation 
levels of the three face conditions between both groups. This revealed a marginally significant 
difference for the neutral faces (t(4.980) = 1.929, p<.051).  
 





Figure 2. Face-specific activation in right FG when comparing faces (fearful/happy/neutral) 
with houses. Left: Areas are shown on an inflated right hemisphere. Activation maps of the 
control subjects are collapsed and displayed by the black contours. Activation of the 
individual DPs is plotted in color. Right: beta-values by condition, group and DP. Error bars 
represent one standard error of the mean (SEM). Conditions represent from left to right: 
fearful faces, happy faces, neutral faces, fearful bodies, happy bodies, neutral bodies and 
houses. White columns display the average value of the three patients. Black columns show 
the average value of the controls. Triangles represent the individual values of the DPs. 
 
IOG 
Figure 3 shows the smoothed face-specific activation (left) in IOG and the beta-values of all 
conditions (right). A t-test on the difference between fearful faces and neutral faces showed 
no significant difference between both groups (t(4.510) = .0233, p<.826). The difference 
between happy faces and neutral faces was also not significantly different between the DPs 
and controls (t(4.989) = -1.235, p<.272). 
 





Figure 3. Face-specific activation in right IOG when comparing faces (fearful/happy/neutral) 
with houses. Left: Areas are shown on an inflated right hemisphere. Activation maps of the 
control subjects are collapsed and displayed by the black contours. Activation of the 
individual DPs is plotted in color. Right: beta-values by condition, group and DP. Error bars 
represent one SEM. Conditions represent from left to right: fearful faces, happy faces, neutral 
faces, fearful bodies, happy bodies, neutral bodies and houses. White columns display the 
average value of the three patients. Black columns show the average value of the controls. 
Triangles represent the individual values of the DPs. 
 
FBA 
Figure 4 shows the smoothed body-specific activation (left) and the beta-values of all 
conditions (right) in FBA.The difference between either fearful bodies (t(4.475) = -.088, 
p<.934) or happy bodies (t(4.567) = .321, p<.762) and instrumental bodies was not 
significantly different between both groups. 





Figure 4. Body-specific activation in right FG when comparing bodies 
(fearful/happy/instrumental) with houses. Left: Areas are shown on an inflated right 
hemisphere. Activation maps of the control subjects are collapsed and displayed by the black 
contours. Activation of the individual DPs is plotted in color. The purple indicates overlap 
between red (AM) and blue (LW). Right: beta-values by condition, group and DP. Error bars 
represent one SEM. Conditions represent from left to right: fearful faces, happy faces, neutral 
faces, fearful bodies, happy bodies, neutral bodies and houses. White columns display the 
average value of the three patients. Black columns show the average value of the controls. 
Triangles represent the individual values of the DPs.  
EBA 
Figure 5 shows the smoothed body-specific activation (left) and the beta-values of all 
conditions (right) in EBA.The difference between fearful bodies and instrumental bodies was 
not different between groups (t(3.786) = 1.153, p<.317). A t- test on the difference between 
happy and instrumental bodies revealed no significant between-group difference (t(3.722) = 
.339, p<.573). 





Figure 5. Body-specific activation in right EBA when comparing bodies 
(fearful/happy/instrumental) with houses. Left: Areas are shown on an inflated right 
hemisphere. Activation maps of the control subjects are collapsed and displayed by the black 
contours. Activation of the individual DPs is plotted in color. The purple indicates overlap 
between red (AM) and blue (LW).Right: beta-values by condition, group and DP. Error bars 
represent one SEM. Conditions represent from left to right: fearful faces, happy faces, neutral 
faces, fearful bodies, happy bodies, neutral bodies and houses. White columns display the 
average value of the three patients. Black columns show the average value of the controls. 
Triangles represent the individual values of the DPs. 
 
Effects of categorical selectivity 
To investigate the selectivity of processing faces and bodies in the brain, we calculated the 
difference between the mean of the three face conditions and the mean of the three body 
conditions in FFA and IOG. A comparison using t-tests showed that this difference was 
smaller in the control group in IOG, but it did not reach statistical significance (t(3.961) = 
2.122, p<.102). We also calculated the difference between the mean of all body conditions 
and the mean of all face conditions in FBA and EBA. Independent sample t-tests showed no 
significant between-group differences. 




Processing of neutral faces 
Since the main body of research on DP concerns neutral faces, we compared the activation 
level of neutral faces between both groups in all four ROIs, using t-tests. In addition to the 
above mentioned difference in FFA, this revealed a marginally significantly higher activation 
for neutral faces in EBA in the DP group (t(4.955) = 2.044, p<.097).  
Effects of emotion in amygdala 
Finally, we performed a post-hoc analysis, in which we defined the amygdala in each subject, 
based on the individual anatomy. This ROI consisted in each hemisphere of a cube of 13 x 13 
x 13 voxels around the center of the amygdala and we performed a second GLM in this area. 
The results are shown in Table 3. Contrasting fearful faces with neutral faces revealed 
significant activation in all three patients (left amygdala in AM; bilateral amygdala in HV and 
right amygdala in LW). Comparing happy with neutral faces showed activation in two 
patients (left amygdala in HV and right amygdala in LW). Fearful compared with neutral 
bodies differentially activated the amygdala in two patients (left amygdala in AM and 
bilateral amygdala HV). Happy bodies triggered significantly more amygdala activity in one 




The first major finding is that compared to the control group, the DP group displays a similar 
activation level for the emotional faces, but a lower activation in FFA for neutral faces. A 
lower activation level in DP for neutral face perception in FG is consistent with earlier reports 
(Bentin et al., 2007; Hadjikhani & de Gelder, 2002). The present results are compatible with 
the theoretical perspective on face recognition difficulties argued for previously (Damasio et 
al., 1982; Damasio et al., 1990) suggesting a higher threshold for neutral face recognition 
performance in prosopagnosics. This relative difficulty with neutral faces is based on the 
notion that faces are more difficult stimuli than many other categories they are routinely 
compared with.  
 




Emotional stimuli trigger a higher level of arousal (e.g. Lang, Greenwald, Bradley, & Hamm, 
1993; Mehrabian & Russell, 1974) and emotion in a face constitutes an additional feature that 
carries important communicative information and is therefore more salient. This saliency 
hypothesis is supported by a number of behavioral studies, with different visual tasks, that 
have demonstrated that adding emotional information to a face results in a greater tendency to 
capture attention (Eastwood, Smilek, & Merikle, 2003; Fox, Russo, Bowles, & Dutton, 2001; 
Pourtois, Grandjean, Sander, & Vuilleumier, 2004; Vuilleumier & Schwartz, 2001). Note 
though that the emotion effects we observe are not specific for emotions with a negative 
valence since we obtain similar effects for both fearful and happy (although less pronounced) 
expressions. 
However, normal FFA activation for facial expressions in the presence of lower than normal 
activation for neutral faces suggests that the activation boost is triggered more in he emotion 
processig than in the impaired face processing system in ventro-temporal cortex. Studies on 
perception of emotional faces in normals have hypothesized the existence of a feedback 
mechanism between FG and amygdala (Rossion et al., 2003; Rotshtein et al., 2001; 
Surguladze et al., 2003; Vuilleumier et al., 2001; Vuilleumier, Richardson, Armony, Driver, 
& Dolan, 2004). The possibility that such feedback connections from the amygdala may be 
active in prosopagnosia and boost face processing was already suggested in an earlier study of 
emotional faces in prosopagnosia (de Gelder et al., 2003). Two acquired prosopagnosics were 
presented with both a neutral and emotional part-to-whole face matching task. The patients 
had lesions in FG and/or IOG, but the results showed normal activation in other face-sensitive 
area’s (amygdala, superior temporal sulcus), for the contrast between emotional and neutral 
faces. The patients were also more accurate and faster when they performed the task with 
emotional faces compared to neutral ones. Moreover, the patients showed a normal inversion 
effect for matching emotional but not for neutral faces. 
Lower neural activity in the DPs for neutral faces, but not for emotional faces is compatible 
with a dual route model of face perception as argued first in de Gelder and Rouw (B. de 
Gelder & R. Rouw, 2000a) and adapted in de Gelder et al. (de Gelder et al., 2003), involving 
subcortical structures along a pathway that is able to proces facial expressions (the pulvinar-
superior colliculus-amygdala route) (Morris, Ohman, & Dolan, 1999) which in turn may boost 
face representations in the cortical route in temporal cortex even when face representations in 
temporal cortex are weak as shown by the lower activation for neutral faces in the DP group 
(de Gelder et al., 2003). The pattern observed here is in line with this and may also explain 




why emotional content facilitates the cortical processing of faces in prosopagnosia. Consistent 
with this, we observed a higher activity level of the amygdala for emotional faces compared 
to neutral ones. A related and more extreme phenomenon is observed in hemianopic patients, 
who are unable to consciously report the presentation of a face in the blind visual field and do 
not show FG activation when presented facial expressions in the blind field but who perform 
well above chance in tasks where they have to guess the facial expression (de Gelder, 
Vroomen, Pourtois, & Weiskrantz, 1999). 
 
Our second main finding concerns the categorical specificity of face vs. body representation 
in DPs. We compared the activation of body conditions in the face selective regions and of the 
face conditions in the body selective regions between both groups. On the one hand, our 
findings indicate that perceiving neutral faces results in a higher activation of EBA in the DP 
group, compared to the control group. Combined with the lower activation for neutral faces in 
FFA, this increased activation in EBA might indicate an anomalous cerebral processing route 
in DP. It may be the case that (neutral) faces are processed in the areas more dominantly 
dedicated to body perception. On the other hand, we find a higher activation for perceiving 
bodies in IOG. These combined findings indicate that the neural correlates of perceiving faces 
and bodies, as manifested in IOG and EBA show a lower degree of specificity in DP. 
For body triggered activity we find no difference in neutral vs. emotional expressions between 
both groups, either in FBA or EBA. This indicates that the anomalous neuro-functional 
substrate in our DP group for neutral faces does not extent to the processing of bodies and 
bodily expressions. This is in line with recent behavioral data showing no impairment in 
recognizing neutral body postures in one DP patient (Duchaine et al., 2006). One of the DPs 
(HV) in the present study participated in a previous ERP study on perception of neutral faces 
and neutral bodies (Righart & de Gelder, 2007) and the results of both studies are partly 
converging. Righart & de Gelder (2007) measured the electrical brain correlates of the 
inversion effect as an index of configural processes (the ability to perceive stimuli as one 
configuration as opposed to an assemblage of features (Young, Hellawell, & Hay, 1987)). HV 
differed significantly from the control group in face processing on two accounts. He displayed 
a paradoxical ERP inversion effect (the reverse pattern from the controls) around 100 ms after 
stimulus presentation (P1 amplitude) and no inversion effect around 170 ms after stimulus 
presentation (N170 latency). But his results for bodies did not differ from the controls. 





An important and relevant difference between face and body perception concerns the coding 
of identity. A face contains all necessary information about the identity of a person and we are 
used and trained to recognize identity by the face. A person can be readily identified on the 
basis of his face, but identification based on the body alone is far less evident. The different 
pattern in FG for faces and bodies may therefore reflect the possibility that FG is more 
involved in processing person identity (Grill-Spector et al., 2004) which is typically more 
based on the face than on the body. 
 
Notwithstanding the well documented involvement of FG in face perception, its precise role 
of FG in prosopagnosia is still a matter of debate. We do not clearly understand at present 
how factors like maturation of different cortical areas, like the FG, are important for normal 
face recognition. Reduced volume of the right temporal lobe has previously been reported in a 
DP patient (Bentin, Deouell, & Soroker, 1999). A structural imaging study in six DP subjects 
investigated volumetric and morphometric properties in occipito-temporal cortex and showed 
a decreased volume of the FG that correlated with face recognition deficits (Behrmann, 
Avidan, Gao, & Black, 2007). At the neuro-functional level, recent data collected from 
normals show a correlation between the volumetric size of the right FFA and recognition 
memory for neutral faces (Golarai et al., 2007). This study also investigated the development 
of category specific brain areas and the results suggest that the relative size of the FFA 
increases during development. Moreover, the development of the FFA takes longer compared 
to that of object selective areas (lateral occipital complex) or face sensitive areas in the 
superior temporal sulcus (see Grill-Spector, Golarai, & Gabrieli, 2008 for review and 
discussion). These findings support the notion that DP may be associated with abnormal 
development of FG which may be either a consequence or a cause of anomalous face skills. 
Lesions in acquired prosopagnosia (AP) patients often include the FG (Barton, Press, Keenan, 
& O'Connor, 2002; e.g. de Gelder et al., 2003), although other cases have also been reported 
with lesions more posterior than the face sensitive part of the FG (e.g. Sorger, Goebel, Schiltz, 
& Rossion, 2007; Steeves et al., 2006). Besides the heterogeneity across lesion localization in 
AP, considerable heterogeneity consists in behavioral symptoms in DP (Le Grand et al., 
2006). Since successful face-processing is likely to involve a variety of hierarchical and 
parallel processes, impairments in different processes will result in different types of 




behavioral and neuro-anatomical correlates. The results from the present study clearly 
demonstrate the importance of emotional information in face processing and urge (future 
imaging) studies to take the modulatory effect of emotion into account, in order to further 
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Huntington’s disease (HD) attacks primarily basal ganglia structures (mostly caudate nucleus 
and putamen) leading to severe motor deficits (Vonsattel et al., 1985). At the same time HD is 
accompanied by deficits in recognizing emotional expressions, particularly facial expressions 
of disgust (Sprengelmeyer et al., 1996; Wang, Hoosain, Yang, Meng, & Wang, 2003). 
However, in natural circumstances facial expressions are rarely seen in isolation, but 
occur in the context of expressions by the whole body. Our ability to perceive these emotional 
body expressions and their representation in the brain is now becoming an important research 
topic (de Gelder, 2006), and there are strong arguments for exploring how HD patients 
recognize emotional body language. In previous studies with neurologically intact observers, 
we used fMRI to clarify how the brain recognizes happiness or fear expressed by a whole 
body (de Gelder, Snyder, Greve, Gerard, & Hadjikhani, 2004; Grezes, Pichon, & de Gelder, 
2007). Our results indicate that observing fearful body expressions produces increased 
activity in brain areas associated with perception of emotional faces, but also in areas 
involved in representation of action and movement, including caudate nucleus and putamen. 
Caudate nucleus and putamen are known for their involvement in motor tasks but have also 
been associated with motivational and emotional task components (Bhatia & Marsden, 1994; 
Grillner, Hellgren, Menard, Saitoh, & Wikstrom, 2005; Kampe, Frith, Dolan, & Frith, 2001). 
Therefore, we conjectured that HD is also associated with a deficit in recognizing emotions 
expressed by the whole body. However, since our pilot data indicated that static bodily 
expressions of disgust are difficult to distinguish from fear (both postures consisting in 
moving backwards and putting hand palms forward), we did not include disgust. 
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Participants. Nineteen HD patients (10 early HD at stage I and 9 at stage II, using the 
classification based on the Total Functional Capacity scale (Shoulson, 1981) and 19 control 
subjects participated. HD patients were recruited from an out-clinic follow-up program within 
the framework of interventional therapy approved by the ethical committee of the Henri 
Mondor Hospital. They had no previous neurological or psychiatric history and their HD 
diagnosis was genetically confirmed. All subjects gave informed consent. Patients were 
evaluated using the Mattis Dementia Rating Scale (MDRS) (Mattis, 1976), and the United 
Huntington’s Disease Rating Scale of which the cognitive part contains the Stroop test, the 
verbal fluency task and Symbol Digit Test. All patients were administered by the same rater. 
Atrophy of the caudate was assessed in 11 patients with MRI by calculating an adjusted 
bicaudate ratio, which took cortical atrophy into account (the minimal distance between the 
caudate indentations of the frontal horns divided by the width of the brain along the same line 
multiplied by 100). We opted for this adjustment since there are now several studies showing 
rather widespread cortical pathology in HD gene carriers (Kassubek, Bernhard 
Landwehrmeyer et al., 2004; Kassubek, Gaus, & Landwehrmeyer, 2004; Thieben et al., 
2002). 
Control subjects were healthy volunteers with normal or corrected to normal vision and no 
previous neurological history. They were matched on age, t(36) = 1.37, p = 0.180, sex, χ2 = 
1.18, p = 0.669, dexterity, χ2 = 0.01, p = 0.958 and years of education, t(36) = 0.29, p = 0.775 











Table 1 Demographic Data of HD Patients and Control Subjects. n. a. = not applicable *N=11.  The 
norms are issued from % (Golden, 1978); § (Cardebat et al., 1990);  µ (Wechsler, 1981);  # (Starkstein 
et al., 1989). 
Demographic data HD Controls 
N 19 19 
Sex 9F/ 10M 8F/ 11M 
Age in years (SD) 52.0 (9.1) 48.2 (8.0) 
Educational level in years (SD) 13.9 (4.6) 14.4 (5.1) 
Evolution duration in years (SD) 5.9 (4.2) n. a. 
CAG-repeats (SD) 42.7 (2.6) n. a. 
Laterality 18R/ 1L 18R/ 1L 
General assessment data  Normal published range 
Total Functional Capacity 10.0 (2.1) 13 
UHDRS motor score 32.4 (19.0) 0 
MDRS 129.8 (7.7) ≥136 
Stroop Color/word 20.3 (10.0) ≥35% 
Fluency “P” in 2 min 16.8 (7.1) 18 § 
Symbol Digit Code 21.9 (8.6) ≥37µ 
Bicaudate ratio’s* 20.7 (4.3) < 10 # 
 
Stimuli and procedure. Video recordings of eight semi-professional actors (half of them 
women, age 22-35 years) were used for stimulus construction. Actors performed fearful, 
angry and sad expressive gestures with their whole body. The actors also performed 
instrumental but emotionally neutral actions (pouring water into a glass, combing one’s hair, 
putting trousers on, opening a door, talking on the telephone and drinking a glass of water). 
These instrumental displays elicit action representation (Johnson-Frey et al., 2003) and are 
thus appropriate to use as controls for investigating emotional body expressions, also eliciting 
action representation and implicit movement perception.   
Prior to the recordings the actors were briefed with a set of standardized instructions.  For the 
instrumental body actions instructions specified the action to be performed. For emotional 
body actions instructions specified a familiar scenario (for example, opening a door and 
finding an armed robber in front of you).  Static images were obtained from the videos by 




selecting the most informative frame from the video file and converting it to grayscale 
pictures. To exclude that face recognition would play a role in recognition of the whole body 
stimuli, the faces were blocked with a grey mask. Stimulus selection for the present 
experiment was based on the results of a pilot study in which the images were presented one 
by one on a PC screen and shown for 4000ms with a 4000ms interval. For the emotional 
bodies, a total of 120 trials were used (3 expressions x 8 identities x 5 repetitions). 
Participants were instructed to categorize each stimulus in a forced-choice procedure as 
quickly and as accurately as possible by pressing one of the three response buttons 
corresponding to the three emotions. Overall correct recognition rate was between 100 and 65 
percent (average 93%). For each stimulus category the six highest ranked exemplars were 
chosen (all recognized at 100% accuracy) for use in the present study. The same procedure 
was used for the instrumental gestures. Overall correct recognition rate in the pilot study was 
between 100 and 90 percent (average 99%), and for each gesture the six highest ranked were 
chosen (all recognized at 100% accuracy) for the present study.  
The experiment consisted of randomized simultaneous presentation of three images on each 
trial, one at the top (target) and two probes right en left underneath. Target and probe pictures 
were always of three persons of the same sex, but one probe displayed the same expression as 
the target and the other one a different expression. Participants were required in a two 
alternative forced choice task to select the probe with the same expression as the target. They 
responded by pressing the corresponding button (see Fig 1A and 1B for stimulus examples). 
Stimuli were presented until response. During the intertrial interval (3000 ms) a blank screen 
was shown. The experiment consisted of a block with emotional stimuli and a block with 
instrumental stimuli. 
The session started with four familiarization trials, followed by 75 experimental trials for the 
emotional block (3 emotions x 5 stimuli x 5 repetitions) and 48 trials for the instrumental 
block (6 actions x 4 stimuli x 2 repetitions). Similar to a previous study (Van den Stock et al. 
(2007), we used a matching task instead of a naming or categorization task because we were 
primarily interested in tapping into the motor perception processes. A naming or 
categorization task appeals more to verbal labeling of stimuli and also necessitates a 
significant language component, abilities which are not impaired in HD. The 2AFC task used 
here requires that matching be based on the basis of movement similarities between stimuli in 
the same emotion category.  







Mean accuracy scores for the two groups, separated by expression, are displayed in Figure 
1C. We carried out a repeated measures ANOVA with expression (4 levels: instrumental, 
anger, fear and sadness) as within-subjects variable and group (2 levels: HD and Controls) as 
between-subjects variable. This revealed significant effects of type of expression, F(3, 108) = 
23.54, p  < 0.001; group, F(1, 36) = 22.25, p  < 0.001; and a significant interaction, F(3, 108) 
= 3.77, p  = 0.013. To follow up on the interaction effect, we performed for every expression 
Bonferroni corrected t-tests between both groups. This showed significant differences 
between the groups on the instrumental and angry expressions, t(36) > 4.73, p  < 0.001. In 
order to explore differences between stage 1 and stage 2 HD, we performed a post hoc 
repeated measures ANOVA on the data of the patient group with expression (4 levels) as 
within-subjects variable and stage (2 levels) as between-subjects variable. This showed no 
main effect of group or interaction with expression. 
 




Figure 1. (A) Stimulus example in the instrumental action block and (B) the emotional block showing 
a fearful body on top and a fearful (left) and a sad (right) body at the bottom. (C) Proportion correct 
matches as a function of group and bodily expression. Error bars represent one SEM above 
the mean. * Significant at the P < 0.01 level. 
 
To investigate a possible relationship between whole body recognition abilities on the one 
hand and behavioral and neurostructural deficits on the other hand, we performed partial 
correlation analyses, controlling for scores on the MDRS in order to correct for effects due to 
general cognitive decline. 
Table 2 shows significant correlations between general assessment measures and 
experimental data. Partial correlations between bicaudate ratio and experimental data were not 
significant for any bodily expression. Since the UHDRS motor consists of a number of 
subscales, we performed an exploratory correlation analysis at the level of different 
components of the UHDRS motor, according to Shannon (Shannon, Raman, & Leurgans, 
1999) namely chorea, dystonia, oculo-motor dysfunction and motor dysfunction. This 
revealed a significant correlation between the motor dysfunction component and recognition 
of angry body postures, r = -0.575, p  = 0.016. The correlation between motor dysfunction and 
recognition of instrumental body postures was marginally significant, r = -0.476, p  = 0.053. 
When confined to the subjects who underwent both bicaudate and UHDRS measurements 
(N=9), both correlations remained stable, but at a lower significance level (r = -0.712, p = 
0.048 and  r = -0.643, p  = 0.085 respectively). Motor dysfunction takes into account gait 
disturbance, axial disorders, bradykinesia, rigidity, postural reflexes and gesture disabilities. 
Table 2 Partial Correlations (Controlling for Performance on MDRS) Between Bicaudate Ratio, 
UHDRS Subscales (Shannon et al., 1999) and Experimental Data. *  Significant at the p < 0.05-level; 
(*) marginally significant 
  bicaudate ratio chorea dystonia motor oculo-motor 
body anger 
 
r -0,012 -0,046 -0,445 -0,575 -0,190 
p 0,973 0,861 0,073 0,016* 0,464 
N 11 15 15 15 15 
body fear 
 
r 0,111 0,123 0,298 0,006 -0,060 
p 0,761 0,640 0,245 0,983 0,819 
N 11 15 15 15 15 
body sad r -0,555 0,085 -0,356 -0,182 -0,161 




 p 0,096 0,747 0,161 0,484 0,536 




r -0,231 0,001 -0,291 -0,476 -0,199 
p 0,520 0,996 0,257 0,053(*) 0,443 
N 11 15 15 15 15 
 
Correlations between bicaudate ratio and MDRS, r = -0.737, p  = 0.004 and between 





The major finding of this study concerns the deficit of HD patients in recognizing 
instrumental and angry whole body postures. Recognition of meaningful non-emotional 
actions was not investigated previously, yet reports in the literature indicate that action related 
deficits in HD have been observed with different tasks in other settings (Aron, Sahakian, & 
Robbins, 2003). The present data provide evidence that action related abilities are important 
for recognition of instrumental actions and bodily expressions of anger. The action component 
at stake in recognition of whole body expressions of sadness is considerably less important. 
We conjecture that this is due to the fact that this emotion is typically associated with 
relaxation and loss of muscle tonus. Similarly, recognition of whole body expressions of fear 
also implies a reduced action component as fear cannot only lead to flight but is equally 
associated with freezing of the whole body (LeDoux, 1996). So the observed deficits in 
recognizing instrumental body actions and bodily expressions of anger are compatible with 
the idea that the motor deficit of HD patients impairs their ability for action recognition. On 
the basis of this, a relationship between the UHDRS motor score and experimental data was 
expected. This is in fact the case. Corrected for general cognitive decline, HD patients were 
more impaired in recognizing the emotional angry and the instrumental body expressions if 
their motor symptoms were more severe. The difficulties in perceiving body emotions were 
not related to abnormal movements like chorea or dystonia but to features that better capture 
the body posture and the abilities to perform gestures. This suggests a link between perception 




and production of body gestures that needs to be further investigated. In view of our previous 
results that caudate nucleus activity was observed in the contrast between "fearful" and 
"instrumental" expressions of the body (de Gelder et al. 2004) it is surprising that 
neurodegeneration of the caudate nucleus in these HD patients is not reflected in impaired 
fear processing.  But at present we have no data available directly comparing fear and anger 
expressions which would allow us to estimate the relative involvement of caudate nucleus in 
fear vs. anger action perception. This issue clearly needs further investigations.  
 
The importance of motor areas for action recognition is illustrated by the research on mirror 
neurons by Rizzolatti and colleagues (di Pellegrino, Fadiga, Fogassi, Gallese, & Rizzolatti, 
1992; Grèzes & Decety, 2002; Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004). Research over the last decade 
has clearly indicated that recognition of instrumental actions involves some of the same brain 
areas that are involved in performance of that action by the observer himself. Thus the 
observed impairment in recognition of instrumental actions evokes the concept of motor 
resonance at the center of motor cognition abilities, which are implemented in premotor 
cortex, parietal cortex and superior temporal sulcus (STS). Degeneration of the motor areas in 
HD, predominantly striatum and its connections to parietal and premotor cortex and STS is 
consistent with the importance of action representation for intact recognition of whole body 
postures. The areas involved in spontaneous facial expressions (dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, 
orbitofrontal cortex, anterior cingulate, insula and amygdala) connect with the motor system 
via de basal ganglia (Alexander & Crutcher, 1990; Damasio, 1999) and this network may 
constitute an important part of a dedicated mechanism for visuomotor emotion perception.  
Correlations between structural and functional cerebral changes and cognitive abilities have 
been reported in HD, although not consistently (see Montoya, Price, Menear, & Lepage, 2006, 
for a review). We were unable to find a correlation between our structural anatomical index 
(adjusted bicaudate ratio) and recognition of body postures. It should be stated that we 
preferred to include cortical pathology in our anatomical index, in view of recent reports 
about rather widespread cortical pathology already in preclinical HD (Kassubek, Bernhard 
Landwehrmeyer et al., 2004; Kassubek, Gaus et al., 2004; Thieben et al., 2002). However, 
incorporating cortical atrophy may rule out any kind of specific relationship between 
decreased volume of the striatum on the one hand and behavioral data on the other hand.  




A question for future research concerns the relationship between recognition of emotional 
faces and bodies. Recently, selective deficits in recognition of angry faces have been reported 
in patients with damage to the ventral striatum (Calder, Keane, Lawrence, & Manes, 2004). 
Furthermore, the disgust recognition deficit in HD has also been extended from facial 
expressions to scenes, odors, vocal expressions and declarative knowledge (Hayes, Stevenson, 
& Coltheart, 2007). We did not include whole bodies expressions of disgust, since our pilot 
data indicated they were very hard to recognize in static stimuli once the facial information is 
completely blurred.  
Considering the relation we observed between emotion recognition deficits (specifically 
anger) and motor abilities, an interesting question is whether the same pattern of deficits 
observed here will also be found when we use dynamic stimuli. We are currently investigating 
this issue.     
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Chapter 11: Perceiving emotions from bodily expressions and multisensory integration 




Investigations of emotion recognition in schizophrenics have predominantly focussed on 
facial expressions. The findings point to a deficit in recognition of negative emotions(Mandal, 
Pandey, & Prasad, 1998). This facial emotion recognition impairment has been linked to the 
social dysfunctions observed in schizophrenics(Pinkham, Hopfinger, Ruparel, & Penn, 2008). 
From that perspective a facial expression deficit is not all that surprising. But an important 
issue is whether one can generalize from a deficit in recognition  of facial expressions to 
difficulties in recognizing emotional signals conveyed by other common channels like the 
voice and the body.   In daily life, emotions are also expressed in the whole body and by 
different sensory channels, but studies addressing body language recognition or emotional 
multisensory integration in schizophrenia so far are rare. We recently used affective face-
voice combinations that were either congruent (for example a happy face presented 
simultaneously with a happy vocal expression) or incongruent (for example a happy face 
paired with a fearful vocal expression) and asked schizophrenics to rate one of both 
modalities and ignore the other(de Gelder et al., 2005; de Jong, Hodiamont, Van den Stock, & 
de Gelder, 2009). The results showed that schizophrenics showed anomalous crossmodal bias 
effects, compared to control subjects. For example, when schizophrenic patients categorized 
the emotion expressed in the voice, they were less influenced by the simultaneously presented 
but task irrelevant facial expression(de Jong et al., 2009). So far, little is known about 
recognition of emotional body language in schizophrenia, but in view of the behavioural and 
neuro-anatomical similarities between perception of faces and bodies(de Gelder, 2006; de 
Gelder et al., 2009), we hypothesize that the patients will be impaired. 
 
Our goal here was explore these two issues further. In Experiment 1, we investigated the 
recognition of emotional body language in a group of schizophrenics, non-schizophrenic 
psychotics and normal controls in order to explore whether the emotion recognition deficit 
previously reported for faces also applies for whole body expressions.  
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In Experiment 2 we investigated how schizophrenics perceive multisensory emotional events, 
consisting of realistic body language combined with affective auditory utterances. We 
presented video clips of emotional body language, engaged in a common activity in an 
everyday situation. In addition to adding human vocal expressions, we also combined the 
video clips with animal vocalizations in order to investigate the role of environmental sounds. 
As reported previously, it is important to control for task variables as attention may shift 
across conditions and trials from face to voice especially in clinical populations(Bertelson & 
de Gelder, 2004; de Gelder & Bertelson, 2003).  
 
Experiment 1: Recognition of static body language 
 
Methods 
Participants. Thirty-one schizophrenics, 23 patients with non-schizophrenic psychosis and a 
group of 21 normal controls matched for gender, age and socio-economic status participated 
in the study. Demographic data are shown in Table 1. There was no significant difference in 
age (F(2,72) = 0.620; p < 0.541) or gender ratio (χ2 ≤ 2.13; p < 0.14) between the three 
groups. Only patients meeting the criteria for schizophrenia and non-schizophrenic psychosis 
set by the DSM-IV (APA, 2000) were included. All patients were under treatment at the local 
day hospital. Diagnosis was established with the Schedules for Clinical Assessment in 
Neuropsychiatry (SCAN, version 2.1), a standardised interview for diagnosing axis I 
disorders, conducted by a trained psychiatrist. All patients were on antipsychotic medication. 
Control subjects with a psychiatric disorder, a brain dysfunction or a genetic predisposition 
for schizophrenia were excluded from participation. All participants were paid for 
participation (22€). 
Informed consent was obtained from all participants according to the declaration of 















Demographic data    
Experiment 1    
N 31 23 21 
Mean age (range) 33.7 (21-52) 35.7 (20-54) 32.4 (21-58) 
Gender 23 M/ 8 F 14 M/ 9 F 13 M/ 8 F 
Dexterity 28 R/ 3 L 20 R/ 3 L 20 R/ 1 L 
    
Experiment 2    
N 16 / 16 
Mean age (range) 36.8 (22-53) / 38.0 (22-53) 
Gender 15 M/ 1 F / 9 M/ 7 F 
Dexterity 15 R/ 1 L / 13 R/ 3 L 
 
Materials and procedure 
Materials consisted of pictures from our own database of body expressions and 
instrumental actions ((for details on stimulus construction, see refs de Gelder, Snyder, Greve, 
Gerard, & Hadjikhani, 2004; Hadjikhani & de Gelder, 2003)).  All body images were shown 
with the faces blurred  and had been validated in a previous study(Hadjikhani & de Gelder, 
2003). Only pictures that were correctly recognized above 85 percent were selected for the 
experiment.  
The experiment consisted of two blocks: one with bodily expressions and one with 
neutral bodily actions. We included these instrumental whole body actions, because these 
displays elicit action representation(Johnson-Frey et al., 2003) and are thus appropriate to use 
as controls for investigating emotional body expressions, also eliciting action representation 
and implicit movement perception. The procedure was identical in each block. Materials for 
the experiment consisted of 30 emotional bodies and 24 instrumental actions. The 
instrumental action block consisted of 48 trials (6 actions x 2 genders x 4 exemplars) and the 
bodily expression block consisted of 36 trials (3 expressions x 2 genders x 6 exemplars). A 
stimulus consisted of presentation of a target at the top of the screen that had to be matched 
with one of two simultaneously presented probes underneath (see Figure 1). The three 
pictures in a stimulus were always from the same gender but three different identities. 
Participants were instructed to select the probe that matched the action or emotion of the 
target body. The position of the correct probe was counterbalanced. Participants responded by 
pressing the corresponding button, indicating their choice for the left or right probe. Stimuli 




were presented till a response was given. During the 1000 ms intertrial interval, a blank screen 
was shown.  
 
Results 
Results are displayed in Figure 1. We calculated for every condition and participant the mean 
accuracy and median reaction times (RT) of the correct trials. Both RT and accuracy data 
were submitted to a repeated measures ANOVA with expression (4 levels: angry, fearful, sad 
and instrumental) as within subjects factor and group (3 levels: schizophrenic, non-
schizophrenic psychosis and control) as between subjects factor. This revealed for the 
accuracy data a significant main effect of expression (F(3,210) = 13.269; p < 0.001) and 
group (F(2,70) = 6.234; p < 0.003). The expression x group interaction was not significant. 
Tukey post hoc tests on the main effect of group showed a significant difference between the 
control group and the schizophrenic group (p < 0.002), and a marginally significant difference 
between the control group and the non-schizophrenic psychosis group (p < 0.054). To follow 
up on the main effect of expression, we performed Bonferroni corrected paired sample t-tests 
between every combination of expressions (n=6). This showed significant differences 
between angry and fearful (t(74) = 5.911; p< 0.001); between instrumental and fearful (t(74) = 
6.818; p< 0.001); and between instrumental and sad expressions (t(74) = 4.303; p< 0.001). 
The difference between fearful and sad expressions was marginally significant (t(74) = 2.483; 
p < 0.015). 
 





Figure 1. Accuracy (top) and reaction time (bottom) of Experiment 1 as a function of expression and 
group (Schizo = Schizophrenia group; NSP : non-schizophrenic psychosis group). Error bars represent 
1 SEM.  
 
The analysis on RT showed a significant main effect of expression (F(3,210) = 8.762; p < 
0.003). The main effect of group and the expression x group interaction were not significant. 
Bonferroni corrected paired sampled post hoc t-tests showed significant difference between 
angry and instrumental (t(74) = 3.481; p < 0.001); fearful and sad (t(74) = 3.326; p < 0.001); 
fearful and instrumental (t(74) = 5.142; p < 0.001); and between sad and instrumental (t(74) = 
4.009; p < 0.001) expressions.  
 
Discussion 
We presented patients with schizophrenia, patients with non-schizophrenic psychosis and 
matched controls with a two alternative forced choice whole body expression matching task. 
The results show that compared to the control group, the schizophrenic group exhibits a 
general impairment in recognizing emotional body language. The non-schizophrenic 
psychosis group occupies an intermediate position between the controls and schizophrenia 
group. The impairment is manifest in both accuracy and reaction time data. The differences 




between emotions in the accuracy and reaction time data are in the opposite direction and 
hence argue against speed-accuracy tradeoffs. It is also unlikely that the observed effects can 
be explained by task difficulty, since the absence of an expression x group interaction reveals 
that the patients are not differentially impaired on recognition of specific emotions, while the 
main effect of emotion indicates that not all emotions are equally well recognizable. Hence, 
the patients are not more impaired in recognizing the more difficult emotions.  
The generalized whole body emotion recognition deficit is consistent with findings from 
facial expression recognition studies (reviewed in ref Mandal et al., 1998). Schizophrenics are 
in general less able to make adequate emotional judgements of ambiguous facial 
expressions(Kee, Horan, Wynn, Mintz, & Green, 2006) and attribute negative emotional 
valence to neutral face cues(Kohler et al., 2003), which may explain the non-specific nature of 
emotion recognition difficulties.  
 
Experiment 2: Multisensory integration of dynamic body language and 
vocalizations 
 
In everyday situations, fearful body language is usually accompanied by anxious screams. 
Recently, we showed that static whole body expressions influence recognition of 
simultaneously presented vocal expressions(Van den Stock, Righart, & de Gelder, 2007). In a 
follow-up study(Van den Stock, Grezes, & de Gelder, 2008) we used dynamic stimuli in 
realistic situations to increase ecological validity, which may be an important factor in 
multisensory integration(Bertelson & de Gelder, 2004; de Gelder & Bertelson, 2003). We 
paired these visual stimuli with nonverbal vocalizations and more importantly, we also 
manipulated the nature of the bimodal combinations by using auditory stimuli that were either 
produced by the same source as the visual stimuli (human vocalizations), or by a different 
source (animal vocalizations). The findings showed that both human and animal sounds 
influence recognition of dynamic body language. Here we use the same materials for the 
second objective of the present study which is to investigate the multisensory integration 
pattern of these everyday emotional events in schizophrenia. 
 





Participants. A new group of sixteen schizophrenics meeting the criteria described in 
Experiment 1 and sixteen matched controls participated in Experiment 2. Demographic data 
are shown in Table 1. There was no significant difference of age between groups (t(30) = 
0.32, p < 0.751). None of the participants of Experiment 2 participated in Experiment 1. 
Materials and procedure 
Materials and procedure of experiment 2 are described in detail in ref(2008). In 
summary, the experiment consisted of a visual (V) block, in which video clips of an actor 
grabbing a glass in a fearful or happy manner were presented and audio-visual (AV) block in 
which each video was synchronically presented with one of the stimuli of the four auditory 
conditions: fearful human vocalizations, happy human vocalizations, fearful animal 
vocalizations and happy animal vocalizations. Participants were instructed to categorize the 
emotion expressed by the body while ignoring the auditory message in a two alternative 
forced choice task by pressing the corresponding button (happy or fearful).  
 
Results 
We excluded trials on which participants responded before the end of the stimulus 
(RT<800ms). On this basis, sixty-four trials (1.3%) were discarded. We computed the 
proportion ‘happy’ responses in the different conditions. Results are shown in Figure 2. The 
data with animal and human vocalizations are analyzed separately. Since the participants 
performed a delayed reaction time task, RT data were not analyzed. 
 





Figure 2. Proportion ‘happy’ responses in the bimodal and unimodal conditions, separated by group, 
emotion, auditory category and congruence. Error bars represent 1 SEM. 
 
a) body videos simultaneously presented with human vocalizations: 
A repeated measures ANOVA was performed on the proportion ‘happy’ responses with visual 
emotion (two levels: fearful and happy) and (human) auditory emotion (three levels: fearful, 
happy and no auditory stimulus) as within-subjects factors and with group (two levels: 
schizophrenia and control) as between subjects factor. This revealed a main effect of visual 
emotion (F(1,31) = 124.154, p < 0.001), a main effect of auditory emotion (F(1,31) = 11.278, 
p < 0.001) and a significant two way auditory emotion x group interaction (F(2,62) = 3.310, p 
< .043). The visual emotion x group interaction was marginally significant (F(1,31) = 3.937, p 
< 0.056). 
The main effect of visual emotion indicates, as expected that the proportion happy 
responses is higher for happy bodies than for fearful bodies. The main effect of auditory 
emotion shows that the ratings of the bodily expressions are influenced by the auditory 
emotion, while the auditory emotion x group interaction indicates that this auditory influence 
is significantly different between the two groups. To follow up on this interaction effect we 
computed the influence of the auditory information for both groups separately, by calculating 
the ordinal difference between the unimodal and bimodal conditions [(fear video minus fear 
video paired with fear audio) + (fear video paired with happy audio minus fear video) + 
(happy video paired with happy audio minus happy video) + (happy video minus happy video 
paired with fearful audio)]. The resulting difference was higher for the schizophrenia group 




(0.46) compared to the control group (0.14)  (t(31) < 2.036, p < 0.054), indicating the 
schizophrenics are more influenced by the vocalizations than the controls.  
We also compared the ratings of both unimodal visual conditions (fearful and happy 
body language) between both groups using independent samples t-tests. This showed no 
significant difference (t(31) < 1.335, p < 0.192), indicating both patients and controls were 
equally able to recognize the body videos.  
 
b) Body videos simultaneously presented with animal vocalizations:  
A repeated measures ANOVA on the proportion happy responses with visual emotion (fearful 
and happy) and (animal) auditory emotion (fearful, happy and no auditory stimulus) as 
within-subjects factors, and group (schizophrenia and control) as between subjects factor, 
revealed a significant main effect of visual emotion (F(1,31) = 112.758, p < 0.001 and a 
significant visual emotion x group interaction (F(1,31) =  4.456, p < 0.043. To follow up on 
the interaction effect, we computed for both groups separately, the mean proportion happy 
responses for the conditions with a happy video, regardless of (animal) auditory information 
and we followed the same procedure for the fearful video conditions. The proportion happy 
responses on the conditions with fear videos was significantly lower in the control group than 
in the schizophrenia group (t(31) = 2.199, p < 0.035), suggesting that the schizophrenics 
categorized the fearful videos more as happy. The difference between both groups on the 
conditions with happy videos was not significant. 
A comparison between both groups on recognition of each of the four unimodal auditory 
conditions showed no significant difference (t(31) < 1.850, p < 0.074). 
 
Discussion 
We presented schizophrenics and controls with short videos of a person engaged in an 
everyday action (picking up a glass from the table), performed either in a fearful or happy 
manner and asked them to indicate the emotion displayed by the actor. Simultaneously with 
the videos we presented emotionally congruent or incongruent vocal expressions, which could 
be produced by a human or an animal. The results show that schizophrenics are more 
influenced by the task irrelevant auditory information, compared to the control group, but 
only for human and not for the animal vocalizations.  Different explanations may be 
envisaged for the increased influence of human auditory information in the schizophrenia 




group. One may relate to the relative dominance of sensory inputs. The increased crossmodal 
bias of vocal expressions on body expressions may point to greater impact of the auditory 
modality under audiovisual perception conditions in schizophrenics. This explanation is also 
compatible with our previous study in which schizophrenia patients showed a reduced 
crossmodal bias of a visual facial expression on the recognition of the emotion in a vocal 
expression(de Jong et al., 2009) and with a recent report from audiovisual speech perception 
in schizophrenia(Ross et al., 2007). But this does not explain why human and animal 
vocalisations have a different effect. Another possible explanation may be task difficulty. The 
recognition of the unimodal visual stimuli shows no ceiling effect and if schizophrenics have 
more difficulty recognizing the visual stimulus, they might rely more on the information 
provided by the secondary stimulus. A direct test between both groups of the unimodal 
conditions reveals no significant difference, indicating that schizophrenics and controls 
perform equally in recognizing whole body expressions as well as human and auditory 
vocalizations, but this does not rule out the possibility that they have more difficulty with 
audiovisual stimuli since performance on an audiovisual integration task depends on other 
factors besides performance in the respective sensory systems. The auditory information may 
be harder to ignore for the schizophrenics either because the focussed attention task requiring 




In the first experiment, we tested recognition of static emotional body language in a group of 
schizophrenics, non-schizophrenic psychotics and controls. The results show an emotion 
recognition impairment in the schizophrenic group for all emotions. The impairment is also 
present in the non-schizophrenic psychosis group, but to a lesser extent. The present study 
shows that the emotion recognition difficulties in schizophrenia, which have been previously 
documented with studies using facial expressions(Mandal et al., 1998), extend to the 
recognition of body language. These perceptual deficits are compatible with neuro-anatomical 
findings: perception of bodily expressions activates not only brain areas associated with 
emotion perception like fusiform gyrus and amygdala(Hadjikhani & de Gelder, 2003), but 
also areas involved in action representation like premotor cortex (de Gelder et al., 2004; 
Grèzes, Pichon, & de Gelder, 2007; Pichon, de Gelder, & Grezes, 2008) and all these 




structures show abnormalities in schizophrenia(Bertrand et al., 2008; Gur et al., 2002; 
Michalopoulou et al., 2008; Phillips et al., 1999; Pinkham, Hopfinger, Pelphrey, Piven, & 
Penn, 2008; Pinkham, Hopfinger, Ruparel et al., 2008). So impaired recognition of body 
expressions in schizophrenia might have its roots in a dysfunction of the brain network 
involved in emotion perception, but also in a deficit of the brain areas involved in action 
representation. 
It has recently been suggested that the motor abilities of the observer are an important aspect 
of body language recognition, linking   movement deficits and anomalous recognition of 
bodily expressions(de Gelder, 2006; de Gelder, Van den Stock, de Diego Balaguer, & 
Bachoud-Levi, 2008). It is possible that the motor problems associated with schizophrenia, 
like catatonia, play an important role in recognizing emotional body language and this may be 
an interesting question to explore in future studies. 
The second experiment focussed on multisensory integration of dynamic emotional body 
language on the one hand and both human and animal vocalizations on the other hand. The 
data show an increased integration of both modalities in the schizophrenic group, but only 
when the auditory information consists of human voices, suggesting that ecological validity 
plays a role in the deficient multisensory integration. We recently reported a reduced 
crossmodal bias effect of emotional faces on the recognition of the emotion in a vocal 
expression(de Jong et al., 2009). Both these data sets are compatible with an auditory 
dominance in the schizophrenia group when perceiving audiovisual stimuli of which both 
modalities have a high rate of co-occurrence in daily life. Compatible with this notion, a 
recent study showed that schizophrenia patients were less able than controls to benefit from 
visual speech information when recognizing degraded auditory speech(Ross et al., 2007). 
At the neuro-anatomical level, binding of emotional information in the face and voice has 
been associated with activity in the amygdala(Dolan, Morris, & de Gelder, 2001; Ethofer et 
al., 2006) and abnormal amygdala activity has been reported in schizophrenics in response to 
facial expressions (Gur et al., 2002; Michalopoulou et al., 2008; Phillips et al., 1999). It is 
therefore not unlikely that the anomalous multisensory integration may partly have its roots 
abnormal amygdalar activity. 
The importance of the amygdala as discussed in both experiments is not surprisingly 
considering its established involvement in emotion perception(Zald, 2003), but another 
important neuro-anatomical aspect relates to brain connectivity. A recent fMRI study reported 




anomalous connectivity between amygdala and frontal regions in a group of schizophrenia 
patients(Leitman et al., 2008). Abnormal amygdalar-frontal connectivity may either be cause 
or effect of dysfunctional amygdala and combining both findings provides a neuro-anatomical 
basis for both the emotion recognition deficit (Experiment 1) and the anomalous multisensory 
integration (Experiment 2). 
Interestingly, the patients show a general impairment in recognizing static emotional body 
expressions, whereas with the videos used here there is no significant group difference. 
Obviously, videos present the viewer with more information than still pictures and are 
therefore relatively easier to recognize. Next to the methodological differences, a possible 
explanation for this finding concerns the cognitive demands. Recognizing isolated static 
expressions requires the perceptual system to fill in spontaneously the missing information or 
requires the brain to engage in motor imagery in order to compensate for the lack of physical 
information in the stimulus, like direction of movement and speed of movement. Future 
research is needed to identify the specific processes that are impaired in schizophrenics, when 
recognizing affective stimuli, possibly related to ecological validity and motor symptoms.  
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The social brain hypothesis 
 
Social animals have developed a whole range of communicative abilities on which their well-
being and survival in a society hinges. Among the cognitive skills of social species is the 
ability to monitor each others’ behavior and to adapt continuously to the social signals of 
others, whether collaborative or competitive most pronounced (Darwin 1872). A longstanding 
assumption in the literature is that dedicated brain resources exist devoted to processing social 
signals, a ‘social brain’ for short, and that social skills resulted from brain evolution in a 
social context. Evidence to support this assumption is intended to apply across widely 
different social species (Preston & de Waal, 2002), all of which have to rely upon 
conspecifics in order to survive.  
 
The hypothesis of a social brain encompassing specialized skills for social perception and 
cognition has gained in popularity among neuroscientists over the last decade. Supportive 
findings are gathered from a wide spectrum of disciplines, ranging from behavioral 
observations to single cell recordings. Species with a similar social history can be expected to 
exhibit important similarities in the lay-out of a ‘social brain’. This assumption is the 
backbone of much neurobiological emotion research of the last two decades where results 
from animal research have inspired human studies (Adolphs, 2002; R.J. Dolan, 2002; Phelps 
& Ledoux, 2005).  
Traditionally the social brain hypothesis is tested in the visual modality as most of the primate 
cortex is dedicated to visual processing and it makes sense to assume that the visual system is 
particularly attuned to the perception of social cues. The visual objects to which the social 
brain is likely to be sensitive comprises facial expressions and whole body gestures, postures 
and movements. They all provide salient cues for adaptive behavior, as seen very clearly in 
displays of aggression which automatically function as a warning signal. 
 
The main topic of this thesis focuses on how our perception of whole body expressions is not 
solely shaped by the body itself, but also by contextual stimuli like auditory information and 
scenes. The subject of this thesis itself is somewhat illustrative for the evolution of the field of 




human affective neuroscience during the last decade. Until recently, the scientific knowledge 
of emotion perception was based almost exclusively on facial expression research. Moreover, 
the literature contained a significant bias since the bulk of the studies used the stimulus set 
developed by Ekman in the seventies (Ekman & Friesen, 1976). This thesis comprises a 
double shift from the isolated facial expression perception inheritance.  
 
Emotions are expressed in the whole body 
 
First, the spotlight on facial expressions zoomed out to shed light on whole body expressions. 
It is somewhat surprising that the detailed description of bodily expressions of many different 
emotions already by Darwin in the nineteenth century (1872), was not followed upon more 
systematically. With the exception of a few isolated reports (Argyle, 1988; Sprengelmeyer et 
al., 1999), the literature on how body expressions are processed has only taken off in the last 
decade.  One of the first basic research questions concerned whether observers can easily 
recognize different emotional states based on body expressions alone. The available data 
indicate that this is clearly the case (Van den Stock, Righart, & de Gelder, 2007). This is not 
surprisingly considering the high frequency of interactions with conspecifics. Repeated 
exposure to body language, be it emotional or neutral, leads to perceptual expertise and tuning 
of the visual system. A similar explanation has been proposed for perception of facial 
expressions (e.g. Gauthier, Skudlarski, Gore, & Anderson, 2000).  
When investigating emotional body language, comparing the results with what is known from 
facial expression research is almost inevitable, considering the many similarities between both 
stimulus categories. Bodies and faces both provide information on diverse dimensions like 
identity, emotion, gender, age… Behavioral, neuro-anatomical en neuro-temporal similarities 
between bodies and faces are reviewed in (B. de Gelder, 2006; B. de Gelder et al., 2009; 
Peelen & Downing, 2007). An interesting approach in comparing findings from face and body 
research might be to focus on the differences rather than on the similarities. At face value, at 
least two significant differences between faces and bodies pop out.  
 
faces convey information about identity 
 




First, faces provide significantly more information about identity compared to bodies. 
Headless bodies reveal little information about personal identity, whereas faces alone are 
sufficient for person identification. The fact that bodies contain little identity information is 
related to the fact that bodies are usually clothed. Clothing may conceal bodily features that 
are sufficient for identification. On the other hand, it has been shown that people can 
recognize friends by dynamic information provided by the body alone (Cutting & Kozlowski, 
1977), underscoring the importance of dynamic and personal identity information contained 
by body expressions.  
 
bodies convey information about actions 
 
Secondly, the emphasis on the function of facial expressions lies in communication of the 
emotional state of the producer, whereas whole body expressions also serve adaptive 
behavioral functions, like fight or flight. There is little discussion that the behavioral 
phenotype of facial expressions is associated with adaptive functions, but these lay primarily 
in the social domain, for example cooperative interaction signaling or infant-caregiver 
interaction facilitation (Schmidt & Cohn, 2001). Another important function of facial 
expressions is danger signaling, where gaze direction also communicates the location of the 
threat.  Traditionally, facial expression research did not target the adaptiveness or 
communicative value of facial expressions, but started from the putative universal 
categorization of facial expression classes: anger, disgust, fear, sad, surprise and happy. As 
stated above, applicable methodology consisted of presentation of isolated faces, whereas 
variability in behavioral phenotypes of a particular emotional face expression and its 
relevance to the underlying adaptive function is considered as noise. Little consideration has 
been applied to the notion that many different kinds of for example fear exist. It is easy to 
imagine that fear of the dark, stage fright, separation anxiety and fear from an armed robber 
are associated with different facial expressions and adaptive behavior, although all can be 
labeled as ‘fearful’. The adaptive behavior associated with the different events described 
above is more explicitly pronounced in the emotional expression conveyed by the whole 
body. Separation anxiety will result in approach behavior towards the object of affection, 
whereas confrontation with an armed robber will lead to avoidance tendencies. This means 
the communicative value of whole body expressions extends beyond the emotional state of 




the producer, but also includes information about the action tendencies of the producer. This 
is an important implication and exposes the direct link between emotion and action, a link that 
hidden in facial expressions. 
How actions are represented in the brain has been a hot topic on the scientific research 
agenda, following the discovery of the currently famous mirror neurons. Mirror neurons were 
discovered in the parietal and frontal cortex of monkeys in neurophysiological studies and 
these neurons fire both when a monkey performs an action (for example grasping an object) 
and when a monkey sees the action being performed. A review of the mirror neuron system 
can be found in (Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004). The focus on research on the mirror-neuron 
system has not been on its role in emotion perception, but it nevertheless brings forward 
interesting challenges. Specifically, the brain activation that has been repeatedly reported in 
human premotor cortex when observing emotional body language (B. de Gelder, Snyder, 
Greve, Gerard, & Hadjikhani, 2004; Grèzes, Pichon, & de Gelder, 2007; Pichon, de Gelder, & 
Grezes, 2008) puts forward the question whether this reflects mere imitational processes 
rather than emotional contagion or action potentiation. Evidence supporting the latter 
hypothesis is available from studies reporting more premotor activity for emotional than for 
neutral bodies (B. de Gelder, Snyder et al., 2004; Grèzes et al., 2007; Pichon et al., 2008). 
Other important advantages of studying whole body expressions in addition to facial 
expressions can be found in (B de Gelder, 2009). 
 
Emotional expressions are prone to contextual influences 
 
The second main turn from the isolated facial expression research concerns the investigation 
of the malleability of emotional expressions by contextual influences. While the emphasis 
used to lay on perception of isolated stimuli, stripped of any contextual information, the 
studies reported in this thesis focus on how our perception of well defined stimulus categories 
like bodily expressions are also shaped by simultaneously occurring visual and auditory 
information. This approach is more in line with our perceptions of everyday life which is 
dynamic and consists of a rich pallet of multimodal stimuli. Our research approach, moving 
beyond isolated stimulus categories therefore also reflects an increase in ecological validity. 
Our behavior and brains are tuned to perform optimally in our natural environment, and a 




better understanding of the working of the brain and the laws of behavior requires the use of 
scientific investigations that target the complexity of our perceptions and how its different 
‘ingredients’ mutually influence one another. 
 
time course of crosscategorical affective influence 
 
The empirical data reported here in chapters three to six clearly indicate reciprocal influence 
between perceiving bodily expressions and contextual stimuli like auditory expressions or 
background scenes. An important issue concerns when and where in the perceptual system 
this interaction occurs. The nature and time point of the affective crossmodal and 
crosscategorical influence can be situated on a continuum with on one extreme interaction in 
the earliest stages of perceptual processing and on the other end a very late interaction 
between stimulus categories, implying that both stimulus categories are first processed 
completely separately and only influence one another during later stages in the sensory 
processing stream. This latter time point is associated with more cognitive and conscious 
decisional effects, whereas the early integration assumes perceptual, automatic implicit 
effects. There is little need to provide evidence for later effects, since the occurrence of 
crossmodal influence in itself implies that they are situated in the time continuum and 
positioning near the late extreme is most parsimonious, whereas the argument for early 
integration needs to be empirically founded. The design of the audiovisual studies reported in 
chapters four to six followed that of previous studies (B. de Gelder & Vroomen, 2000; 
Meeren, van Heijnsbergen, & de Gelder, 2005) and does not allow solid conclusions about 
where on the continuum the crossmodal effects are situated. The use of experimental 
methodology with high temporal resolution like electro-encephalography or magneto-
encephalography are best suited to answer these questions. To date, no such studies have been 
carried out with bodily expressions, but findings from facial expression research point to early 
integration of faces and vocal expressions and scenes (B. de Gelder, Vroomen, & Pourtois, 
2004; Righart & de Gelder, 2006). 
Behavioral experimental techniques exploiting well-documented psychophysical phenomena 
like audiovisual recalibration aftereffects (e.g. Radeau & Bertelson, 1974) are also useful to 
investigate the nature of crossmodal bias effects. Audiovisual recalibration has mainly been 
studied with basic multimodal stimuli like light flashes and sound bursts. For example, 




participants are presented with light flashes and beeps that are temporally synchronized, but 
originating at discordant (incongruent) locations. When the participants are instructed to 
indicate the location of the auditory stimulus and to ignore the visual stimulus, their responses 
will be biased towards the location of the visual stimulus. This is known as the ventriloquist 
illusion (Bertelson, 1999) and this is an immediate effect of intermodal conflict situations. 
Next to immediate effects, aftereffects occur during unimodal presentation following repeated 
exposure to incongruent multimodal stimuli. For example, when subjects are exposed to the 
audiovisual stimuli described above and subsequently presented with an isolated sound burst 
(without the light flash), the reported location of the auditory stimulus will be biased towards 
the direction of the light flash, indicating recalibration of auditory localization system. Similar 
effects have been reported in the temporal domain, where the reported time point shifts 
towards the time point of the discordant light flash. The occurrence of this kind of after effects 
argues in favor of early perceptual effects since there is no simultaneous conflicting 
heteromodal stimulus present. Making use of this paradigm, one could investigate whether 
recalibration effects also occur in the affective domain. For example, does repeated exposure 
to an audiovisual neutral body with fearful vocal expression leads to increased ‘fearfulness’ of 
the neutral body? So far, no such studies in the affective body-voice domain have been carried 
out. Maybe the empirical data reported in chapters four to six provide an incentive for future 
studies addressing this issue. 
 
neuro-anatomy of crosscategorical influences 
 
Besides the time course of intercategorical stimulus integration, another issue concerns the 
location at the brain level where the reciprocal influence occurs. Again, we have to turn to 
data from facial expressions to infer hypothesis about whole body expressions. Evidence from 
multiple face-voice combination fMRI-studies point to involvement of the amygdala in 
multisensory affective integration (R. J. Dolan, Morris, & de Gelder, 2001; Ethofer et al., 
2006) and this finding is supported by anatomical data, showing multisensory projections to 
amygdala (McDonald, 1998). 
Next to the amygdala, recent findings have suggested a role of premotor structures in 
audiovisual perception. Bimodal mirror neurons have been described in monkey premotor 
cortex and they fire both when an action is seen or heard (Kohler et al., 2002). The evidence 




for the existence of a mirror neuron system in humans is until now indirect (Grèzes, Armony, 
Rowe, & Passingham, 2003), but recent data are compatible with an audiovisual mirror 
neuron system in human premotor cortex: the premotor cortex is more more activated by 
listening to piano excerpts that belong to the motor repertoire of the observer than excerpts for 
which the observer has no executionable skills (Lahav, Saltzman, & Schlaug, 2007). 
Thirdly, the role of the superior temporal sulcus (STS) in audiovisual perception as well as 
processing of biological motion is well established. Recent audiovisual face-voice emotion 
perception studies also found superadditive activation for audiovisual stimuli compared to the 
unimodal conditions in the superior temporal region (Robins, Hunyadi, & Schultz, 2009).  
Phylogenetically older brain structures, like the superior colliculus contains multimodal 
topographic maps of the environment in the visual, auditory and tactile domain. Its function is 
mostly associated with orienting of attention, but it also has a role in emotion processing 
(Morris, de Gelder, Weiskrantz, & Dolan, 2001; Panksepp, 1998). 
Finally, it has been shown that perception of multisensory events, particularly face-voice 
combinations also mediates activity in primary sensory areas (Ghazanfar, Maier, Hoffman, & 
Logothetis, 2005).  
It is clear from a first glance at the regions discussed above that crosscategorical stimulus 
influences are mediated through a complex network of brain structures with feedforward and 
feedback connections. A helpful approach to start to untangle the mechanisms of perception 
and emotional perception in particular may be the evolutionary perspective. The visual system 
evolved from the organism’s requirement to distinguish brightness from darkness, so its 
primary functions were quite primitive. In parallel with functional specialization at the central 
nervous systems, there has also been specialization at the ocular level, leading to 
differentiated sensitivity across the visual field. This is specialization has its correlates in the 
early projections from retinal ganglion cells to the evolutionary older brain structures of the 
visual system.  
The evolutionary approach is also particularly relevant regarding emotion, especially whole 
body expressions that provide a link with adaptive actions. It is therefore not surprisingly that 
Darwin himself investigated emotional expressions in man and animals (Darwin, 1872). The 
model displayed below aims to provide a coarse framework for crosscategorical modulation. 




Parvocellular ganglion cells with small receptive fields and sensitivity to color and form are 
primarily present in the foveal part of the retina, while magnocellular retinal ganglion cells 
with larger receptive fields and sensitivity to motion are more equally distributed across the 
retina. This division is reflected further in the visual processing stream by the tectopulvinar 
and geniculostriate pathway, where the latter is primarily involved in detailed from and color 
perception, and the former is more involved in motion perception and orienting. It is adaptive 
for the organism to be able to rapidly orient to moving and emotionally significant (and 
potentially threatening) stimuli in the foveal visual field but also and perhaps even more 
importantly in the periferral visual field. This function primarily relies on the tectopulvinar 
pathway and one of the functions of this processing stream lies in detection of emotional 
stimuli. The geniculostriate pathway is primarily involved in fine grained analysis of form, 
shape, colour and texture of stimuli in the central visual field. From the striate cortex, detailed 
processing of different object classes like faces, bodies or houses occurs in specialized areas 
of the ventral stream. Amygdalar projections to these occipitotemporal areas modulates the 
processing of emotional stimuli. 
The model outlined below is in principle applicable for perception in general. The emphasis 
here lies on the emotional information conveyed by stimulus categories. The primary question 
then is what constitutes ‘emotional’. There are legio definitions of emotion in the literature 
each emphasizing on or another aspect, like subjective feeling, action readiness or cognition. 
In line with the above reasoning, we would like to put the emphasis on the evolutionary aspect 
and define emotions as ‘acute mental and bodily states that facilitate adaptive reactions to 
present environmental events’.  
The term ‘acute’ is included to distinguish emotions from moods, which are associated with a 
more graduate build-up and longer duration. ‘Mental and bodily states’ refer to the subjective 
feelings that are part of emotions as well as to the associated behavioral patterns and actions 
expressed by the organism. The latter part of the definition, ‘present environmental events’, 
refers to the notion that emotions are reactions to very recent or ongoing events that occur in 
the direct surroundings of the organism. 
 
In conclusion, the findings discussed here point to reciprocal influences between the many 
ingredients making up the complex course of our everyday perceptions. Evolution has shaped 




our brain and behavior with ‘special’ sensitivity for perception of emotional expressions 
conveyed by faces, voices bodies and scenes. 
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